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MYERS S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

Political Asylum and Other Concerns: Some
Reflections on the World, Yesterday and
Today
LEONARD
I.

v.B.

SUTTON*

INTRODUCTION

Dean Beaney, Professor Nanda, other distinguished guests, students,
and friends. It is a distinct honor to give the fourteenth annual Myers S.
McDougal lecture at the University of Denver College of Law. Professor
McDougal's outstanding contributions to the teaching and study of international law are well known and too numerous to mention.' On a personal
note, I had the privilege long ago not only to meet Professor McDougal
but also to correspond with him about two individual chapters he and I
by Luis Kutner, entiwere furnishing for a book published in 1970, edited
2
tled The Human Right to Individual Freedom.
II.

PREFACE

We are living in a.very historic and challenging time in 1989 and
1990. Visualize 1917 when communism swept across Russia wiping out
the long-held laws, traditions, and customs of Imperial rule. The 1918
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk3 seemed to insure that the Russian Revolution
* Attorney, Denver, Colorado; Recipient of the Grand Order of Merit, Federal Republic
of Germany, 1935; Colorado College, B.A., 1937; Fellowship with the National Institute for
Public Affairs, 1937-38; University of Denver, J.D., 1941; Honorary L.LD from Colorado
College, University of Denver, and University of Colorado; Former Chair, Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United States; Former Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme
Court.
1. Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, in the tenth lecture in this series,
ably described some of Professor McDougal's work. See Falk, Accountability, Asylum, and
Sanctuary: Challenging Our Political and Legal Imagination, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
199 (1988).
2. See generally THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM- (L. Kutner ed. 1970).
3. See V. VALENTIN, THE GERMAN PEOPLE 567 (1946).
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would turn what has become the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics into
a difficult neighbor and state; one which would, and did, seek to impose
its imperialistic designs and international communism world-wide.
Now, almost seventy-three years later, we see the totalitarian society
envisioned by Marx and Engels, created by Lenin, and built into a reign
of terror by Stalin, changing drastically within. The communist system in
Russia has failed because it was not only economically unworkable but
also because of the denial of freedom and other basic human rights to its
citizens. The Gorbachev era of pragmatism, glasnost, and perstroika has
resulted in dramatic changes in both Russia and Eastern Europe. It may
also have helped to bring on, to some extent, the recent changes and
moves towards democratic societies in Nicaragua and South Africa, as
well as other political changes elsewhere in the world.
The failure of Russian Communism brings into focus the need for
states everywhere to begin anew the search to outlaw war and to make
the United Nations and its auxiliary organs (e.g., the International Court
of Justice) more effective and useful.
In spite of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the freedom granted Eastern Europe, there is one factor which may determine whether the world's
rapidly evolving political changes will result in greater cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and other states in matters of world-wide concern.
That factor is whether the Western World will allow President Gorbachev
to deal, in his own way, with the question of freedom for the Baltic Republics. I predict Gorbachev may find a practical solution if he is not
pushed too aggressively by the outside world. We should note that he has
apparently never said he will dismantle the U.S.S.R., agree to re-align the
German/Polish border, or grant complete independence to Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, or Azerbaijan. Obviously, if the Gorbachev government grants freedom to one of the above
areas, similar concessions may have to be granted to the others. We can
all foresee the severe and perhaps unacceptable consequences to the Russian Empire if this occurs.
Caution, which has been followed by the Bush Administration to
date, may be the only way to proceed in the areas of disarmament and
diplomacy. Success in these negotiations may eventually help to achieve
greater peace and observances of human rights.
We should remember that the United Nations, in June 1945, succeeded the League of Nations. On a personal note, I have been involved
in studying world organizations since 1933. In September 1935 1 was privileged to be sitting in the League of Nations press box at the Geneva
sessions as a student reporter. I was present the day sanctions were voted
against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia. 4 I witnessed Italy's Ambassador
walk out after the vote and only afterward fully realized its effect. In

4. This was approximately September 5, 1935.
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1945, while stationed in Oakland with the U.S. Army, I was privileged to
attend, as an observer, three important sessions of the founding of the
United Nations and to report on them to my General (over the years, I
have also attended several sessions of the U.N. in New York City).
Returning to the League of Nations, we should recall that before the
founding of the League in 1920, the world had previously had a Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"). It was created by the
Hague Conference of 1899, organized in 1900, and began operating in
1902. 5 The purpose of the court was to help states resolve primarily legal
and political disputes, and to serve the cause of world peace.
On May 17, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations, with the
powers conferred on it by statute, adopted a Resolution recreating the
above mentioned court. It also provided that non-member states could
utilize the court under certain conditions.' The Resolution was ratified
thereafter by a majority of the member states and became effective in
September 1921. This Court was available until 1946 when the Charter of
the United Nations created its own International Court of Justice
("ICJ").
The need for and effective use of the ICJ is more evident today than
in earlier times due to the present threat of nuclear disaster and the possibility of nuclear proliferation to small, hostile states. Additionally, the
evolution of a "one world" society makes the ICJ indispensable.
The development of international courts, over almost a century, reflects an attempt by the nations of the world to devise a workable system
to assist states in resolving disputes by using courts instead of war or
force.
Today, our planet has evolved into one world with mutual dependence among all states. Most industrialized states realize that their survival depends, now more than ever before, on global cooperation to solve
common problems. They finally agree that we must prevent world-wide
pollution and try even harder to solve the racial, ethnic, sexual, political,
health, and economic problems which infect so much of our world. We
need only to read the daily newspapers to personally witness these continuing tragedies all around us.7
From our vantage point we can see why states have created a system

5. G.
6. M.

ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL'COURT OF JUSTICE

15-18 (1971).

HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE QUESTION OF

(1925).
7. The frictions and problems of industrialized societies seem insignificant when compared to those in other countries. No one person, government, or organization, even the
United Nations, seems able to stop environmental pollution world-wide or stop deforestation. Nor do any such entities seem able to help stabilize or reduce the violence and in some
cases the oppression in areas such as the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Burma,
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Northern Ireland, Columbia, and Peru. Nor,
at least up to this time, has the Western world been able to encourage and help China,
North Korea, and Libya to evolve into more humane societies.
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION 364-65
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of diplomatic immunity and in some areas a recognized right of political
asylum. In the modern world, however, we apparently seldom, if ever, see
a legal "right" of sanctuary.
The processes of diplomatic immunity and political asylum for the
protection of individuals have remained even after development of the
PCIJ and the ICJ, which are for use only between states. The U.N. and
the Council of Europe with its headquarters in Strasbourg, have been instrumental in developing courts specifically designed to protect the individual.' These have been working fairly well to date.

III.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Very few of the wide ranging and difficult international problems facing humanity and its governments today can be discussed in a single lecture. One of particular interest to many lawyers and judges, however, is
how states function to meet the practical needs of their representatives
stationed abroad. The present solution to this problem is termed "diplomatic immunity."
This subject seems to be well understood in the international context.9 It ranks among one of the most well established principles of international law. In large measure its principles are now codified in conventional law.
The basic premise behind Diplomatic Immunity is that governments
have agreed to certain recognized rules and standards so that their representatives in foreign lands can function efficiently and not be interfered
with or arrested. 10 In today's world, it is generally recognized that if diplomats and their families commit felonies in the host country they may be
punished by the host's system of justice. Recent changes have occurred in
the U.S. to try to regulate, to some degree, misdemeanor offenses such as
parking tickets and uninsured motorist problems committed by foreign
diplomats and their families."
12
Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
declares that the premises of a diplomatic mission "shall be inviolable."
Similarly, article 29 pronounces the inviolability of a diplomatic agent.
More recently, the International Court of Justice unambiguously
stated, in a case involving the U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 13 that "there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct

8.
9.
chapter
10.

See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(7).
See II C. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 97 (1973). The
is entitled, "Immunities and Exceptions."
See also Falk, supra note 1, at 199-208.

11. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.

LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 946-47 (3d

ed. 1988).
12. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
13. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1979 I.C.J. 7.
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of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys
14
and embassies.
Over two hundred years ago, these principles were recognized in one
of the earliest cases in U.S. history. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
"[t]he person of a public minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers
any violence to him . . . is guilty of a crime against the whole world."15
The states of Latin America asserted at one time a regional custom under
which a right to grant asylum in the diplomatic premises would exist. The
existence of such a right was tested in the 1950 Asylum Case (Columbia
v. Peru).' 6 In this case the ICJ held that the Columbian government had
failed to prove the existence of such a regional custom of diplomatic asylum. In response to the Court's decision, a new convention on asylum was
adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954.11

IV.

POLITICAL ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

"Political Asylum" is defined as the granting of protection to a refugee from extradition by another state or states. Petition is made by the
refugee to the courts or executive branch of the receiving state for what
amounts to a form of sanctuary.
issue[d an] executive order
Most recently, President Bush "...
[promising] to guarantee that Chinese students who fear for their safety
if they return home may remain in the United States."' 8
On a personal note, in 1971 I was the Chief Counsel for a Cuban
refugee with an American residency green card who was detained in what
was then British Honduras. Guatemala was seeking to extradite him on a
trumped up bank fraud charge. I drafted a lengthy "Petition for Political
Asylum" soon after arriving in Belize. I filed it both with the Trial Court
there and with the then British Governor General's office. With the help
of local counsel, the courts, and my trips to the United Nations in New
York, the British Foreign Office in London, and other contacts, I was
eventually successful in obtaining my client's full release after a year of
incarceration in a Belize jail. He is now an American citizen and a very
successful Florida businessman.
Political asylum is used quite often in international law to protect
basic human rights and is a necessary part of international law in a turbulent world.
International terrorism - whether political, religious, or, at times,
state supported - is well known to all of us. It seems to be an endless
problem. We have the IRA in Northern Ireland, the now resolved U.S.

14. See id. at 19.
15. Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 116 (1784).
16. Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266.

17. See

IV M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

436 (1968).

18. Bush to Allow Chinese Sanctuary, Den. Post, Apr. 7, 1990, at 7A, col. 4.
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hostage crises in Tehran, the present hostages in Beirut, the Libyan 9 and
Iranian Governments' support of terrorist groups and the Columbian
drug dealers, among others.
The Western World seems to be a particular target of this malaise.
Each government must try to resolve the violence and problems which
affect it as best it can; however, several multilateral treaties and agreements have been executed between or among states to try to cope with
terrorism. It seems obvious that neither diplomatic immunity, political
asylum, nor any kind of protection should be granted to perpetrators and
their accomplices in this nefarious business.
When one thinks of what might be done to discourage international
terrorism and how the United States seeks foreign cooperation, two fairly
recent events come to mind. The first is the U.S. Congress' adoption of a
foreign criminal "long arm statute. ' 20 Using this statute, prosecutors can
seek extradition of persons charged with harming U.S. nationals outside
our borders, or of those who commit drug offenses contrary to our laws.
The well known murder case of an American by foreign terrorists on the
steamship Achille Lauro and the more recent fatal bombing of a Pan-Am
flight from Frankfurt to the United States are examples of situations in
which the new statute might be used.
Time will tell whether we are successful in attempting to extradite
some of those arrested in other countries for these and similar crimes.
One difficulty the United States faces in seeking extradition in such cases
is that we have both federal and state death penalty laws, which our system believes to be necessary. Conversely, countries such as Germany
(where an alleged illegal bomber was arrested) do not allow capital punishment. Courts in countries without a death penalty object to extraditions if the accused could suffer the death penalty.'
It should be pointed out that the U.S. has not always been entirely
circumspect about forcing foreign nationals (many of whom have never
been in the U.S.) to our shores and before our courts. Federal courts have
long condoned what they call "abductions" (but which to some others
appear to be out-right "kidnapping" punishable by our laws) to bring
such persons before our courts to be tried." The most recent example of
this type of operation is the abduction of Panamanian dictator Manuel
Noriega. s
The question naturally arises whether the United States or any coun-

19. See Goldberg, The Shoot-Out at the Libyan Self-Styled Peoples Bureau: A Case of
State Supported InternationalTerrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1984).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
21. Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See also Note,
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986: Faulty Drafting May
Defeat Efforts to Bring Terrorists to Justice, 21 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 127, 132 (1988).
22. People v. Pagan, 377 N.Y.S. 2d 420 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Rubin, Is Noriega Worth Subverting U.S. Law, Christ. Sci. Mon., Mar. 19,
1990, at 18, col. 1.
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try has or, should have, a legal right to unilaterally "abduct" foreigners
from other countries in order to bring them to "justice." I submit that no
government has an inherent right to kidnap people, and that other ways
should be devised to accomplish the desired end, (i.e., through multilateral and mutually beneficial treaties or agreements).
In the case of General Noriega, one newspaper reported that he was
charged with several criminal violations under our federal statutes.24
Since he is a Panamanian national and former Panamanian official, and
he was seized in Panama and forcibly brought to the United States, we
can assume these issues will be decided in the federal court in Florida
where he is to be tried. In view of prior federal court rulings, the predictable result of the abduction defense is foreseeable.
Referring for a moment to my earlier remarks on diplomatic immunity, it appears that the problem faced by the United States in obtaining
custody of Noriega in Panama has another interesting dimension. He
claims he chose not to surrender willingly during or after the U.S. military invasion of his country because there was no formal declaration of
war against Panama. It is interesting to note that one of Noriega's defenses is that he is a "prisoner of war." 25 This is because he was captured
as a result of the American military invasion. The U.S. invasion at the
time was criticized by an overwhelming majority of the U.N. General Assembly and objected to by Columbia and Peru as being in violation of the
O.A.S. Treaty prohibiting such action.2" The conduct of the United States
may be a substantive defense for Noriega since it apparently violated
both conventional and customary international law. It also demonstrates,
once again, that major powers, when it suits their objectives, may apply
the old adage that "might makes right." Another defense Noriega might
raise is whether the United States action against Panama was a violation
of the new United States-Panama Canal Treaty and the Charter of the

O.A.S.

27

24. See Noriega Expected in Court Today, Den. Post, Jan. 4, 1990, at 11A, col. 1.
These charges included accepting $46 million in bribes from drug traffickers; allowing Panama to be used as a drug relay station; using political power to protect drug traffickers;
laundering drug money in Panamanian banks; and three counts relating to marijuana.
25. Noriega's Surrender, Newsweek, Jan. 15, 1990, at 15.
26. See Nanda, The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990). The U.N. General Assembly is quoted as
stating, the invasion was "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states." U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240, 29 Dec. 1989. See
also N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at A9, col. 5.
27. Professor Ved Nanda, in his article, quotes the O.A.S. charter, article 18 which
reads:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic, and cultural elements.
Nanda, supra note 26, at 495.
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The undeclared invasion resulted in the reported deaths of 23 U.S.
military personnel and of an estimated 300 Panamanian civilians.2 8 As a
result, the U.S. government is faced with an estimated cost of hundreds
of millions of dollars, not only to repair the damage from the invasion but
to help the Panamanian economy back on its feet.2 9 The cost of repair is
due not only to the U.S. military invasion but also to a deteriorating
economy which is the result of our long-time trade embargo.
Even though there exists a "long enjoyed practice by states of humanitarian intervention or the protection of a state's nationals and sometimes others ....,"o it seems that the United States government's reliance on this principal is very weak. News accounts prior to the attack
reported that one U.S. national had been killed and that there was at
least one other violent episode involving an American citizen. Those
"provocations" (if these were sufficient) become de minimis in light of the
fact that the U.S. government had previously executed treaties stating
that it would not take any military action against Panama. It then becomes a question of degree as to how bad a situation would have to be
before the use of the humanitarian intervention doctrine becomes legal.
Even if the above doctrine applies in this situation (which I do not
believe it does), the question remains whether the invasion was legal
under the U.N. Charter, other treaties, and international law. An additional question exists regarding the position of a person such as Noriega
who properly seeks and obtains, in his own country, political asylum in a
third country's diplomatic embassy. Does an invading government (specifically the United States) have any legal right to act as the U.S. did to
force a wanted person to abandon his sanctuary? And, is forcing him out
of his sanctuary a rejection of the recognized law of political asylum?
In Panama, after Noriega fled for protection to the Embassy of the
Papal Nuncio, the United States military surrounded that embassy with a
fleet of armored vehicles, tanks, and armed soldiers, stopping, questioning, and apparently searching persons entering or leaving the embassy.
The U.S. Military also played blaring rock-and-roll music twenty-four
hours a day to try to break the refugee's resolve and sanity and to force
him to surrender. This conduct was well beyond the norms of present
recognized international law.
Article 20 states in pertinent part that the territory of a member state "may not be the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation" or any other use of force. Article 21 provides, "[t]he American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have
recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing
treaties or in fulfillment thereof."
28. A Standoff in Panama, NEWSWEEK,Jan. 8, 1990, at 28.
29. Panama Death Toll Eludes Officials, Den. Post, Jan. 10, 1990, at 4A, col. 1.
30. See McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 21 (1989). In this scholarly article, Professor Myers S. McDougal discussed humanitarian intervention. He also
thoroughly analyzed today's need for a community of international, governmental, and other
groups which would assist humanity to transcend national boundaries to make this a more
peaceful, humane, and workable world.
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By comparison, the actions of the communist government in Budapest in 1956 in the case of Cardinal Mindszenty were quite inapposite.
Mindszenty took refuge in the United States embassy to escape the wrath
of the communist government after the Soviet Union and some of its
Warsaw Pact allies invaded Hungary." Our government protected him
there for fifteen years until a negotiated release allowed him to fly safely
to freedom in Rome where he died four years later.3 2 I do not recall any
conduct on the part of the government of Hungary against Mindszenty or
our embassy in 1956 or later, comparable to our actions in 1990 against
the Papal Nuncio and his embassy in Panama.
A second case for comparison involved the Chinese government following the Chinese army's assault of June 1989 in Tiananmen Square. At
that time the prominent Chinese astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, who disapproved of the use of force by his government and favored a continued
loosening of political restrictions in China, fled with his wife to the
United States Embassy in Beijing for safety. 3 There was no direct harassment of these two refugees reported in news accounts, but there was at
least one incident when a few Chinese soldiers fired into a nearby nonembassy owned apartment building. Also, there were the "to be expected"
searches and restrictions at the embassy entrance gate. News reports up
to now, however, indicate that the Chinese government has not sought to
force the refugees out by any such extraordinary methods as those used
by the United States Government against General Noriega in Panama.
Each of us can draw our own conclusions as to the legality under international law, as well as the morality, of the comparisons recited above.
V.

SANCTUARY

Another concern of many people today is the purported right of sanctuary, usually meaning church or church related protection.
Sanctuary was an ancient right of protection against secular power. It
was given to certain individuals by some ancient cities and later by some
religious orders using their churches for that purpose.3 4 Today "sanctuary" is defined in Webster's New Universal Dictionary as:
1. A holding place; a building or place set aside for worship of a god or
gods; ....
2. A place of refuge or protection; originally fugitives from justice were
immune from arrest in churches or other sacred places.
3. Refuge or protection; immunity from punishment or the law, as by
taking refuge in a church, etc. 38
31. See Whitemen, supra note 17, at 463-64.
32. Noriega's Move Puzzle for Church, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 29, 1989, at 10, col. C.

33. Kyodo News Service, Jan. 2, 1990.
34. See Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (1986).

35.

WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

1603 (2d ed. 1979).
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Sanctuary continued and was recognized in some nations of the
Western world until the sixteenth century. 6 A period of steep decline began in England under King Henry VIII. 7 By 1624 the few remaining English general church sanctuaries were abolished. Canon law apparently
also abandoned its recognition of sanctuary long ago. In recent times
there has been no mention of sanctuary in the newly revised 1983 Code of
Canon Law. The Code dropped its previous statement that a "church enjoys the right of asylum so that weak criminals who flee to it are not to be
removed from it except in case of necessity, without the assent of the
ordinary or the rector of the church."3
One recent article points out that the right of sanctuary historically
only applied to various types of wrongdoers such as persons accused of
crimes or debtors. 9 Political refugees were not included. Also, persons in
England who were in a sanctuary could not stay permanently and were
soon forced out one way or another.
Apparently, all or most of the refugees coming to the United States
in recent years from El Salvador and Nicaragua have been fleeing from
either political unrest or war. Those from Guatemala and Haiti have been
fleeing from upheavals of one kind or another.40 Some allegedly have also
come seeking a better economic life.
When one measures their reasons for seeking sanctuary against the
qualifications for sanctuary before it was abolished in England centuries
ago, it is readily apparent that, then and now, they would not qualify
since they do not claim to be criminals or debtors.
Also, when one considers that political refugees were not specifically
included in the English sanctuary laws, it seems that even those who can
prove "persecution" or "a well-founded fear of persecution" should seek
relief in the courts or through the executive .branch for political asylum
and not under a church's claim of sanctuary.4
For various reasons most refugees seeking sanctuary in our country
have not succeeded. This is not surprising considering that they cannot
show a "clear probability of persecution" once they are returned. Our
courts have recognized that the ancient law of sanctuary does not exist in
the United States.
One authority concluded that leaders of the claim to sanctuary for
Central American refugees have admittedly promoted "a myth or fable"
in order to change the present foreign policy of the United Sates towards

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Carro, supra note 34, at 766.
Id.
Id. at 767.
See id.
U.S. Biased on Asylum Amnesty Group Claims, Den. Post, Mar. 29, 1990, at 6A,

col. 1.
41. See U.S. v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
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El Salvador and Nicaragua.' 2
In spite of the federal court rulings and the legal fact that the old
English laws of sanctuary were discarded long ago, it is reported that today about 400 churches and synagogues are attempting to grant sanctuary in the United States.' Their food, housing, and relief assistance to
refugees are commendable. Their attempts to protect refugee aliens from
being deported according to our laws, however, appear to be of doubtful
value in view of the federal government's constitutional and statutory
right to regulate and control aliens.
VI.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONNALLY

AMENDMENT

It is common knowledge that the International Court of Justice is an
arm of the United Nations." Over twenty years ago a debate ensued in
the United States Senate when the American Bar Association ("ABA")
and other organizations and groups sought to have the Connally Amendment repealed. This amendment was added by the Senate as a condition
of the U.S.'s acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. I was one of
those assisting the ABA in the endeavor to repeal the amendment.
The Connally Amendment is still relevant to discussions of the ICJ
because, even though it was repealed by the Senate, President Reagan
saw fit to re-institute it as an executive act. The President did not want
the U.S. to appear before the ICJ when Nicaragua sued the United States
for mining its harbors even though no state of official war existed between
the two countries.

Here is a brief history of what transpired with the amendment. The
first U.S. declaration of adherence stated:
This declaration shall not apply to .. .(b) Disputes with regard to

matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of
America."6

It was these underscored words which were stricken once the U.S. government later agreed to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
If the Connally Amendment were omitted,
the relevant parts of the
6
United States' declaration would read:'
42. Carro, supra note 34, at 769 (quoting the Chairperson of the Cincinnati Coalition
for Public Sanctuary).
43. Transcript of "The Today Show," Mar. 23, 1990, interview with a Catholic church
worker by Bryant Gumbel (available upon request from the National Broadcasting Company, New York).

44. See U.N.

CHARTER, art. 92.
45. DUKE LAW SCHOOL WORLD RULE OF LAW
ON THE WORLD COURT AND THE UNITED STATES

ANSWERS].

46. Id. at 5-6.

BOOKLzT

SERIES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

(emphasis added)[hereinafter

QUESTIONS AND
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A. The United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation;
Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months
after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.4
There are two main effects of the Connally Amendment. First, the
United States can prevent adjudication in any case brought against it
under this Declaration by stating that, in the opinion of the United
States, the matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. Second,
because of the principle of reciprocity, any other country can similarly
prevent adjudication in any case brought by the United States by stating
that, in that country's opinion, the matter is essentially within its domes8
tic jurisdiction.'
The difficulty with the first point is that it is not a complete answer
to what happens if a case is brought against the U.S., and our government
were to say that, in its opinion, the matter "is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction." Under well established principles of international
law, the ICJ is the authority which must determine jurisdictional facts,
not the United States Government. This is certainly true here since the
U.S. expressly gave up the right to self determination when the Connally
Amendment's wording was later stricken.
The ICJ itself held in the case of France v. Norway, that an instrument in which a party is entitled to determine the existence of its obligation is not a valid and enforceable instrument of which a court of law can
take cognizance.41
Arthur Larson, who compiled the Duke University pamphlet cited
above, lists numerous domestic issues involving the United States that
could have both a national and international effect, but which clearly
would remain solely under domestic jurisdiction.
After the filing of the suit against the U.S. by Nicaragua, the United

47. Declaration of the United States of America Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, in Conformity with art. 36, V L, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, August 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 61 Stat. 1218, 1 U.N.T.S. 9.
48. See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway) 1957 I.C.J. 9.
49. Id. at 48.

1991

POLITICAL ASYLUM AND OTHER CONCERNS

States announced, "it will not accept the forum's jurisdiction in Central
American disputes for two years."5 0 The reason given was that the United
States was financing and waging an undeclared war against Nicaragua
and also was financing and supplying the Contras when it mined Nicaragua's harbors to interfere with its shipping and movement of goods and
equipment.
As the lawsuit progressed, the U.S. Administration formulated a resolution that it, ".

.

. will formally cease to recognize the authority of the

World Court except in non-political cases . . . ."5 Washington officials
were also quoted as saying the U.S. would, "continue to deal with the
Court on 'mutually submitted' disputes involving legal or border
problems with other nations." 2
The United States did not defend itself in this suit, and consequently, the Court held that the U.S.'s activities constituted illegal intervention." The Court further ruled that the United States is under an
obligation to make reparations to Nicaragua for damages caused by U.S.

activities."
There were many organizations and people who objected to the
United States' position. For example, the Boston Bar Association passed
a resolution condemning our government for not
abiding by its agreement
55
to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

There are other fairly recent instances of the United States choosing
to act unilaterally and militarily against other countries, whenever the
administration in power deemed it to be in its best interests. The military
invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya are two examples. Each of

us can judge for ourselves what opinion the world will hold of us and our
government when it acts alone, as it did in Panama in December 1989. I
submit that one of the best courses to pursue for a more peaceful world,
obviously, is mutual cooperation of states to strengthen world organizations as much as possible, no matter how difficult the road may be. We, as
people who live in representative democracies, must acknowledge that it
is very difficult for our governments to try to reason and deal with the
Castros, the Khadafys, the Khomeinis, and other dictatorial governments
in order to solve world problems.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The challenges are vast indeed. Dramatic current political, social,
50. U.S. Rejects World Court in Latin Role, Den. Post, Apr. 9, 1984, at 1A, col. 3.
51. U.S. to Cease Recognizing Authority of World Court in Political Matters, Den.
Post, Oct. 7, 1985, at 8A, col. 1.
52. Id.
53. World Court Brands U.S. Contras' Support as Violation of Law, Den. Post, June
28, 1986, at 3A, col. 1.
54. Id.
55. See Resolution of the Boston Bar Association, Feb. 20, 1985.
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and territorial changes have been occurring almost daily since the Fall of
1989. Many of these changes demonstrate humanity's often thwarted but
constant search for political as well as economic freedom, justice, and
human dignity. Perhaps new governments - with the assistance of freed
citizens voting and working in harmony - can move our planet along the
road to a better world environment for humanity everywhere. We know
the road ahead is still fraught with pitfalls and dangers. Yet lawyers,
judges, public representatives, and government bureaucrats can do much
to alleviate injustice and to move the process along.
At this time, I suggest we need to continue to widen and more effectively work in several areas:
1. Diplomatic Immunity. This is one of the most important
fields of
cooperation and should be used continuously to help governments function better externally.
2. Political Sanctuary. This should be granted whenever possible to
relieve the suffering and distress of many politically threatened people.
3. Hostage Taking. This practice is reprehensible to all decent people. Many countries are actively participating in attempts to stop this
practice and to obtain the release of those now being held. These efforts
should be continued. The international legal cooperation which at times
leads to the extradition of terrorists, bombers, and drug growers and dealers should also continue.
4. Environmental and Other Concerns. Many states are joining in an
effort to protect our mutual environment and to place restrictions on the
uses and depletions that are destroying it. All governments should be
urged and enticed into joining in this necessary effort. All governments
should assist actively in human rights causes. We also see some international efforts to deter and prevent money laundering and to open secret
bank accounts.
5. Unrest and Violence. With the existence of widespread racial, ethnic, and religious violence and hatred, I suggest states should also more
actively support the United Nations Charter in trying to abolish violence
and war and to help the U.N. enforce the Charter's mandate that territory taken by force cannot be retained. I submit U.N. member states
should also consider a Charter amendment to assure a timetable that will
reasonably provide for the prompt return of territory conquered by an
invader, or taken from affected inhabitants of an area by a defending
state. In addition, lawyers on a personal basis should cooperate with nonmilitant religious leaders as well as fraternal and civic organizations on
ethical and public issues to help sustain the fabric of democracy
everywhere.
6. International Court of Justice. It seems appropriate for lawyers
and judges to urge, whenever ethically possible, that all United Nations
members must accept compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Further, ways
should be sought to obtain some limited power for that Court, in addition
to the force of public opinion, to enforce its judgments, decrees, and
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orders.
In summary, we should encourage lawyers and judges everywhere to
be leaders, as many are, in urging action in appropriate fields and in assisting their respective governments in solving public problems. In addition we should seek better usage of the ICJ. There is a real danger that if
we, who see the challenges our societies and the environment face in this
period of drastic change, do not grasp the nettle and try to see to it that
our societies and governments move ahead rapidly, humanity may lose its
current opportunity to make the world safe for democracy, as well as to
maintain this as a liveable place for humanity.
In 1968, Denna Frank Fleming, who was then Emeritus Professor of
International Relations at Vanderbilt University, recited some pertinent
thoughts and made some predictions which seem even more timely
today.56
He first quoted President Woodrow Wilson's speech in St. Louis regarding what Wilson called the "betrayal" of our government when the
Senate failed to ratify the League of Nations Treaty following World War
I.
Wilson said he felt as if he now should have, "... the boys, who went
across the water to fight. . ." called together and tell them what he
had said before they went, that World War I was a "war against wars"
and he had done his best to fulfill that promise. But now he had failed
and because of that failure, "there will come some time ... another
struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America
will have to die but as many millions as are necessary to accomplish
the final freedom of the peoples of the world." 67
Wilson was certainly prophetic as to another major war coming,
namely World War II. Fortunately, he was not correct as to the number
of American lives lost in that war, for it was not in the millions. He was
accurate, however, in predicting that millions of lives would be lost when
one thinks of the 60 to 70 million in all who died as a result of that terrible war. Professor Fleming went on to point out that "our people knew in
1918 and 1919 what should be done, but not enough of them insisted on
its being done. ' 58 This was after the United States Senate refused to ratify the League Treaty. He also stated that, "[w]e do not know what the
full outlines of the coming world order will be, but we know that it must
come, since life is no longer tolerable without it .... If this war has done
nothing else it has shattered the myth of national sovereignty. 59 He further stated:
"In these deadly years the alert citizens of every nation have discovered that the nation is not enough, that to live tolerably they must

56.
57.
58.
59.

SEE

D.

FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT,

Id. at 161.
Id. at 185.
Id.

1920-1966 (1968).
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have something more - a higher level of protection, to which they
must yield a fraction of their sovereignty in order to keep the bulk of
it, the precious essentials of ordinary self-government. Thus the
United Nations is not something imposed on us, but something we
seek and are glad to give loyalty to, a loyalty which will deepen and
dignify our national patriotism, such as the latter makes fruitful and
productive our local patriotism. We add a level of government to preserve all the others, not to weaken or destroy them."'
Further, he observed that "[n]o voice is raised against the Permanent
Court of International Justice." He quotes from Attorney General Homer
H. Cummings saying in 1934 that ".

..

in the fullness of time the World

Court is destined to become the most useful, the most majestic tribunal
in all the history of the human race .... A strong, working organization

of the nations can be postponed again until after a Third World War - if
there is then anything left to organize." '
All knowledgeable people everywhere surely realize how prophetic
the last statement is when they stop to think what would happen in the
event of a nuclear holocaust. They should also agree that it is up to them
to see to it that it does not happen.

60. Id. at 186.
61. Id. at 186-87.
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Volume 19, issue 3 of the Denver Journal of InternationalLaw and
Policy includes two articles on the topic of International Transportation
Law. The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy in conjunction with the TransportationLaw Journal solicited various articles from
international legal scholars and practitioners for our joint symposium issue. We have selected these two articles for publication because they represent both the public and private sides of International Transportation
Law.
The article written by Werner Ebke and George Wenglorz provides
an in depth look at the European Community's liberalization of air transportation. In stark contrast, Dean Alexander has written a timely piece
on maritime terrorism and the possible civil remedies which may be
sought by individuals against the terrorists and the maritime carriers.
These articles serve to remind us of the importance of global transport and the legal issues involved, now and into the future.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the founding years of the European Community,' the law and
policy of air transport was largely ignored.2 It was not until the end of the
1970's that the First Memorandum of the EC Commission on Air Trans* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Business and Tax Law Chair, University of
Konstanz School of Law. Referendar (J.D.) 1977; Doktor der Rechte (S.J.D.) 1981, University of Mlnster School of Law; LL.M. 1978, University of California at Berkeley School of
Law. Member, New York Bar. Associate Editor-in-Chief, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
Coeditor-in-Chief, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT.
** Referendar (J.D.) 1989, University of Bonn School of Law. S.J.D. Candidate, University of Konstanz School of Law.
1. Although the European Community ("EC" or "Community") is often thought of as a
single entity, there are three legally independent Communities: the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC"), the European Economic Community ("EEC"), and the European
Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). See Treaty Instituting the European Coal and
Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957); Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958)[hereinafter EEC Treaty or
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167 (1958). The Merger Treaty of 1965 did not merge the three Communities as
such; rather, the Treaty instituted a single Commission ("EC Commission" or "Commission") to replace the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and the
Commissions of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
Community. The Merger Treaty also established a single Council ("Council of Ministers" or
"Council") to replace the separate councils of the three Communities. See Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 4
I.L.M. 776 (1965). For a general discussion of EC institutions, see T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8-87 (2d ed. 1988).

2. For a detailed explanation of the reasons, see J. BASEDOW, WETrEEWERB Aur DEN
VERKEHRSMXRKTEN 157-63 (1989).
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port brought about a change to this situation.3 This memorandum was
the catalyst for the dialogue between the EC Commission, the EC Council, the European Parliament, and the Member States concerning the future development of civil aviation within the Community and beyond.
The efforts were reinforced by the publication of the Second Memoran4
dum of the EC Commission in 1984.
As a result of two decisions rendered by the European Court of Justice in 19855 and 19866 and the impetus provided by the Single European
Act,7 there has been a considerable increase in legislative activity concerning air transport during the last few years.8 The Commission has
proved itself in this respect, to be a major force behind the liberalization
movement. The Council of Ministers only recently came to a decision

3. See AIR TRANSPORT: A COMMUNVrY APPROACH (Memorandum of the Commission),
COM(79) 311 final (July 4, 1979), reprinted in BULL. EuR. COMM. Supp. 5/79 [hereinafter
First Memorandum].
4. See CIVIL AVIATION MEMORANDUM No. 2 - PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMUNITY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY, Mar. 15, 1984, COM(84) 72 final, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 182) 1 (July 9, 1984) [hereinafter Second Memorandum].
5. European Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, [1985] Sammlung der Rechtsprechung
des Gerichtshofes (European Court of Justice Reports) [hereinafter Slg.] 1513.
6. Ministhre Public v. Asjes et al., Cases 209-213/84, [1986] Slg. 1425 [hereinafter
Nouvelles Frontirescase].
7. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (June 29,
1987) (effective July 1, 1987) [hereinafter SEA]. See also the Decision adopted by the Foreign Ministers on the Occasion of the Signing of the Single European Act, containing a
series of implementing details, 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. 1986/2, at 115-16.
8. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the
procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1 (Dec. 31, 1987); Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application of article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain
categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 374) 9 (Dec. 31, 1987); Council Directive 87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on
fares for scheduled air services between Member States, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L374) 12
(Dec. 31, 1987); Council Decision 87/602/EEC of 14 December 1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between Member States and
on access for air carriers to scheduled air-service routes between Member States, 30 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 19 (Dec. 31, 1987). See also Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
2671/88 of 26 July 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices concerning joint planning and coordination of capacity, sharing of revenue,
and consultations on tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports, 31 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 239) 9 (Aug. 30, 1988); Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2672/88 of 26
July 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements between undertakings relating to computer reservation systems for air transport services, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 239) 13 (Aug. 30, 1988); Commission Regulation (EEC)
No. 2673/88 of 26 July 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain
categories of agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings
and concerted practices concerning ground handling services, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
239) 17 (Aug. 30, 1988). For a discussion of these Regulations, see Banowsky, Cutting Drag
and Increasing Lift: How Well Will a More Competitive EEC Air Transport Industry Fly?,
24 INT'L LAW. 179 (1990); Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of
EEC Air Transport, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 615 (1988).
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concerning the important question of the Second Phase of the liberalization of scheduled air transport.' The pertinent regulations became effective on November 1, 1990, and they represent a major step towards entry
into the Single European Market on January 1, 1993. The purpose of this
article is to present and critically evaluate the current state of scheduled
air transport deregulation within the EC. The analysis will focus primarily upon the legislative measures promulgated by the Council of Ministers
concerning the Second Phase of air transport liberalization which were
published in August 1990.
In order to evaluate the regulations enacted by the Council, it is necessary to throw some light on the general legal framework of international
air transport. The article will then take a closer look at the pertinent provisions of the EEC Treaty. Finally, the historical process of the liberalization of air transport within the EC and the prospects for air transport
deregulation will be analyzed.

II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD AIR TRANSPORTATION

The present world air transport system is based upon the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the Chicago
Convention."0
A.

The Chicago Convention

The Chicago Convention was negotiated by 52 nations in 1944,
shortly before the end of World War II when it became apparent that a
new legal framework for world air transport would be necessary." The
Chicago Convention went into effect on April 4, 1947.12 One of the basic
principles of the Convention is that of national air sovereignty. According
to this principle, every nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory."s As a result, every nation has the

9. The "Second Phase" of the liberalization of scheduled air transport consists of the
following three Regulations: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares
for scheduled air services, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 217) 1 (Aug. 11, 1990); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2343/90 of 24 July 1990 on access for air carriers to intracommunity scheduled air-service routes and on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on
scheduled air services between Member States, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 217) 8 (Aug. 11,
1990); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2344/90 of 24 July 1990 amending Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 3976/87 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of
agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
217) 15 (Aug. 11, 1990).
10. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948) [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
11. See A. KARK, DIE LIBERALISIERUNG DER EUROPXISCHEN ZIVILLUFTFAHRT UND DAS
WETTBEWERB SRECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 73 (1989).
12. See Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 91. For a list of countries that have
signed the Chicago Convention, see S. ROSENFIELD, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AVIATION, Booklet 5, 52-54 (1984).
13. See Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
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right to decide upon the distribution of air transport rights to and from
its territory on a case by case basis.
Initially, the parties to the Chicago Convention intended to establish
a multilateral system of transport rights. Due to the uncompromising positions of the United States which took a very liberal view, and the
United Kingdom which followed a protectionist approach, a comprehensive agreement could not be reached.14 Agreement was only reached with
respect to two of the eight "Freedoms of the Air.""u The two freedoms
agreed upon are commonly known as the "technical freedoms." The failure to achieve an all-encompassing multilateral agreement concerning air
transport rights at the Chicago conference led, in the following years, to
the system of bilateral agreements that still forms the legal basis of the
current international air transport system.
B.

Bilateral Agreements

Over the years, a tight international network of bilateral air transport
agreements concerning scheduled air services has developed between almost all countries of the world." The agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom that was negotiated in Bermuda in early
1946 ("Bermuda I Agreement"), served as a model for the majority of
such bilateral agreements. 7 The bilateral air transport agreements of the
Federal Republic of Germany were, and still are, based upon the German

14. For details, see A. KARK, supra note 11, at 73-75; M. DAUTZENBERG, DER BRITISCH/
AMERIKANISCHE KARTELL-RECHTSSTREIT UM DIE IATA-FLUGTARIFE AUS DEM BLICKWINKEL DES
PROTECTION OF TRADING INTERESTS ACT 70-72 (1987).

15. The First through the Fifth Freedoms are defined in article 1(1) of the International Air Transport Agreement, an appendix to the Chicago Convention, supra at 10. The
Sixth through the Eighth Freedoms are combinations of the Third through the Fifth Freedoms. For a detailed discussion of the First through the Eighth Freedoms, see S. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, Booklet 3, at 3-6. The First through Fifth Freedoms of the Air read as
follows:
First Freedom: The right to fly across the territory of a foreign country without
landing.
Second Freedom: The right to land for non-commercial purposes (technical operations relating to the aircraft, the crew, refueling, etc.) in the territory of a
foreign country.
Third Freedom: The right to fly from the country of registration to another
country and put down, in the territory of the other country, passengers,
freight, or mail taken aboard in the country of registration.
Fourth Freedom: The right to fly from a foreign country with passengers,
cargo, or mail loaded in that foreign country, to the country of its registration.
Fifth Freedom: The right to transport passengers, mail, or cargo between another contracting state and a third country.
16. There are approximately 2,500 bilateral air transport agreements today. See also L.
WEBER, DIE ZIVILLUFTFAHRT IM EUROPXISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT 47 (1981).
17. See Bermuda Agreement, 60 Stat. 1499, 3 U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Bermuda I].
The Bermuda I Agreement of 1946 was replaced, in 1977, by another bilateral agreement
between the United States and the United Kingdom ("Bermuda II"). See 1 AIR LAW, ch. IV,
at 30 (C. Shawcross & M. Beaumont eds., 4th ed. 1990).
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Model Draft of a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, which in turn is
based upon the Bermuda I Agreement." s Almost all of the agreements
based upon the Bermuda I Agreement contain the following provisions:
1. The distribution of air transport rights with respect to the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Freedoms. 1" In some bilateral agreements, the Fifth Freedom is also granted;20
2. The determination of particular flight routes;"'
trans3. The number of air carriers permitted to make use of the
22
port rights mentioned above (single or multiple designation);
4. Determination of capacity (size of aircraft and frequency of

service) ;13
5. The tariff
approval process, usually including a double ap24
proval clause.
Bilateral air transport agreements based upon such provisions thus
regulate market access, the number and scope of air transport rights, capacity, and tariffs. Almost all bilateral agreements considerably restricted
competition between airlines well into the 1980's, and some of them continue to do so to this day.25 Specifically, a number of significant aspects of
market structure were excluded from the forces of competition. This is
also true with respect to most bilateral air transport agreements between
Member States of the EC.
C.

Tariff Agreements

The network of bilateral air transport agreements has been supplemented by tariff agreements between airlines. These tariff agreements
were, and still are, negotiated within the International Air Transport Association ("IATA"). 2' As a general rule, tariffs are set at IATA conferences and then approved by national governments 2 7 Such tariff agreements are reinforced by both EC law and the laws of EC. Member States.
1. EC Law
Under article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty, tariff agreements may be ex-

18. See German Model Draft of a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, reprinted in D.
KLOSTER-HARZ,

DIE LUFTVERKEHRSABKOMMEN

DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Appendix

I (1976) [hereinafter Model Agreement].
19. Id. art. 2(1)(c).

20. Id. art. 8(3).
21. Id. art. 2(2).
22. Id. art. 3(1).
23. Id. art. 8(4).
24. Id. art. 10(1).

25. See A. KARK, supra note 11, at 77-78.
26. For a general discussion of the functions of IATA, see W. SCHWENK, HANDBUCH
LUFTVERKEHRSRECHTS 327-332 (1981); J. BRANCKER, IATA AND WHAT IT DoEs (1977).
27. See generally Bermuda I, supra note 17, Annex II h.
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empt from European antitrust laws.2" Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty has
been implemented by two EC Regulations.2" Under these Regulations,
tariff "consultations" between airlines are permitted to the extent that
the various conditions of article 4 of Commission Regulation 2671/88 are
met.30 Most importantly, article 4(1)(e) of this Regulation requires that
28. See EEC Treaty, supra at 1, art. 85(3) reads as follows:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member states
and which have as their object or effect the prevention restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
(a) any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
(b) any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
(c) any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerted restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
29. See Council Regulation 3976/87 and Commission Regulation 2671/88, supra at 8.
30. See Commission Regulation 2761/88, supra note 8, art. 4 that reads, in its pertinent
part, as follows:
1. The exemption concerning the holding of consultations on tariffs shall apply
only if:
(a) the consultations are solely intended to prepare jointly tariff proposals
covering scheduled air fares to be paid by members of the public directly to a
participating air carrier or to its authorized agents for carriage as passengers
with their accompanying baggage on a scheduled service and the conditions
under which those fares apply, in application of Article 4 of Directive 87/601/
EEC;
(b) the consultations only concern tariffs subject to approval by the aeronautical authorities of the Member States concerned, and do not extend to the
capacity for which such tariffs are to be available;
(c) the tariffs which are subject [sic] of the consultations are applied by
participating air carriers without discrimination on grounds of passengers' na-
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tariff proposals resulting from such "consultations" not be binding.31
Until 1978, IATA member airlines were legally bound to participate
in IATA tariff coordination conferences and to adopt tariffs that were
negotiated at such conferences."2 As a result of the 1978 "show cause order""3 of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") of the United States, the
IATA regulations were changed. Beginning in 1979, member airlines were
no longer required to participate in, nor to adopt tariffs agreed upon by,
the IATA conferences. Because of the non-binding tariff setting process
within IATA, the participation of European carriers is consistent with the
4
two Regulations aforementioned.
2.

German Law

Until December 31, 1989, tariff agreements among airlines were also
exempt from Germany's antitrust laws. According to German law,"9 the
Antitrust Statute did not apply to contracts of companies dealing with
the transportation of persons or goods, if the tariffs for the transport services had to be approved by a state agency." Under German law, 7 airline
tariffs must be approved by the Federal Department of Transportation
5 Consequently, tariffs
(Bundesverkehrsministerium).
agreed upon at
IATA conferences were exempt as a matter of law.
Effective January 1, 1990, however, this policy changed. Under the
new law, 9 contracts of airlines concerning interstate transportation
0
within the EC are no longer subject to Germany's Antitrust Statute.'

tionality or place of residence within the Community;
(d) participation in the consultations is voluntary and open to any air carrier who operates or has applied to operate on the route concerned;
(e) any draft tariff proposals which may result from the consultations are
not binding on participants, that is to say, following the consultations the participants retain the rights to act independently, both in putting forward tariff
proposals for approval independently of the other participants and in freely
applying such tariffs after they have been approved;
(f) the consultations do not entail agreements on agents' remuneration or
other elements of the tariffs discussed;
(g) in respect of each tariff which was the subject of the consultations,
each participant informs the Commission without delay of its submission to
the aeronautical authorities of the Member States concerned.
31. See Id. art. 4(1)(e).
32. See M. DAUTZENRERG, supra note 14, at 80.

33. For details of the "show cause order," see P.

BARLOW, AVIATION ANTITRUST

21-23

(1988).
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. See Antitrust Statute [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen], Sept. 24, 1980,
1980 Bundesgesetzblatt!r[German Official Gazette) 1 1761 [hereinafter "BGBI"].
36. See id. art. 99(1).
37. See Air Transport Statute [Luftverkehrsgesetz], Jan. 14, 1981, 1981 BGBI. I 61.
38. See id. art. 21(1).
39. See Antitrust Statute, Dec. 22, 1989, 1989 BGBI. I 2486 [hereinafter 1989 Antitrust
Statute].
40. See id. art. 99(1), No. 1.
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The German legislature has thereby taken account of the fact that EC
law takes priority over the laws of the Member States when air transportation involving at least two Member States is concerned. How the new
law will affect air transport services rendered solely within Germany remains to be seen.
3.

Implementation of IATA Tariff Consultations

In order for a tariff that has been negotiated by participating airlines
at an IATA conference to become effective in a given country, it is necessary that the tariff proposal be approved by the government of that country."1 In the past, such proposals have almost always been approved.4 2
Accordingly, IATA airlines may in fact be viewed as a price cartel. 43
D.

Pooling Agreements

Bilateral air transport agreements are typically supplemented not
only by tariff agreements but also by pooling agreements. Such agreements concern the financial or organizational cooperation of two or more
airlines. Pooling agreements may contain a multitude of regulations.44
Very often they deal with the distribution of earnings from a particular
flight route serviced by two or more airlines. 45 In pooling agreements, airlines occasionally agree to restrict the number of flights on a particular
route and to regulate the joint use of airport services.4 Pooling agreements, along with tariff agreements and bilateral agreements, have been
the foundations upon which an almost completely regulated market has
been built.
E.

Liberalization Tendencies in Europe

In the last ten years, there has been a tendency towards more liberal
bilateral air transport agreements. In particular, since the 1980's, the
British Government has negotiated procompetitive bilateral air transport
agreements with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Federal
Republic of Germany. These bilateral agreements were modeled after the
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Luxembourg of March
1985.47 The Air Route Agreement provides for a dismantling of market

41. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 4(1). See also Luftverkehrsgesetz, supra note 37, art. 21(1).

42. A. KARK, supra note 11, at 86.
43. Accord J. BASEDOW, supra note 2, at 26. See also D. KASPER, DEREGULATION AND
GLOBALIZATION 49 (1988); G. KNIEPS, DEREGULIERUNG IM LUFTVERKEHR 52 (1987).
44. L. WEBER, supra note 16, at 51-52.
45. See DEREGULATION AND AIRLINE COMPETITION 33-34 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ed. 1988).
46. W. SCHWENK, supra note 26, at 205.
47. See Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Luxembourg to liberalize route access, capacity and tariff approvals, Mar. 21, 1985
[hereinafter Air Route Agreement].
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access and capacity restrictions, as well as introducing the double disapproval procedure for tariffs. According to the double disapproval principle, a tariff proposed by an airline becomes effective unless the governments of both countries voice their disapproval within an agreed period of
time. Each of the agreements between the United Kingdom and the
aforementioned countries contain similar provisions.4"
While such bilateral agreements may be likely to further the liberalization process within the EC, they are unlikely to accomplish a complete
liberalization of air transport, as not all Member States are prepared to
agree to similar, let alone even more liberal measures."9 If the Single European Market is to become reality, a comprehensive air transport law
applicable to all EC Member States is an absolute requirement. 50 The
regulations of the Council of Ministers that went into force on November
5
1, 1990, are an important step towards this goal.
III.

THE

EEC

TREATY AND EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT POLICY

The EEC Treaty lays the foundations for a European air transport
policy. According to the EEC Treaty, the establishment of a common
market is the Community's primary goal. 5' The introduction of a common
transport policy is expressly stated in the Treaty as one of the means of
establishing a common market.5 3 In view of the important role that transport services play in the process of integration of the economies of EC
Member States, the EEC Treaty contains special provisions dealing with
transportation. 4 Of these provisions, only one directly addresses air
48. For details of the various agreements, see A. KARK, supra note 11, at 95-98.
49. Accord A. KARK, supra note 11, at 98.
50. It should be noted that the EC air transport laws enacted in recent years (supra at
8) do not displace the bilateral agreements presently in force between EC Member States.
The EC laws do, however, limit the sovereignty of the Member States where such bilateral
agreements are inconsistent with EC laws.
51. For details of the new regulations, see infra notes 181 through 253 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the EC Commission's proposals on which the new regulations
are

based,

see

Ebke

&

Wenglorz,

Die

zweite

Stufe

der

Liberalisierung des

Linienluftverkehrs in der EG: Open Skies in Europa?, 36 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN

WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 468, 475-77 (1990).
52. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2. Article 2 reads as follows:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it.
53. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(e). Article 3, in its pertinent part, reads as
follows:
3. For the purposes set out in art. 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set
out therein:. ...
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport.
54. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 74-84.
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transport;"' the other provisions apply to road transport, railways, and
inland waterways. Article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty grants the EC Council
of Ministers the power to decide "whether, to what extent and by what
procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport." 56 It was not until 1983 that the Council acted pursuant to the powers granted by article 84(2). This is due to the fact that individual Member States' views with respect to both the function of civil aviation and its
implications for the European transport policy differed significantly, and
still do today. 7
A.

The French Seamen's Case

EC Member States and the EC Commission have long disagreed on
whether or not the general provisions of the EEC Treaty, including the
antitrust provisions of the Treaty, apply to air transport. The Commission has always taken the position that the Treaty's general provisions
are applicable to air transport, even though the Treaty leaves the shaping
of specific air transport rules and policies to the Council.5 8 France, on the
other hand, was of the opinion that the general provisions of the EEC
Treaty did not apply to air transport.6 9 The French government argued
that under article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty, air transport, like sea transport, is regulated exclusively by the Council of Ministers." Prior to 1983,
the Council had not, however, taken any action with regard to air
transport.
In 1974, the European Court of Justice had an opportunity, in the
French Seamen's case, to address the related issue of whether the general
provisions of the EEC Treaty apply to sea transport.6 The case arose in
connection with a French law requiring that "leading" positions aboard
French ships be given to French citizens only. The EC Commission was of
the opinion that the French law violated the EEC Treaty. Specifically,
the Commission argued that the French law was contrary to the Treaty's
general provisions on the free movement of labor.2 In its decision the
55. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), which in 1974 read as follows:
2. The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air
'transport.
Due to the Single European Act (see supra at 7) art. 84(2) was changed in 1987. It now
reads:
2. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, decide whether, to what
extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea
and air transport.
56. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2).
57. For a detailed exposition of the reasons for the different views of the Member
States, see L. WEBER, supra note 16, at 88-89.
58. Id. at 97-98.
59. Id. at 98.
60. Id.
61. Commission v. France, Case 167/73, [1974] Slg. 359.
62. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48-51.
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European Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's view that the general provisions of the EEC Treaty apply to all transport services, including sea transport. The Court held that while they are not subject to the
specific provisions of the EEC Treaty concerning transport services," air
and sea transport services, like other transport services (i.e., road transport, railways, inland waterways), are subject to the general provisions of
the EEC Treaty. 4 Although it did not concern air transport, the Court's
decision provided an important signal for the integration of air transport
65
within the Community.
B.

Aftermath

Unfortunately, in the years following the Court's decision in the
French Seamen's case,6 6 the Council used its powers under article 84(2)
of the EEC Treaty with a great deal of reluctance. Many of the proposals
of the EC Commission concerning the establishment of a competitive air
transport system amounted to nothing, or were postponed from one
Council meeting to the next.17 The goal of a common air transport policy
was not realized due to a lack of political will on the part of a majority of
Member States. According to one commentator, air transport policy developed into "a dark chapter in the history of European integration.""8
The European Parliament seemed to have agreed with this view. In
1983, the Parliament took the unusual step of taking the Council to court,
under article 175 of the EEC Treaty, 9 for its inactivity in the entire area
of transport policy. The Parliament argued that the Council had failed to
introduce a common transport policy, or to provide a binding framework
for such a policy, and that the Council had thereby violated the EEC

63. Id. arts. 74-83.
64. See Commission, [1974] Slg. at 371.
65. See L. WEBER, supra note 16, at 89.
66. Commission, (1974] Slg. at 359.
67. Basedow, Der europkische Verkehrsmarkt als Rechtsproblem, 12 TRANSPORTRECHT
402, 403 (1989).
68. Schr~tter, Europ~iische Verkehrspolitik auf dem Prafstand - Das Unttltigkeitsurteil des EuGH vom 22. Mai 1985 aus integrations-und verkehrspolitischer Sicht, in 2
AKTUELLE RECHTSFRAGEN -

MISCELLANIA

70-72 (I. Seidl-Hohenveldern ed. 1987).

69. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 175 which reads as follows:
Should the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail
to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community may
bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement
established.
The action shall be admissible only if the institution concerned has first
been called upon to act. If, within two months of being so called upon, the
institution concerned has not defined its position, the action may be brought
within a further period of two months.
Any natural or legal person may, under the condition laid down in the
preceding paragraphs, complain to the Court of Justice that an institution of
the Community has failed to address to that person any act other than a recommendation or an opinion.
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Treaty.7 0
C.

Transport Policy Decision

In 1985, the European Court of Justice held partly in favor of the
European Parliament. 7' The Court opined that the EEC Treaty's provisions that generally required a common transport policy within the Community, were not sufficiently concrete to be actionable.7 2 The Court determined that articles 75(1)(a) and (b) of the EEC Treaty were adequately
clear to require the Council of Ministers to take appropriate actions to
implement a policy of intra-community transportation and to regulate
cabotage rights. 73 According to the Court, the failure of the Council to act
in accordance with articles 75(1)(a) and (b) of the EEC Treaty constituted an inactivity amounting to a violation of the Treaty. 74 The Court
set no deadline by which time the Council had to meet its obligations
the Council a "reasonable
under these articles; rather, the Court granted
75
period of time" to take appropriate actions.
At first glance, the Court's decision may appear to be of relatively
little importance inasmuch as it only reiterated the principle of freedom
of trade in services provided for in the EEC Treaty. The decision had,
however, far-reaching political implications. Only a few months after the
Court's decision, the Council of Ministers presented a Master Plan Concerning Transport Policy 76 that, among other areas of transport services,

70. The Parliament claimed that the Council's failure to act constituted a violation of
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(e), art. 61, art. 74, art. 75, and art. 84. Art. 61 reads, in its
pertinent part, as follows:
1. Freedom to provide services in the field of transport shall be governed by
the provisions of the Title relating to transport.
Article 74 reads as follows:
The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters governed by this Title, be pursued by Member States within the framework of a common transport policy.
Article 75 reads, in its pertinent part, as follows:
1. For the purpose of implementing Art. 74, and taking into account the distinctive features of transport, the Council shall, acting unanimously until the
end of the second stage and by qualified majority thereafter, lay down, on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee and the Assembly:
(a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member States;
(b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services within a Member State.
71. European Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, [1985] Slg. 1513. For a general discussion of this case, see P. DAGTOGLOU, AIR TRANSPORT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 50-75
(1989).
72. European Parliament, [1985] Slg. at 1596-1600.
73. Id. at 1600-1601.
74. Id. at 1600.
75. Id.
76. See Masterplan, BULL. EUR. COMM. 11/85 at 81 (1985).
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affected air transport. Additionally, the Council set a seven year time
limit within which substantial progress in regard to the freedom of trade
in services had to be accomplished." The Council also accepted the proposals made in the EC Commission's White Paper on the Completion of
the Internal Market."8 The White Paper contained a detailed plan of actions for the integration of the transportation markets. At roughly the
same time, the governments of the EC Member States arrived at an
agreement concerning the Single European Act(the "SEA")."9 The SEA
amended the EEC Treaty and provided the foundation for the Single European Market.
On the basis of these measures, the Council and the Commission of
the EC have become very active in the field of air transportation."0 With
its decisions in the French Seamen's case" and the Transport Policy
case, 2 the European Court of Justice made a significant contribution to
the establishment of European Community transport policy which should
not be underestimated. These decisions helped accelerate the process of
European integration towards a common market.
IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE.

EC

AIR TRANSPORT POLICY PRIOR TO

DECEMBER

1987

The first major step towards the development of a common, liberalized air transport system within the European Community was taken by
the Commission in 1979 with the publication of its First Memorandum. 3
A.

The First Memorandum

The First Memorandum was based upon a detailed analysis of EC air
transport policies existing prior to 1979. On the basis of this analysis, the
Memorandum set forth the short, intermediate, and long term objectives
relating to a common air transport policy within the EC. It also proposed
possible and desireable measures for effecting their implementation. 4
Most importantly, the Memorandum underscored the need for a change
to the then existing market structures.
In the following years, the First Memorandum provoked a broad discussion of the proposed measures among all concerned, including airlines,
the EC Commission, the EC Council, and the EC Member States.

77. See Schr6tter, supra note 68, at 84.
78. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market
(White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, June 28-29, 1985),
COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
79. See SEA, supra at 7.
80. See, e.g., the measures concerning the First and Second Phase of air transport liberalization, supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
81. Commission, [1974] Slg. at 359.
82. European Parliament, [1985] Slg. at 1513.
83. See First Memorandum, supra at 3.
84. See First Memorandum, supra note 3, at 20-26.
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B. Inter-regional Air Services Directive
After intensive discussions, the EC Council, at the suggestion of the
EC Commission, promulgated the first directive for the liberalization of
air transport.8 5 The impact of this directive however, was limited. The
directive applied only to international flights within the Community by
aircraft with no more than 70 seats over a distance of at least 400 kilometers.86 In addition, the directive only pertained to flights into small airports (i.e., category II and III airports) . 7 As a result, the practical importance of the Council's first step towards air transport liberalization
remained modest."8
It was not until 1989, that the Inter-regional Air Services Directive
was further liberalized. 89 As a result of the 1989 amendments to the Directive, airlines were allowed to service routes under 400 kilometers.' 0
Furthermore, aircraft size restrictions were removed.' Regarding this
rather advanced step towards the aim of a deregulated framework for regional air transport services, the Council has adopted the Commission's
attitude. This attitude, developed in recent years, is that regional air service between Member States is to be strongly promoted in order to take
pressure off the large congested airports within the Community.
C.

The Second Memorandum

In view of the world-wide crisis in civil aviation at the beginning of
the 1980's and the increased competitive pressure upon both the airline
and the aircraft industry, the EC Commission published a Second Memorandum on Civil Aviation." This Memorandum reflected the United
States' experience with airline deregulation, which had its roots in the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.'3 The Second Memorandum set forth

85. See Directive (83/416/EEC) concerning the authorization 'of scheduled inter-regional air services for the transport of passengers, mail, and cargo between Member States,
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 237) 19 (July 25, 1983) [hereinafter Inter-regional Air Services
Directive].
86. Id. art. 1(a)-(c).
87. See id. Appendix A.
88. For details, see A. KARK, supra note 11, at 116.
89. See Council Directive 89/463/EEC of 18 July 1989 amending Directive 83/416/EEC
concerning the authorization of scheduled inter-regional air services for the transport of
passengers, mail and cargo between Member States, 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 226) 14
(Aug. 3, 1989).
90. See id. art. 1.
91. Id.
92. See Second Memorandum, supra at 4.
93. See Airline Deregulation Act, 92 Stat. 1705. For an exposition on the Airline Deregulation Act and its consequences see, Ebke & Wittmann, Wettbewerb im Linienluftverkehr:
Erfahrungen mit der Deregulierung in den USA, 36 RIW 962 (1990); Goetz & Dempsey,
Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 927
(1989); E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985).
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4
the major features of a future common air transport policy for the EC.9
The Commission was primarily concerned with the regulation and crea95
tion of conditions for a competitive market for scheduled air transport.
The Memorandum was aimed at a liberalization of the existing bilateral
air transport agreements. The deregulation envisaged by the Second
Memorandum included only the EC Member States. Air transport between EC Member States and third countries would be deregulated at a
later date."

D.

The Nouvelles Fronti~res Case

The Second Memorandum of the EC Commission and the decision of
the European Court of Justice in the Transport Policy case 97 increased
pressure on the EC Council to take effective measures towards the liberalization of EC air transport. The discussions within the Council proved
to be difficult and time consuming. It was the European Court of Justice
that finally took the lead in the liberalization process. In April 1986, the
Court handed down the single most important decision relating to the
liberalization of EC air transport.9 s The case, commonly known as the
Nouvelles Frontirescase, involved the issue of whether a travel agency
registered in an EC Member State has the right to sell airline tickets at
fares below the tariffs agreed upon by IATA-airlines and approved by the
Member States' government.
In its decision, the Court held that the Community's antitrust laws,
in particular articles 851" and 86100 of the EEC Treaty, are as a general
rule applicable to civil aviation. 10 ' The Court, however, qualified its hold-

94.
95.
96.
97.

See Second Memorandum, supra note 4, at 21-28.
See id. at 28-40.
See id. at 21.
European Parliament, [1985] Slg. at 1513..

98. MinistAre Public v. Asjes et al., Cases 209-213/84, [1986] Slg. 1425. For a general
discussion of this case, see P. DAGTOGLOU, supra note 71, at 77-114. See also Note, New
Frontiers in EEC Air Transport Competition, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 455 (1987).

99. For the text of EEC Treaty, see supra note 1, art. 85. See also supra at 28.
100. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86 that reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contacts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contacts.
101. Minist6re Public v. Asjes [1986] Slg. at 1463-1466.
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ing by stating that articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty cannot be enforced directly by the Commission or the Member States until these provisions are implemented by secondary Community law, such as
implementing regulations or directives (as required by article 87 of the
EEC Treaty). 102 Pointing to articles 88103 and 89104 of the EEC Treaty,
the Court suggested that the Commission and the competent authorities
of the Member States take appropriate measures to enforce the general
principles underlying articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.'0 5 Citing its
decision in the Bosch case,106 the Court made it very clear that the en-

102. See id. 1466-1470. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 87 reads as follows:
1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to
the principles set out in Arts. 85 and 86.
If such provisions have not been adopted within the periods mentioned, they
shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed, in
particular:
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Art. 85(1)
and in Art. 86 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments;
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Art. 85(3), taking into
account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extend on the other;
(c) to define, if needed be, in the various branches of the economy, the
scope of the provisions of Arts. 85 and 86;
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court
of Justice in applying the provisions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provisions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article.
103. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88 reads as follows:
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Art. 87,
the authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements,
decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the
common market in accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions of Art. 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Art. 86.
104. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 89 reads as follows:
1. Without prejudice to Art. 88, the Commission shall, as soon as it takes up its
duties, ensure the application of the principles laid down in Arts. 85 and 86.
On application by a Member State or on its own initiative, and in co-operation
with the competent authorities in the Member States, who shall give it their
assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases of suspected infringement of
these principles. If it finds that there has been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end.
2. If the infringement is not brought to an end, the Commission shall record
such infringement of the principles in a reasoned decision. The Commission
may publish its decision and authorize Member States to take the measures,
the conditions and details of which it shall determine, needed to remedy the
situation.
105. Minist~re Public v. Asjes, [1986] Slg. at 1469.
106. Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Gens en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH, Case 13/
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forcement procedure of articles 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty is not capable of assuring complete compliance with articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty."0 7
Due to the limited applicability of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, the Court's decision provides no answer to the question of
whether IATA tariff agreements are in compliance with EC law. The
Court's decision is also politely silent on the issue of whether or not
Member States are in breach of the EEC Treaty when they approve tariffs agreed to at IATA conferences. Despite its limited holding, the
Court's decision has had an immediate impact. In view of the Court's emphasis of the Commission's responsibilities under article 89 of the EEC
Treaty, the Commission proceeded against ten major European airlines
for violation of article 85 of the EEC Treaty.108 With the Commission's
threat of a lawsuit against them looming ahead, the airlines eventually
agreed, among other things, to bring their tariff, capacity, and pooling
agreements into compliance with the EC antitrust laws. 0 9
E.

The Single European Act

The decisive step towards the liberalization of scheduled air transport within the Community was finally brought about by the Single European Act, which went into effect on July 1, 1987.110 The Single European
Act provides for the establishment of a Single European Market for air
transport.' Most importantly, decisions concerning the establishment of
a single market for air transport no longer require unanimous voting by
Member States; rather, measures can now be taken by a majority of
votes. 12
In June 1987, after intensive discussions, the Council agreed upon1 a3
package of measures for the liberalization of scheduled air transport.'
The implementation of these measures was delayed by a veto of the
Spanish government."" The Spanish government was unwilling to accept
the application of the EC liberalization measures to Gibraltar airport, as
Spain still contests British sovereignty over Gibraltar. The concerns of
the Spanish government were overcome by the end of 1987. The Council's
compromise cleared the way for the First Phase of the process of liberalizing air transport within the EC.

61, [1962] Slg. 97.
107. Ministres Public v. Asjes, [1986] Slg. at 1469.
108. These airlines included Air France, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, British Airways, British
Caledonian, KLM, Deutsche Lufthansa, Olympic, Sabena, and SAS.
109. See A. KARK, supra note 11, at 130-31; Lenz, Die Verkehrspolitik der Europiischen Gemeinschaften im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes, 23 EUROPARECHT
[EuR] 158, 173 (1988).
110. See SEA, supra at 7.
111. See id. art. 13.
112. Id. art. 16.
113. See Dempsey, supra note 8, at 671-72.
114. Id. at 672.
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V. THE FIRST PHASE
In December 1987, the Council took a number of measures toward
the liberalization of air transport that are commonly referred to as the
First Package of Liberalization. This Package consists of the following: a
Council Directive on tariffs, a Council Decision concerning capacity sharing and market access, a Council Regulation concerning the application of
the EC antitrust laws to the air transport sector, and
a Council Regula11 5
tion concerning exemptions from EC antitrust laws.
The measures mentioned are applicable only to flights between EC
Member States. They do not apply to domestic flights within a given
Member State, nor do they apply to flights between a Member State and
third countries.11 Rights and obligations of Member States vis-a-vis their
airlines are not subject to the First Package. The regulation of domestic
air transport remains the responsibility of each Member State. The First
Package affects the Member States' sovereign rights with respect to market access for intracommunity flights, capacity sharing, and tariff approval. To illustrate the significance of the First Package, we shall take a
closer look at the various provisions.
A. Antitrust Regulations
For the first time in the history of the European Community, the
Council Regulation (EEC) 3975/871" effected the application of articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to airline companies in regards to flights
between EC airports."'s The Regulation also grants the EC Commission
power to investigate and impose sanctions on both airlines and
Member
1 9
States for violations of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
According to Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87,120 the Commission

may, by means of a further regulation, exempt from EC antitrust laws
121
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices of airlines.
Such group exemptions are generally permitted under article 85(3) of the
EEC Treaty.1

22

Group exemptions may be subject to certain conditions

and specific requirements.1 2 In case of a breach of an obligation that was
attached by the Commission to an exemption, the exemption may be revoked." The Commission may also impose a fine on airlines that violate
a granted exemption. 2 6 The following activities between airlines may be
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See supra at 8.
See, e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) 3975/87, supra note 8, art. 1(2).
See id.
Id. art. 1.
Id. arts. 3-6.
See Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87, supra at 8.
Id. art. 2.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(3). See supra note 28 for text of art. 85(3).
See Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87, supra note 8, art. 2(3).
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 7(2).
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exempt: agreements concerning slot allocation, flight schedules, the joint
acquisition of computer reservation systems, the maintenance of aircraft,
tariff setting, the coordination of capacities, and the division of earnings
from scheduled flights (i.e., pooling agreements). 2 8
Without delay, the Commission made use of its powers pursuant to
article 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87 by promulgating three regulations."'7 These regulations set forth the prerequisites for group exemptions with respect to the activities mentioned above. Those exemptions
granted by the Commission were far-reaching and remained effective until January 1, 1991. " ' For example, airlines were permitted to continue to
cooperate with other airlines on the basis of the above mentioned agreements. Thus, the exemptions provided the airlines concerned with a significant amount of protection in an increasingly competitive market.
B.

Tariffs

Council Directive 87/601/EEC 2 8 on tariffs for scheduled flights between Member States maintains the traditional tariff approval procedure. 130 Hence, a tariff becomes effective only if it has been approved by
the governments of both Member States. 1 ' The substantive prerequisites
for the approval of a proposed tariff are set forth in article 3 of the Directive. According to this provision, a tariff proposed by an airline shall be
approved by the government if they are reasonably related to long-term,
fully allocated costs of the applicant carrier.' 2 Under article 3 of the Directive, the fact that the proposed air fare is lower than that offered by
on the same route, is not a sufficient reason for withholdanother carrier,
33
ing approval.1
Tariff proposals may be made by an airline alone or after consultations with other airlines.3 In the latter case, the consultations must conform to Commission Regulation 3976/87.1" Article 7 of Council Directive
87/601/EEC provides a detailed procedure of notification and the consultation and arbitration process, should a Member State withhold
approval. 3 '
The Tariff Directive introduces a new tariff approval concept that
the Directive refers to as "zones of flexibility.' 3 7 Proposed tariffs that are

126. Id. art. 2(2).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Commission Regulations (EEC) 2671/88, 2672/87 and 2673/87, supra at 8.
See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) 2671/88, supra note 8, art. 8.
See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra at 8.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 3.

133. Id.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. art. 4(1).
See Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87, supra at 8.
See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra note 8, art. 7.
Id. art. 5.
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within the margins of such zones of flexibility, are to be approved automatically by the governments concerned. 13 8 The Directive creates two discount zones. In the first zone (i.e., the discount zone), the discount is 10
to 35 percent of the reference tariff."' 9 In the second (i.e., the deep discount zone), the discount of the reference tariff may be between 35 and
141
55 percent. ' Discount tickets are subject to considerable restrictions.
Still, member states are free to agree to more liberal discount practices
than those set forth in the Tariff Directive. 142
C.

Market Access and Capacity Sharing

The Council Decision 87/602/EEC liberalizes market access and capacity sharing. 4 s Bilateral agreements have traditionally provided for an
equal (50:50) sharing of passenger capacity based upon the number of
passengers of one airline on a given route. The Decision aims at a liberalization of firm sharing clauses. According to the Decision, airlines may increase or decrease their capacity by 5 percent, a capacity sharing ratio of
55:45.1" The country in which the airline is registered may not interfere
for the benefit of its airline. Effective October 1, 1989, the ratio was
changed to 60:40.'4
For the first time in the history of EC air transport law, the Council
Decision grants every Member State the right of multiple designations.
Each Member State may appoint more than one airline to service a given
bilateral route, to the extent that the route is used by a certain number of
passengers.1'4
The Decision also permits Community carriers to establish flight connections between major airports (i.e., category I airports)'14 in their home

138. Id. art. 5(2).
139. Id. art. 5(1).
140. Id.
141. Id. Annex II.
142. Id. art. 6.
143. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra at 8.
144. Id. art. 3(1).
145. Id. art. 3(2).
146. Id. art. 5(2) which reads as follows:
A Member State shall also accept multiple designation on a country-pair basis
by another Member State:
1. in the first year after the notification of this Decision, on routes on which
more than 250,000 passenger were carried in the preceding year,
2.in the second year, on routes on which more than 200,000 passengers were
carried in the preceding year or on which there are more than 1,200 return
flights per annum,
3. in the third year, on routes on which more than 180,000 passengers were
carried in the preceding year or on which there are more than 1,000 return
flights per annum.
147. Category I airports are listed in Annex II to Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra
note 8, at 25.
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country and regional airports (i.e., category II and III airports)' s of another Member State, regardless of distance or aircraft size."19 In addition,
Community carriers are entitled to introduce scheduled air services to
and from two or more points in other Member States, provided that no
traffic rights are exercised between the combined points. 150
Most importantly, Community carriers may also carry out scheduled
flights falling within the Fifth Freedom if certain conditions are met. The
flight route thus needs to include at least one regional airport and the
first or final airport must be within the home country of the carrier. In
addition, the flight service in question may not exceed more than 30 percent of the annual capacity of the airline on any given route.' 5'
D.

Critique

The First Package was a cautious and conservative step toward more
competition in scheduled air transport within the Community. Radical
changes to the market structure were not accomplished by the new laws.
Rather, the reforms were relatively minor since they were coupled with
generous exemptions for EC carriers from the EC antitrust laws. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the First Package had only
modest effects on both airlines and passengers.1 52 Despite a few market
entries and the establishment of many new flight routes," 3 the development of air fares has remained a disappointment given the Commission's
high expectations. The measures did not result in noticeable tariff reductions. "54
' Consequently, additional more far-reaching measures are necessary if the objective of competitive market structures, in the area of
scheduled air transport within the EC, is to be accomplished by January
1993.

VI.

THE

Ahmed Saeed CASE

In April 1989, the European Court of Justice took the opportunity, in
Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekiampfung unlauteren
8
Wettbewerbs e.V.,"'
to comment on the First Package position concern-

148. Category II and III airports are also listed in Annex II to Council Decision 87/602/
EEC, supra note 8, at 25.
149. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra note 8, art. 6(1).
150. See id. art. 7(1).
151. Id. art. 8(1).

152. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Report on the first year
(1988) of implementation of the aviation policy approved in December 1978, COM(89) 476
final (Oct. 2, 1989).
153. Id. at 7-12.
154. Accord Sir Leon Brittan, EC Commissioner of Competition, in a lecture presented
at the Inaugural Conference of the European Air Law Association held in London on November 2, 1989, reprintedin AIR TRANSPORT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (P. Dagtoglou ed. 1991) (forthcoming).
155. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen et al. v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs e.V., Case 66/86, reprinted in 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT

DEN. *J.INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 19:3

ing the new legal situation in EC air transport. This case involved two
travel agencies in Frankfurt, Germany, that had sold tickets at fares that
were up to 60 percent less than those approved by the German government. For this purpose, the travel agencies purchased tickets outside of
Germany for flights originating in the country of purchase with a destination in a third country outside the EC, but having a stopover in a German
airport.
In the lawsuit brought by the Association for the Protection Against
Unfair Trade Practices in Germany, the plaintiff alleged that the two
travel agencies had violated German law by selling the tickets above-described. It was argued that the agencies had violated the German Air
Transport Statute,"6 which prohibits the application of air fares not approved by the German government. It was further argued that the agencies had engaged in unfair trade practices, insofar as the fares for the
tickets sold undercut the approved tariff applied by their competitors.
The lower courts held in favor of the Association. The Bundesgerichtshof,
Germany's highest court in civil and commercial matters, granted the writ
of certiorariand submitted the case to the European Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 177 of the EEC Treaty.' 57 The
European Court of Justice concluded that tariff setting agreements between carriers constituted illegal cartels and therefore violated article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty. L5 8
A.

Assumptions of the Court
The holding of the Court is based upon the assumption that article

[ZLW] 124 (1989) [hereinafter Ahmed Saeed]. For a general discussion of this case see P.
supra note 71, at 133-146.
156. See Air Transport Statute, supra at 37.
157. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177(3), which reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make preliminary rulings
concerning:

DAGTOGLOU,

(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice
to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court or
tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal law, such court
or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
For a discussion of the procedures under art. 177, see G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 366-452 (1981); T. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 246282.
158. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 127.
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85 of the EEC Treaty was directly applicable to the case at hand. This
assumption went beyond the holding in the Nouvelles Fronti&res case. 159
In that case, the Court held that because of the lack of implementing
Community legislation, article 85 of the EEC Treaty could not be enforced directly; rather, the Commission and the competent authorities of
the Member States could take measures against airlines only pursuant to
articles 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty. If article 85 of the EEC Treaty is
directly applicable, the Commission no longer needs to utilize the procedures provided for in article 89 of the EEC Treaty. Rather, the Commission may proceed directly under article 85 of the EEC Treaty as implemented by Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87.160
B.

Article 85 of the EEC Treaty

In Ahmed Saeed, the European Court of Justice explicitly stated
that tariff setting agreements constitute illegal cartels and violate article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty. 161 According to Council Regulation 3976/87,
such agreements may not be subject to group exemptions. 63 The Court
pointed out that tariff "consultations," as opposed to tariff "agreements,"
remain exempt. 6 ' The criteria for differentiating between permissible
tariff consultations and illegal tariff agreements are set forth in article 4
of Commission Regulation 2671/88.164 Consequently, tariff agreements for
intracommunity flights that did not fall within the group exemption were
void per se, unless an objection made by the carrier concerned under article 5 of Council Regulation 3975/87 was successful.' 65 With respect to domestic flights and flights between a Member State and a third country,
the procedure pursuant to articles 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty remains
applicable. "
C.

Article 86 of the EEC Treaty

The statements of the European Court of Justice as to article 86 of
the EEC Treaty are particularly interesting. The Court suggests that the
abuse-of-market-power provisions of article 86 of the EEC Treaty apply
to the entire air transport sector. That is to say that article 86 of the EEC
Treaty applies to intracommunity flights, to domestic flights and flights
from an EC Member State to a third country.' 67 Consequently, tariff

159. See Ministere Public v. Asjes et al., Cases 209-213/84 [1986] Slg. 1425. For details,
see supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
160. See Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87, supra note 8.
161. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 127.
162. Id. at 127.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 128. See also Commission Regulation 2671/88, supra note 8, art. 4. The text
of this regulation is reprinted supra at 30.
165. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 127.
166. Id. at 128. For details of the procedures under arts. 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty,
see supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
167. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 129.
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agreements concerning flights from an airport of an EC Member State to
an airport outside of the Community fall as much within the ambit of
article 86 of the EEC Treaty, as do tariff agreements concerning intracommunity and domestic flights. This is particularly true in cases
where an airline company is in a position to control the market or to
charge excessively high or extremely low tariffs on a given route.168
According to the Court, the fact that article 86 of the EEC Treaty
has not been implemented by secondary Community law does not prevent
the Commission from enforcing the provision.'6 9 Member States' courts
may also enforce article 86 of the EEC Treaty, even absent secondary
Community law implementing said Treaty provision.1 7 0 For the
Bundesgerichtshof,this was an important observation, as it had to decide
the issue of whether a court may enforce article 86 of the EEC Treaty
despite the lack of implementing Community legislation.
D. Articles 5 and 90 of the EEC Treaty
Based upon its conclusions with respect to articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty, the European Court of Justice stated that a Member State
violates Community law (i.e., its obligations under article 51M and article
90(1)72 of the EEC Treaty) if it approves tariffs that are contrary to article 85 or article 86 of the EEC Treaty.17 s As a result, the Member States'
governments are required, in the approval process, to assure that the
tariff consultations are in conformity with the principles laid down in articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, as well as Council Directive 87/601/
EEC and Commission Regulation 2671/88."" The Court also made it perfectly clear that it expects the Member States not to enter into new bilateral agreements with third countries that, directly or indirectly, provide
for illegal tariffs. " 5

168. Id. at 130-131.
169. Id. at 129.
170. Id..at 130-131.
171. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5 reads as follows:
Member States shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting
from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate
the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
172. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90 reads, in its pertinent part, as follows:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to those rules provided for in Art. 7 and Arts. 85 through 94.
173. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 131.
174. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC and Commission Regulation (EEC) 2671/88,
supra at 8.
175. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 131-132.
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Analysis

In the Ahmed Saeed case, there are two issues concerning the tariff
setting process worth noting. By extending the application of article 86 of
the EEC Treaty to flights between Member States and third countries,
the Court put considerable pressure on the Member States to make sure
that tariff setting and tariff approval provisions in bilateral agreements
are consistent with EC antitrust laws. As a result, existing agreements
that are contrary to article 86 of the EEC Treaty need to be renegotiated.
Also, the applicability of article 86 to agreements concerning flights from
within the Community to third countries is an extension of existing EC
Laws"' not only to intracommunity flights but also to both domestic
flights within an EC Member State and flights to third countries.
The European Court of Justice rendered its decision in the Ahmed
Saeed case just as the Commission was about to finish its work on the
proposals for the Second Phase of Liberalization. Nevertheless, the Commission managed to include the implications of the Ahmed Saeed deci17 7
sion in its proposals for the Second Phase of liberalization.
VII.

THE SECOND PHASE

In September 1989, the EC Commission published proposals for further liberalization of EC scheduled air transport.17 The proposals are
aimed at the relaxation of tariffs, capacity sharing, and market access. On
the basis of the Commission's proposals, the Council of the EC Transport
Ministers, at its meeting in June 1990, agreed to a package of measures,
commonly referred to as the Second Phase of the liberalization of EC air
transport. These measures consist of three Council Regulations, two of
which1 79 became effective November 1, 1990.180
A.

Tariffs

The new Tariff Regulation is the centerpiece of the second package.
This Regulation provides more flexibility in the tariff setting and approval process. While the requirement that tariffs be approved by the affected governments remains unchanged, " both the approval procedure
and the range of approvable fares have changed considerably. Most importantly, the 1990 Tariff Regulation introduces, for the first time in the
history of EC air transport laws, the double disapproval system. " The
Regulation did not, however, go so far as to permit the double disap-

176. See Council Regulations, Directive and Decision, supra at 8.
177. See COM(89) 417 final (Sept. 8,1989) at 1-5.
178. COM(89) 373 final and COM(89) 417 final (Sept. 8, 1989). For a detailed discussion of the Commission's proposals see Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 51, at 475-477.
179. See Council Regulations 2342/90 and 2343/90, supra at 9.
180. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 14.
181. See id. art. 4(1).
182. Id. art. 4(4).
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proval system to be applied to all tariffs, as proposed by the EC Commission. ' Rather, the double disapproval system applies only to tariffs that
exceed the reference tariff by at least 5 percent. 8 4
The First Phase system of reference tariffs and flexibility zones was
revised. The Tariff Regulation allows Community carriers to set the price
for a "normal economy class ticket," independently, ' within a margin of
plus or minus 5 percent of the reference tariff.186 Under the First Phase,
the price for an economy class ticket was fixed at 100 percent of the reference tariff. The margins of the discount zone were changed from between
90 and 65 percent to between 94 and 80 percent. The margins of the deep
discount zone were broadened from between 65 and 45 percent to between 79 and 30 percent.1 8 7 The diagram in Table 1 illustrates the differences concerning the zones of flexibility between the First and Second
Phase:
The prerequisites for attaining a ticket within the discount zone have
been eased. Prior to November 1, 1990, the journey had to include at
least one Saturday night and a total of six nights, or alternatively, had to
take place during off-peak times.'"8 Under the new Tariff Regulation,
these requirements, particularly detrimental to business travelers, no
longer exist."89 This impressive move towards more flexibility for a passenger wanting to acquire lower priced tickets is counteracted by the fact
that the discount zone was reduced from 35 to 14 percent. 190 The reduction is not offset by the increase in the margins of the deep discount zone
from 20 to 49 percent. For the most part, the restrictive requirements for
entering the deep discount zone continue to be in effect.' 9'

183. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), art. 4(3).
184. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 4(4). The reference tariff is
described in more detail infra, note 186.
185. Id. art. 4(3).
186. The reference tariff is defined in Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art.
2(i) which reads as follows:
Reference fare means the normal one way or return, as appropriate, economy
air fare charged by a third or fourth freedom air carrier on the route in question; if more than one such fare exists, the arithmetic average of all such fares
shall be taken unless otherwise bilaterally agreed; where there is no normal
economy fare, the lowest fully flexible fare shall be taken.
187. Id. art. 4(3).
188. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra note 8, Annex II No. 1.
189. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, Annex II No. 1.
190. Id. art. 4(3).
191. Id. Annex II, No. 2.
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1. The Tariff Approval Process
According to the new Tariff Regulation, tariff approval follows from
one of three procedures:
a.

Automatic Approval

If the proposed tariff of an airline lies within one of the aforementioned flexibility zones, the governments of the Member States are required to approve the tariff.1 9 2 This results in a system of automatic approval, as the approval itself is merely a formality if other conditions,
particularly for those set forth in article 3 of the Tariff Regulation, are
fulfilled.

192. Id. art. 4(3).
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b. Double Disapproval
If a tariff proposed by an airline lies above the zones mentioned in
article 4(3) of the Tariff Regulation (i.e., if it is more than 5 percent
above the reference tariff), 19s the system of double disapproval applies.
Under this system, a tariff is deemed to be approved if the Member
States concerned do not, within 30 days of the airlines' application for
approval, reject the requested tariff. 19' While it applies to a small number
of tickets only, the double disapproval system enables the Member States
and the EC Commission, to gain practical experience with the procedure.
This is important when one takes into consideration that, beginning January 1, 1993, the double disapproval system will be applied to all
tariffs. 9 5
c. Double Approval
A tariff proposed by an airline that is neither within one of the flexibility zones nor above the reference tariff, must be approved explicitly by
both governments.' 9 6 In such a case, the tariff is deemed to be approved if
neither one of the governments involved rejects the tariff within 21 days
upon receipt of the application.19 Tariffs subject to the double approval
system are most likely to be below the deep discount zone. The Member
States, it seems, were not prepared to give up their strict control over
these tariffs.
2. Investigation and Consultation Procedure
The Tariff Regulation provides control mechanisms for cases in
which a Member State challenges a tariff for lack of conformity with the
Tariff Regulation.
a. Article 5 of the Council Regulation
At the request of a Member State having a reasonable interest in the
route in question, the Commission is obliged to inquire into the conformity of any previously approved tariff that does not lie within the flexibility
zones. 99 The Commission is also required to inquire whether the other
Member State has met its obligations under article 3(3) of the Regulation.199 According to article 3(3),200 the Commission must investigate
whether or not an airline charges unjustifiably high tariffs that are not in
193. For a definition of the reference tariff, see supra at 186.
194. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 4(4).
195. Id. art. 12.
196. Id. art. 4(5).
197. Id.
198. Id. art. 5(1).
199. Id.
200. For the text of Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 3; text of Council
Regulation 2342/90, supra at 193.
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the best interest of consumers. It is also obliged to investigate whether
the tariffs are "dumping tariffs" aimed at the expulsion of competitors
from a given route.2 " Within 14 days of being called upon by a Member
State, the Commission must decide whether or not the tariff in question
is to remain in effect during the investigation period.202 The final decision
on all these matters must be made within two months of the receipt of
the Member State's request.20 8 Within one month after the decision, the
204
affected Member State may appeal to the EC Council.
The procedure provided for by article 5 of the Tariff Regulation is an
important instrument in the hands of the Member States. The provision
enables the Member States to control a fare's development, especially if
the tariff deviates too far in one direction or another. It should be recognized, however, that the possibility of an appeal by the concerned Member State to the EC Council of Ministers adds a political dimension to the
tariff setting process which could be undesirable in light of the importance of the enforcement of EC antitrust laws.
b.

Article 6 of the Council Regulation

Article 6 of the Tariff Regulation deals with cases in which tariffs
that are below the flexibility zones and have to be approved by both governments, °1 are rejected by one government. 208 In those cases, article 6
provides for a detailed consultation and arbitration procedure.20 7 If confirmed by the EC Commission, the arbitrators' decision becomes binding
20 8
on both governments.
3.

Price Leadership

The new Regulation extends the possibilities for EC airlines to become price leaders (i.e., introducing lower tariffs on an existing flight
route). 2 9 Prior to November 1, 1990, the possibility for increased price
competition was limited to routes on which the Third and Fourth freedom rights were exercised (i.e., on intra-community non-stop connections). 10 According to the new Tariff Regulation, Community carriers
may now become price leaders when operating on the Fifth Freedom
route; provided, the tariffs proposed by the airlines remain within the
flexibility zones.2 11 Despite this limitation, the provisions are likely to

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See Council Regulation 2342/90 supra note 9, art. 3(3).
Id. art. 5(2).
Id. art. 5(3), (4).
Id. art. 5(5).
See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 6(1).
Id. arts. 6(1)-(9).
Id. art. 6(8).
Id. art. 3(6). For the text of art. 3, see supra at 193.
See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra note 8, art. 4(5).
See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 3(6).
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considerably strengthen competition on routes on which airlines of the
third, fourth, and fifth freedoms operate.
4.

Other Provisions

The Tariff Regulation allows Member States to enter into or maintain more flexible bilateral agreements than those mentioned in article 4
of the Tariff Regulation.2" This is true, for example, of the British-German Agreement" ' and the British-Luxembourg Air Transport Agreement.2"4 Furthermore, EC Member States are required to bring their bilateral agreements with third states that were granted Fifth Freedom
rights for their carriers on routes within the Community, in line with the
Tariff Regulation "at the first possible occasion," if the agreements are
contrary to the Council Regulatioi. 21 6 Most importantly, the new Regulation requires that the double disapproval system be introduced by January 1, 1993.216
5.

Scope of the Tariff Regulation

'
Contrary to the proposals of the EC Commission, 17
the Council did
not extend the Tariff Regulation to flights from within the EC to flights
from an EC airport to a third country. The Regulation applies only to
scheduled flights on routes between Member States.2 1 8 It should also be
noted that the new Tariff Regulation binds Member States directly.
Thus, there is no room for the Member States to exercise discretion in
the transformation and application of the Regulation. This differs significantly from the old Tariff Directive of 1987211 that, like all Directives, left
the form and methods of implementation to the Member States.

B.

Market Access and Capacity

The Council Regulation Concerning Capacity Sharing and Market
Access 220 may be divided into two parts.
1.

Market Access

The Regulation explicitly grants the right of an EC carrier to fly an
international route within the Community, as part of the Third and
Fourth Freedom rights. 221 Consequently, EC carriers that operate under
the Third and Fourth Freedom rights have free access to all EC air-

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. art. 7.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
See Air Route Agreement, supra at 47.
Id. art. 11.
Id. art. 12.
See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex I, art. 1.
See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 1.
See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra at 8.
See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra at 9.
Id. arts. 4, 5(1).
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ports. 22 2 At the same time, the Regulation requires Member States (country of destination) to allow, on the basis of reciprocity, airlines that operate internationally and are registered in another Member State (country
of registration) to make use of the Third and Fourth Freedom rights on
2 3
the same route.
The reciprocity requirement is controversial as it allows a Member
State to make the introduction of new routes or frequencies on an existing route conditional upon the receipt of the same number of new
routes or frequencies for its airlines. The reciprocity rule can have the
effect that a carrier based at a slot-tight airport (i.e., British Airways in
London-Heathrow, England) maybe unable to obtain new frequencies at,
or routes to, less frequently used airports (e.g., Lisbon, Portugal) unless
an airline of that country (e.g., TAP Air Portugal) attains route rights for
London-Heathrow. While it may be detrimental to large carriers operating out of slot-tight airports, the reciprocity requirement may be beneficial to smaller carriers operating out of less frequented airports as they
may use their leverage power to gain access to the slot-tight airport.
a.

Multiple Designation

The new Regulation reduces the threshold for multiple designations
on a country-pair basis."" Since January 1, 1991, a Member State must
agree to a multiple designation by another state on a given bilateral route
if there were more than 140,000 passengers travelling on the route or
more than 800 return flights in the preceding year.22 5 Effective January 1,
1992, however, the threshold will be reduced to 100,000 passengers or 600
return flights per year and route. 2 The Regulation opens the way for EC
Member States to allow more than one airline to service a particular
route. As a result, a route that has previously been limited to a single
carrier per country, may in the future be served by more than one carrier.
b.

Fifth Freedom Rights

In addition, the Regulation extends the possibility for airlines to exercise Fifth Freedom rights.2 2 7 Under the First Phase Decision, an airline
was only allowed to use 30 percent of its annual carrying capacity on a
given route for Fifth Freedom service. 2 8 Under the new Regulation, it is
possible to use up to 50 percent of the seating capacity per flight plan
period on any given route.22 9 The 20 percent increase constitutes modest
improvement towards more competition. Unfortunately, the Council did

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

There are a few exceptions to this general rule, see id. art. 1(4).
Id. arts. 5(1), (2).
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 6(2).
Id.
Id. art. 8.
See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra note 8, art. 8(1).
See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 8(1).
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not follow the Commission's proposal to allow carriers to make use of

their rights of the Fifth Freedom in regard to third countries, if such
countries agree.2"' Thus, there is considerable room for further liberalization in the future.
c.

Public Service Obligation

Under the new Regulation, an airline may be required to service regional airports within its home country."3 ' In order to fall within this category of airports, however, the airport must be of paramount importance
to the economic development of the region concerned.2 32
d. Inter-regional Air Service
The 1990 Regulation replaces the Inter-regional Air Services Directive of 1983.111 Inter-regional air transport is now subject to the new Market Access and Capacity Sharing Regulation. To a limited extent, the
1990 Regulation protects airlines that service regional airports and that
have opened new routes, against carriers operating with larger aircraft.3 4
To protect regional carriers, the reciprocity requirement is not applied for
a period of two years; provided, the carrier has been granted the privilege
to fly a new route between two regional airports within the Community."3 '
The reciprocity rule comes into effect again, however, if a foreign carrier
with an aircraft carrying no more than 80 passengers intends to fly the
same route. 36
e. Reverse Discrimination and Cabotage
It is important to call attention to two provisions that were part of
the Commission's proposals23 7 that the Council, however, did not include
in the 1990 Tariff Regulation.
The Commission had proposed a clause according to which each
Member State was required to allow more than one airline in its own
territory to offer scheduled flights, if certain financial and technical criteria were met.23 s The Council, however, was of the opinion that the new
Regulation should not interfere with the relationship between a Member
State's government and carriers registered in that Member State.3 9 Consequently, there is always a possibility that domestic carriers may be dis230. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 8 No. 2.
231. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 5(3).
232. Id. art. 5(3).
233. For details of the Inter-regional Air Service Directive, see supra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
234. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 5(4).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 3(1), 9.
238. Id. art. 3(1).
239. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
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criminated against under the laws of its country of registration. Under
the new Regulation, it is still possible that an EC Member State would
deny a carrier that is registered under its laws the ability to offer certain
air services, only to allow a carrier registered under the laws of another
Member to do so. It seems to have been impossible to obtain majority
within the Council for the Commission's proposal because the adoption of
the Commission's proposal would, in effect, have resulted in the loss of
national sovereignty rights which the Member States were not prepared
to accept at this point in time. Accordingly, the problem of reverse discrimination of domestic carriers continues to exist and there continues to
be no relief under EC laws to remedy this situation.
Furthermore, the Council did not adopt the Commission's cabotage
rights proposal. According to this proposal, the Member States were to
introduce, beginning in 1990, cabotage rights for Community airlines to a
limited extent.2 40 The Council stated, however, that it found it "desirable" to take further liberalization measures with respect to market access
and capacity sharing, including the introduction of a cabotage rule by
June 30, 1992.241 It remains to be seen whether the Council will meet its
own deadline. It should be noted that the deadline stated in the Regulation creates no legal obligation on the part of the Council to act.
2.

Capacity Sharing

Starting with the 60:40 capacity sharing ratio that came into effect on
October 1, 1989,242 the new Regulation allows Community carriers to extend their seating capacity, beginning on November 1, 1990, by 7.5 percent per flight plan period.2 43 At the request of a Member State, the Commission may, however, limit the growth in capacity, if the capacity
increase results in substantial damage to a carrier registered in that
244
Member State.
It is worth noting that the new Regulation states as one of its objectives, the full dismantling of barriers regarding capacity sharing between
Member States by January 1, 1993.245 This has, however, already been
implemented for all regional flights within the EC, effective November 1,
1990, regardless of the seating capacity of the aircraft used. 24 6 Unfortunately, the Regulation again does not go as far as' the Commission's original proposal. The Commission had suggested that capacity limits also be

240. For details see COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 9.
241. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, preamble.
242. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra note 8, art. 3(2).
243. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 11(1): It should be noted that
the summer flight plan period lasts from April 1 until October 31, the winter period from
November 1 until March 31.
244. See id. art. 12(1).
245. Id. art. 11(2).
246. Id. art. 11(3).
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dismantled for flights between category I airports and regional airports. 24 7
Such a measure would have benefitted international air services between
regional airports and large airports. At the same time it would have relieved the pressure on major European airports that are already heavily
congested.
C.

Antitrust Provisions

The EEC Council Regulation 2344/9024 which forms part of the Second Phase, should be mentioned as well. The Regulation consists of one
provision only. This provision empowers the Commission to continue to
exempt, until December 31, 1992, certain airline practices and airline
agreements from the EC antitrust laws.249 The Council did not, however,
follow the Commission's proposal concerning amendments and extensions
of Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87.2 50 The Council's failure to
adopt the Commission's proposal is regretful because the Council simply
ignored the holding of the European Court of Justice in the Ahmed
Saeed case 251 concerning the application of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty to flights to third countries and domestic flights.252
VIII.

OTHER AIR TRAFFIC PROBLEMS

The degree of competition that may develop in air transport within
the EC, depends to a large extent upon the available infrastructure, including runways, air traffic control systems, and slots. In this area a number of problems exist. With the expected growth in air traffic, 253 these
problems are likely to become more severe. It has been said that, in Europe, chaos on the ground and in the air is no longer a myth, but nearly a
reality. 25 4 Necessary changes and improvements will be extraordinarily
expensive. At a number of European airports, such as Frankfurt, Madrid,
and London-Heathrow, slots are no longer available during peak hours.
The shortage of slots makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for new
airlines to enter the market.2 5 Also, the European air traffic control sys-

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 12 (3).
See Council Regulation 2344/90, supra at 9.
Id. art. 1.
See COM(89) 417 final (Sept. 8, 1989).
See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 124. See also supra notes 155-76 and accompanying

text.
252. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
253. IATA expects European air traffic to grow at least 6% per annum in the coming
years. See Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Oct. 30, 1989, at 26.
254. According to a Stanford Research Institute study that was prepared for IATA,
European air traffic is likely to collapse unless there is a radical improvement in the organization of air traffic, especially in the field of air traffic control and the capacity of larger
airports. See Frankfurter Allgerneine Zeitung, May 3, 1990, at R13.
255. The great importance of attractive slots for new market entries could be observed
in the case of the German airline newcomer "German Wings." The company went out of
business less than a year after its entry, mainly because "German Wings" was unable to
attain peak-hour slots. See Die Zeit, May 4, 1990, at 32.
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tern is technically outdated and still largely based upon the traditional
system of national air space control.2 " Internationally integrated air traffic control systems, such as Eurocontrol, are, unfortunately, still of relatively little significance. 5 7 The lack of a modern international control system within the Community is a technological and political anachronism
at a time when the completion of the Single European Market is less than
two years away.
The Commission has already made a number of proposals to the
Council in an attempt to solve the problems mentioned.25 Additional
proposals have also been announced. " New initiatives regarding to airport fees, 6 0 EC-wide air traffic control, and slot allocation are being proposed 2 61 Moreover, the Commission is presently attempting to obtain a
power of attorney from the Member States to negotiate, on behalf of the
EC as a whole, air transport agreements with third countries. "2 A comprehensive package of complementary measures will be necessary if the
opportunities provided by the Second Package of liberalization are to be
realized. Most importantly, one should not forget about the safety of aircraft. In the United States, this aspect of deregulation has proved to be
in an expanding and competitive market for air
increasingly important
262
transport services.
IX.

CONCLUSIONS

The Second Phase of liberalization of EC air transport has resulted
in changes to the existing system in a number of respects. In the areas of
market access, tariffs and capacities it constitutes considerable progress
towards the creation of more competitive and more market oriented
structures. State controls have been dismantled. These are all positive
achievements. However, there is still a number of important issues that
need to be solved. These issues include, but are not limited to, cabotage
rights and reverse discrimination of domestic carriers as well as a technically updated air traffic infrastructure. Thus, a Third Package of air
transport liberalization is needed if the Single European Market in the
air transport sector is to be completed by January 1, 1993.

256. See Bothe, Hohmann & Schmidt, Maglichkeiten einer Reform der europliischen
Flugsicherung?, 39 ZLW 40 (1990).
257. Id. at 43-45.
258. See, e.g., COM(88) 577 final (Jan. 16, 1989).
259. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989) at 11.
260. See COM(90) 100 final (May 22, 1990).
261. See, e.g. COM(90) 576 final (Jan. 30, 1989).
262. See COM(90) 576 final (Jan. 30, 1991).
263. See, e.g., Oster & Zorn, Deregulation and Commuter Airline Safety, 49 J. AIR L.

& CoM. 315 (1984). See also TRANSPORTATION
& I. Savage eds. 1989).

SAFETY IN AN AGE OF DEREGULATION

(L. Moses

Maritime Terrorism and Legal Responses
DEAN C. ALEXANDER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The specter of terrorism, known since antiquity, continues to
threaten the stability and fabric of modern society in the 1990's.' The
often cited term "terrorism" has yet to find a universally accepted definition. 2 This article will define terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Recent events such as the horrific murder of Leon Klinghoffer
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center(expected 1991); J.D., American University, Washington College of Law; Diplome, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internaitonales, Geneva (thesis in preparation); B.A., Georgetown University. Mr. Alexander is

also the author of The Legal and Economic Impact of the Federal Reserve Board's Ruling
to Allow U.S. Depository Institutions to Accept Foreign Currency Deposits, 14 N.C. J.
INT'L & COMM. REG. 459 (1989); The Export-Import Bank of the United States' War
Against Subsidized Export Credits, 9 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. (1991) (in press).

1. For a synopsis of international terrorism incidents, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS Report, Terrorism, Nov. 5, 1990, (JPRS-TOT-90-038-L); Loeb, 2 U.S.
Airmen Killed Near Air Base in Philippines, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 14, 1990, at Al;
IRA Takes Blame For Bomb That Injures 6 in London, Wash. Times, May 15, 1990, at A10.
For a history of terrorism, see Bell, Comment: The Origins of Modern Terrorism, 9
TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 309 (1987) (focusing on terrorism in late 1800's and early 1900's);
THE TERRORISM READER (W. Laquer and Y. Alexander eds. 1987).
For an excellent theoretical and practical analysis of terrorism, see INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Y. Alexander ed. 1976).

2. An ad hoc United Nations Committee on International Terrorism "was unable to
agree either on the definition of terrorism, its causes, or methods to prevent it." Levitt, The

International Legal Response to Terrorism: A Reevaluation, 50 COLO. L. REv. 533, 537
(1989). See Bennett, United States Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism, 7 INr'L LAW. 752 (1973) (discussing U.S. attempts to formulate definition
of terrorism in U.N.). See also Levitt, Is Terrorism Worth Defining? 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV.

97 (1986). In contrast, in 1985, the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, passed a Resolution on Criminal Acts of a Terrorist
Character. U.N. Doc. A/CONF 121/L.12/Rev.1 (1985).
3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1986 at inside front cover
(Jan. 1988). For a definition of international terrorism, see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982).
Various U.S. state statutes discuss terrorist acts. See LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TER-

RORISM, 308-19 (Y.Alexander & A. Nanes, eds. 1986); Ludington, Validity and Construction
of Terroristic Threat Statutes, 45 A.L.R. 4th 949, 954-88 (1986); Legal Controls and Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 465 (1982).
State-sponsored terrorism is defined as: "The deliberate employment of violence or the
threat of use of violence by sovereign states or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted
by sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law.

These criminal acts are intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger
than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened." R. CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER,
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during the seizure of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro underline the
need for practical legal measures to reduce the harmful aspects of this
virus.4
The purpose of this article is manifold. Part II describes the role of
civil suits brought by states and other victims of terrorism. Part III reviews early international legal responses to maritime terrorism. Part IV
explains the factual background to the Achille Lauro incident and Part V
summarizes the civil suits which followed that incident. Part VI discusses
the rationale and analysis of the Southern District of New York's June
1990 order in the Klinghoffer v. PalestineLiberation Organization(PLO)
suit, in which the court determined, inter alia, that the federal court had
jurisdiction over the PLO. Part VII assesses the Klinghoffer v. PLO order. Part VIII discusses U.S. legislative proposals to provide U.S. victims
of international terrorism (and their families) a civil cause of action in
U.S. federal district court. Part IX addresses the recent international response to maritime terrorism, such as the 1988 I.M.O. Convention, and
Part X concludes that unilateral, bilateral, and multinational legislative
responses are essential to furthering the vital, though slow struggle,
against terrorism.
II.
A.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SUITS BROUGHT BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM

Overview

Professor Harold Koh differentiates between the criminal and civil
responses to terrorism. 5 Prof. Koh notes that criminal sanctions generally
revolve around "the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists."6 Furthermore, the criminal paradigm is additionally sub-divided
into four tiers; global conventions, regional agreements, bilateral pacts,
and national legislation.' In contrast, civil responses are subsumed under
"all nonforcible, noncriminal means of sanctioning terrorists and states
who support terrorism."8 Prof. Koh notes that civil remedies are primarily questions of legal rather than political theory, and decried at the lack

TERRORISM AS STATE-SPONSORED COVERT WARFARE 32 (1986).

4. See infra notes 104-122 and accompanying text.
5. Koh, Civil Remedies For Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 169, 171 (1987).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 173. "The array of possible 'civil' antiterrorist responses run the gamut from
those remedies directed primarily against terrorist individuals and groups to those intended
primarily to sanction their state supporters. Immigration measures and curtailment of travel
rights are prime examples of nonforcible, noncriminal actions targeted against individual
terrorists. A listing of the available nonforcible, noncriminal sanctions against state supporters of terrorism, by contrast, encompasses nearly every tool of economic warfare currently
available to nations: denial of import benefits, export controls, financial embargoes and economic boycotts, withholding of foreign aid, termination of arms sales, and suspension of air
flights by both official and nongovernmental institutions, to name but a few" (footnotes
ommitted). Id. at 175-77.
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of international framework to compensate victims." Also, Prof. Koh proffers that while criminal prosecution corresponds to deterrence and punishment, civil sanctions afford monetary and economic benefits to victims
of terrorism."0
Civil remedies to terrorism will ultimately, according to Prof. Koh, be
determined by the following considerations: "[w]hat objectives do the recognition and enforcement of civil remedies against terrorism serve and
what institutions within the national government are best situated to create and enforce the remedies - the courts, Congress, or the Executive
Branch?" ' Prof. Koh concludes that it is up to the Congress to craft extensive civil statutory schemes against terrorism.12 Only. in this manner,
can the development of public international litigation be sustained.1"
Other authors have also suggested that private sanctions are vital to
the war against terrorism. " As Prof. Jordan Paust noted, "a realistic approach to law and choice should not focus on questions of whether there
should be private involvement in decisions about and sanctions against
terrorism, but rather how to make private participation more useful."' 5
Prof. Paust advocates the use of the legislative and court systems to deter
terrorism.' 6 McDougal and Feliciano point to military, diplomatic, economic, and ideological solutions to terrorism.1 7 Additionally, Prof. Paust
discusses a possible cause of action for terrorist victims against common
carriers.'" More specifically, he states that tort law can be utilized by airline passengers to recover damages from airlines for acts committed by
terrorist groups on their planes.' 9
Imposing civil liability against airlines could be perceived as an equitable distribution of the risk and a promotion of anti-terrorism efforts.2 0
Thus, the idea of civil suits by the Klinghoffers against the owners of the
Achille Lauro does not seem novel, nor far-fetched.2 In fact, Prof. Paust
supports civil liability whenever individuals or institutions are intentionally or negligently involved in an act of terrorism.2 2 For instance, Prof.
Paust cites as an example a gun shop owner supplying illicit dum-dum

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 175-77.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 15-37 and accompanying text.
Paust, Private Measures of Sanction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERROR-

ISM 578 (Evans and Murphy eds. 1978).
16. Id. at 587, 593-5, 597-9, 607-11.
17. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW
63, 102-103, 148-58 (1961).
18. Paust, supra note 15, at 597.
19. Id. at 597-98.

AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

20. Id. at 598.

21. See infra notes 123-250 and accompanying text.
22. Paust, supra note 15, at 598.

56-57, 62-
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bullets to terrorists who commit violent acts. He argues that such a vendor should be held strictly liable for the damages resulting from the sale
of such an inherently dangerous product.2" Such civil sanctions would
greatly expand the scope of weapons which could be used to combat
24
terrorism.
While private causes of action involve non-state actors, strengthened
governmental rules regarding international civil procedure would also assist private suits.2 5 Additionally, more government rules are necessary to
coordinate resolutions of such suits in light of already existing bilateral
and multilateral conventions regarding jurisdiction and choice of law over
the offender.2 6 Such integration and use of established international law
precepts will ultimately enable a victim of terrorism to receive
27
compensation.
Several authors suggest that civil causes of actions may already be
brought under existing conventions, such as the European Convention on
28
the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (European Convention).
Professor Otto Lagodny points out that the European Convention expedites prosecution of terrorist offenders.29 More specifically, it denies terrorists the designation of their violent activities as "political offenses,"
which are excepted from extradition under the European Convention.30
As Article I provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of
the following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an
offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by
political motives: ...
c. a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents;
d. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious
unlawful detention;

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Leanza & Sico, Compensation for Victims of Maritime Terrorism, in
MAiTimE TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-105 (Ronilli ed. 1990); Trotter, Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Framework in the United States, 22 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 383 (1987); Pollock, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 235 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 103; Lagodny, The European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism, 60 COLO. L. REV. 583
(1989). European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan.
27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 [hereinafter ECST]. See also
Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Council
of Europe 1977).

29. Lagodny, supra note 28, at 584.

30. Id.
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e. an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic
firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons;
f. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation
as an accomplice
of a person who commits or attempts to commit such
'
an offence."'
Second, Professors Umberto Leanza and Luigi Sico argue that the
European Convention assists civil remedies in the fight against terrorism."2 More particularly, the Convention permits victims to be compensated by the nation where the crime occurred.3 3 While acknowledging
some immunities, Leanza and Sico note that the Convention provides,
"set maximum levels of compensation; specif[ies] damages that may be
claimed; outline[s] procedures
for placing claims; and guard[s] against
3 4
double compensation.
Other authors argue that civil remedies against terrorists can be
framed using existing U.S. legislation, namely, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization statute ("RICO").3 5 While the RICO statute
was not designed to curb terrorism, civil RICO permits private treble
damage suits by persons harmed in their property or business against
RICO "enterprises" involved in a "pattern of racketeering."36 RICO stipulates that a "pattern of racketeering" involves the carrying out of several
acts including "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, arson, or
3 7
extortion" within a ten-year period.
There has been some use of the civil RICO statute by U.S. Attorneys'
Offices against terrorist groups.3 s More particularly, the U.S. Attorney Office for the Southern District of New York utilized civil RICO provisions
to obtain injunctions, curb the actions, and gain the forfeiture of assets of
institutions who support terrorist groups.3 9 In contrast, United States v.
Ivic" ° attempted unsuccessfully to use criminal RICO against alleged arson and murder by Croation terrorists. 41 In Ivic, the Second Circuit concluded that criminal RICO was inapplicable because the alleged offenses

31. ECST, supra note 28, art. 1.
32. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 103.
33. ECST, supra at 28.
34. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 103.
35. Nathan & Juster, Law Enforcement Against International Terrorists: Use of the
RICO Statute, 60 COLo. L. REV. 553 (1989). RICO can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
38. Koh, supra note 5, at 175, n. 24.
39. Id. See Summary of Panel on Civil Remedies Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Terrorists, American Bar Association National Conference on the Law in Relationship to Terrorism (June 6, 1986) (remarks of Carl T. Solberg, Chief of Civil Division, Office
of United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York).
40. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. Id.
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were "neither claimed nor shown to have any mercenary motive."42
Furthermore, in Ivic, the court stated that "RICO's origins, most particularly
of the mischief it was meant to remedy, indicate that political terrorism,
at least when unaccompanied by any financial motive . . .is beyond its
contemplated reach."'

In a subsequent case, United States v. Bagaric," which involved allegations that a Croatian terrorist group was perpetrating an international
extradition scheme, the Second Circuit concluded that RICO required
that the criminal activities be motivated by only some economic or financial objectives."" Nevertheless, the Bagaric court concluded that terrorist
6
acts are beyond the reach of RICO.4
Given the apparent limitations of RICO to combat terrorism in the
U.S., Irvin Nathan and Kenneth Juster suggest amending RICO in order
to enlarge the predicate offenses list of the statute.' 7 This modification
would allow for sanctioning "(1) hostage taking, (2) assault on foreign or
8
federal offenses, and (3) assassination of foreign or federal officials.'
Furthermore, Nathan and Juster articulate that RICO should be
amended to eliminate the economic/financial motive to the predicate
list.'" If such changes are made to existing law, the authors conclude, the
U.S. will have another tool to fight terrorism. 0
The issue of who in the terrorist organization should be sued must
also be addressed." Although for evidentiary and length of procedure interests it would seem logical to file a civil action against the actual perpetrators, such defendants are unlikely to have the financial resources to
adequately compensate the victims. 2 Instead, it is more beneficial to
name the actual terrorist organization and its leaders in the suit; 3 however, impediments arise in such a scenario as well. 5' For example, since
terrorist organizations are illicit, secret cadres, it is often difficult, if not
impossible, to locate and attach their assets. 8
Consideration should also be given to the defenses which can be
claimed by terrorist organizations. 6 As has long been the case, terrorist

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 63.
706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 58.
Id.
Nathan & Juster, supra note 35, at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 99.
Id.
Id.

54. Id.

55. Id. at 100.
56. Id. See generally Roberts, The Legal Implications of Treating Terrorists as
Soldiers, 9 CONFLiCT 375 (1989).
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groups view themselves as freedom fighters and, in cases such as the
PLO, as sovereign states.5 7 If the latter is recognized as such an entity,
then the "terrorist" group (and its leaders) could proffer the defense of
sovereign immunity.58 As will be discussed below, most terrorist groups
which claim to be states, do not possess the attributes which define a
state under international law." Terrorists groups could, however, be
ascribed the signification of insurgents under international law.60 Viewing
a terrorist group as an insurgent would similarly provide this extra-legal
61
organization with the defenses of a sovereign state.
B.

Civil Suits Against Common Carriers

A plaintiff injured in a terrorist incident aboard a common carrier is
more likely to obtain a judgement against the charterer of the carrier or
against the common carrier itself than against a terrorist group.6 2 National laws often require that the safety of passengers (and their luggage)
be guaranteed by the common carrier.6 1 Moreover, international agreements, such as article 3 of the 1974 Athens Convention, state that: "[tihe
carrier shall be liable for the damage suffered as a result of the death of
or personal injury to a passenger and the loss of or damage to luggage if
the incident which caused the damage so suffered occurred in the course
of the carriage and was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier, of his
servants or agents acting within the scope of their employment.11 4 While
the Athens Convention is not yet in force, its basic principles shed light
on both contractual liability and tort culpability of a common carrier. 65
For instance, Italian law requires that, to obtain damages, a passenger (in
our analysis, a terrorist victim) need only show that the harm occurred
during the course of the voyage. 6 In contrast, in a tort-based suit, the
carrier's negligence must be demonstrated.6 7 If the negligence standard
must be satisfied in order to recover against the carrier, it would obviously be more difficult to prevail since it would be hard to show a direct
relationship between the harm caused by the terrorist and the negligence
68
of the carrier.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
anza &
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 100.
See infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text.
Id.
Roberts, supra note 56, at 375-88.
Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 100.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101. See arts. 409 and 412 (1), Codice della Navigazione (Italy) cited in LeSico, supra note 25, at 104.
Athens Convention of December 13, 1974, art. 3 [hereinafter Athens Convention].
Id.; Sico, supra note 25, at 101.
Sico, supra note 25 at 101, n.13, citing Italian legal provisions.
Id.
Id.
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Civil Suits Against Nations and Their Agents

Since it is a state's responsibility to check immigration and security
matters during pre-boarding of maritime vessels, it would appear, at first
glance, that state liability attaches if this duty is not met.6 9 More specifically, a state could likely be responsible "if the terrorist group was on
board the carrier from the time of embarking, or [at] a port of call where
terrorists boarded the carrier."7 Damages accruing from this state responsibility can be based on either direct or vicarious liability.7 Yet, using tort principles, a nation's liability for harms to passengers resulting
from a terrorist attack can accrue solely if the extra-legal attack was reasonably foreseeable.72 Furthermore, sovereign immunity laws and the act
of state doctrine may indeed 73 be a grave impediment to suits against
states by victims of terrorism.
III.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

The Achille Lauro incident brings into clear focus several international agreements that could have a useful role in fighting terrorism: The
1958 Convention on the High Seas, the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, and the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("I.M.O.
Convention"). 74 Before these international documents can be applied,
then to assess
however, it is necessary to define the term "piracy," and
75
whether the Achille Lauro incident constituted piracy.

69. Id. at 101.
70. Id. at 102.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention]. 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/122, art. 101, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Law of the Sea Convention]. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located On the Continental Shelf, International Maritime Organization Doc. SUA/CONF/16/Rev.2, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 668 (1988).
75. Compare McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for InternationalLaw,
52 TENN. L. REv. 691, 700 (1985) ("Thus it is evident that the seizure of the Achille Lauro
was piracy jure gentium"); Halberstam, Terrorism On the High Seas: The Achille Lauro
Piracy and the I.M.O. Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 282 (1988)
("While the Achille Lauro incident may bring the hijackers within the definition of piracy, it
might not apply to terrorist acts in different circumstances"); Gooding, Fighting Terrorism
in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158, 159
(1987) ("While it may be contended that the taking of the Achille Lauro is not included
within [the 1958 Convention on the High Seas] definition [of piracy] because there was no
second vessel involved or because the hijackers did not act for private ends, customary international law and the history of the enforcement of the norm against piracy indicate that
such a position is unfounded"). See also Ronzitti, The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force
Against Terrorist Activities, in MARITIME TERRORISM, supra at 25 ("[T]he Achille Lauro
hijacking cannot be considered as piracy, for two reasons: first, because the two-vessel re-
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Although an ancient crime, an authoritative definition of piracy is
lacking."6 Part of this deficiency is due to arguments over the components
of the crime which include: "[1] whether... an intent to rob, was a necessary element, [2] whether acts by insurgents seeking to overthrow their
government should be exempt, as were acts by state vessels and recognized belligerents, and [3] whether the act had to be by one ship against
another or could be on the same ship.""' Nevertheless, customary international law views piracy as a crime."8 More specifically, it encompasses
"every unauthorized act of violence against persons or goods committed
on the open sea either by a private vessel against another vessel or by the
mutinous crew or passengers against their own vessel. '7 9 In contrast,
modern maritime terrorism often involves acts committed on one ship,
and involves political rather than monetary goals.8 0
Under article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress is empowered to define and punish acts of piracy." While early federal court
decisions characterized piracy as "robbery and murder on the high seas"
and "depredation on the seas,"8 " later courts have focused on the utility
of sanctioning piracy in order to permit all countries "to navigate [freely]
on the high seas." ' Current legislation requires stringent punishment of a
convicted pirate.8 4 Yet because federal legislation defers its definition of
piracy to international law, international clarification of the elements of
piracy is vital.89
In order to establish a uniform definition of piracy in the law of nations, the 1958 Geneva Convention sculptured a straight-forward description of the crime. 6 The Convention provides that piracy includes any of

quirement is lacking; secondly, because piracy is a crime committed for private ends,
whereas terrorist organizations act for political aims." Note, Towards A New Definition of
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L. L. 723, 748 (1986) ("The Palestinians'
actions, however, do not qualify as piracy under international law").
76. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 272-73. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 154
(1928) ("There is no authoritative definition of international piracy").
77. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 272-73.
78. "[Pliracy by the law of nations, in its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis." S.S.
Lotus, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), reprinted in 2 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 20, 70 (Moore, J., dissenting).
79. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 608-09 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
80. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 277-281.

81. Congress is empowered to "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
82. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 155, 158 (1820).

83. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied,
685 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1114 (1983).
84. "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned
for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). See also 33 U.S.C. § 381 (1982) (discussing President's
right to implement public ships to counter piracy).
85. Id.
86. 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, art. 15. Article 101 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention has similar provisions on piracy. 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Dec. 10,
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the following:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any acts of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article. 8
Scholars have argued that the language "for private ends" does not
necessarily require an intent to rob.8 8 Yet, questions remained whether
this term "was intended to exclude all acts done for political purposes or
only acts committed by unrecognized insurgents that would be lawful if
committed by recognized belligerents."'89 Answers to these questions seem
to be pronounced in the affirmative by the International Law Commission's comments on the draft 1958 Geneva Convention.9" More specifically, the comment concluded that "the draft convention excludes from
its definition of piracy all cases of wrongful attacks on persons or property for political ends, whether they are made on behalf of states, or of
recognized belligerent organizations, or of unrecognized revolutionary
bonds." 91
Despite apparent exemption of terrorist acts from the elements of
piracy, Article 16 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas stipulates,
"[tihe provisions of this convention do not diminish a state's right under
international law to take measures for the protection of its nationals, its
ships and its commerce against interference on or over the high seas,
when such measures are not based upon jurisdiction over piracy. '92 The
comments to this article explain that this provision stands for the proposition that acts having the characteristics of piracy would be deemed
unlawful if carried out by the unrecognized belligerent, while the same
acts committed by revolutionaries would be legal. 3 More simply, only
when insurgents' piratical activities are aimed at a nation whose govern-

1982, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, art. 101, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
87. Id.
88. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 278.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Harvard Research in International Law, Comment to the Draft Convention on
Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 749, 786 (1932) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
92. 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, art. 16. See Halberstam, supra note 75, at
278-79 (discussing implications of art. 16).
93. Harvard Research, supra note 91, at 857; Halberstam supra note 74, at 279 (reviewing analysis of comments).
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ment they want to replace, will the attack be defined as non-piracy.9 4
Although international law often differentiates between soldiers and
insurgents, an exemption from liability due to an insurgent's arguable piratical actions hurts the world community's fight against terrorism." After all, language by one author describing the insurgent who commits
"piracy" as "not the enemy of the human race, but he is the enemy solely
of a particular state" is preposterous." Such an "escape" enables the terrorist/insurgent to be absolved of his crimes if he is conveniently labeled
an "insurgent."9 After all, Articles 15 and 16 of the 1958 Geneva Convention provide that the distinguishing characteristic, given the same facts,
between piracy and other crimes depends on whether the activities are for
political ends." Thus, by excluding political acts from this international
criminal designation, the world community is, in essence, approving of
many national liberation movements' crimes. 9 Such distinctions in the
1958 Geneva Convention must be reexamined since "personal security of
life and property far outweigh the need for radical groups to prey upon
the innocent."' 0 0
In conclusion, since international law is forever evolving, its metamorphosis must include "[an] exemption for insurgents [which] would
not exclude present-day terrorists, since it applied only to insurgents who
confined their attacks to a particular state."' 0 ' Furthermore, as Sir Lauterpacht explained, "it would not seem improper to describe and treat as
piratical such acts of violence on the high seas which by their ruthlessness
and disregard of the sanctity of human life invite exemplary punishment

and suppression. "102

94. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 279.

95. W.

HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW

234 (1st ed. 1884).

96. See Halberstam, supra note 75, at 279. See generally TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM
FIGHTERS, (E. Tavin and Y. Alexander eds. 1986); Rubin, Terrorism and the Laws of War,
12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 219 (1983); Bouffard, Extradition - Political Offense Exception - United States Court Creates A New Definition for Use Against InternationalTer-

rorists, 6

SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L

L.J. 197 (1982).

97. See Halberstam, supra note 75, at 288. "Insurgents who did not confine their attacks to ships and property of the government they sought to overthrow. . . were considered
pirates." Id. See also The Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. 47 (1853) (discussing that depending on whom they attack, persons may be considered pirates or insurgents).
98. McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United States'
Response to Achille Lauro - Questions of Jurisdictionand Its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 435, 448 (1986).
99. Crockett, Toward a Revision of the InternationalLaw of Piracy, 26 DE PAUL L.
REV. 78, 87, 92 (1976). See, Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 496 (1961); Vali, The Santa Maria Case, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 968 (1961) (providing overview of seizure of luxury ship in Caribbean by "pirates"/"rebels" opposing Portuguese
government).
100. McCredie, supra note 98, at 449.
101. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 289.
102. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-08 (1968).
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On October 7, 1985, four armed men, allegedly members of the Pales-

tine Liberation Front (PLF), a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), seized an Italian registered cruise ship, the Achille Lauro,
in Egyptian territorial waters. 103 The PLO hijackers, posing as passengers,
managed to board the vessel without any opposition.'" At the time of the
seizure, approximately one hundred passengers,
including twenty-eight
10 5
Americans, and a crew of 350 were aboard.
According to some accounts, the seizure and terrorist activity on the
Achille Lauro, some thirty miles off Port Said, Egypt, was not supposed
to occur.' 6 Instead, the hijackers were part of a team, masterminded by
Mohammed Abu Abbas, who intended to launch an attack in Ashdod,
Israel. 0 7 Apparently, as the terrorists were in their cabin taking stock of

their weapons, other passengers entered their room. Consequently, the
cadre was exposed, and the terrorists then decided to take control of the
10 8
ship.
Upon securing control of the vessel, the PLO terrorists stated that
they would blow up the Achille Lauro unless the Israeli government released fifty Palestinians held in Israeli jails. 109 Although the terrorists
probably foresaw Israeli nonacquiescence, they nevertheless stressed the
seriousness of their demands. 110 To underscore the ramifications of an Is103. Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Seized: Hijackers Demand Release of 50 Palestinians In Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, Al, at col. 6. The seizure of the Achille Lauro
occurred while the ship was sailing between two Egyptian cities, Port Said and Alexandria.
The Egyptians could assert jurisdiction over the incident since according to the Law of the
Sea, Egypt has a contiguous zone measuring twenty-four nautical miles from its shores.
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 37 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda
Item 28), U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/122 (1982).
The Palestine Liberation Front is a radical splinter group of the PLO, which broke
away from the umbrella group in 1982. The group is led by Abu Nidal. Bergen, Even With
A Name It's Hard To Know Who The Hijackers Are, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at A9, col. 2.
"Abu Nidal may be the deadliest terrorist alive ... Over the past twelve years [he] has
molded his organization . . . into a fanatical, amorphously structured terrorist band with
between 200 and 500 adherents." Master of Mystery and Murder, TIME, Jan. 13, 1986, at 31.
The PLF is composed of both pro-Arafat and anti-Arafat sections. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1985, § 1, at 7, col. 2.
For an overview of PLF's background and activities, see Y. ALEXANDER & J. SINAI, TERRORISM: THE PLO CONNECTION 43, 212-13 (1990) [hereinafter PLO CONNECTION]. For an indepth analysis of the PLO's structure, relations with other states, and activities see J.
BECKER, THE PLO: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (1984).
104. The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 30-31 [hereinafter TIME].
105. Id.
106. Tagliabue, supra note 103; N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
107. Id.; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6; McCredie, supra note 98, at 436.
108. McGinley, supra note 75, at 692.
109. Tagliabue, supra note 103, at Al, col. 6; Friedman, Jailed Palestinians:Hundreds
Held, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
110. Prial, Israel Firm on Terror Policy, But Seems Willing to Help, N.Y. Times, Oct.
9, 1985, at AS, col. 1 [hereinafter Israel Policy]; We Are Losing Patience,N.Y. Times, Oct.
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raeli refusal to release the jailed Palestinians, the hijackers brutally murdered an elderly, disabled American, Leon Klinghoffer. 111 This unprovoked shooting, and subsequent discard of Mr. Klinghoffer (and
wheelchair) overboard, marked the only fatality during the incident.'1 2
Negotiations attempted to find a resolution to the incident. Participants in the talks were Abu Abbas of the PLF, Ani el-Hassan, an adviser
to PLO Chairman Arafat, Egyptian authorities, and the hijackers.113 On
October 9, 1985, when the terrorists understood that the Israelis would
not negotiate, and upon obtaining a guarantee of their immediate release,
Egyptian authorities allowed Abbas to remove his comrades and accompany them off the ship."" The terrorists were then taken into custody by
Egyptian authorities, although they were not arrested." 5 The following
day, the Egyptian government claimed that it no longer knew the whereabouts of the Palestinian hijackers."' Despite these assurances by the
Egyptians, various intelligence sources obtained convincing evidence that
the terrorists had boarded an Egypt Air 737 flight to Tunisia." 7 Following
this exposition, the Egyptians argued that the hijackers were sent to Tunisia to stand trial before the National Ruling Council of the PLO."' Additionally, the purpose of the proposed transfer from Egyptian to PLO
forces was, according to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, an opportunity for Yasir Arafat to reiterate his denunciation of terrorism." 9
While the aircraft was in flight to Tunisia, President Reagan put
pressure on the Tunisian government, causing the latter to deny the
Egyptian plane the right to land.' More specifically, President Reagan
communicated to Tunisia that "the United States ha[d] reason to believe
... that the hijackers were on board an EgyptAir plane headed for Tunis
[Tunisia] .. .[and][that] the terrorists should not be allowed to land."''
The Tunisians agreed. At the same time, U.S. Navy F-14 fighter planes

9, 1985, at A9, col. 45 [hereinafter Patience].
111. Miller, Hijackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain, 400 Are Safe; U.S. Assails Deal With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
112. Id., N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6. At a 1988 press conference in
Algiers, Algeria, Abu Abbas, jokingly remarked that Mr. Klinghoffer "was trying to swim for
it." Memorial Foundation, infra note 266, at 2.
113. Sacerdofi, States' Agreements With Terrorists in Order to Save Hostages: Non-

Binding, Void or Justified by Necessity?, MARIME

TERRORISM,

supra note 25, at 25-26.

114. Israel Policy, supra note 110; Gwertzman, State Department Angry At Speedy
Accord With Gunmen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 3; Schumacher, Arafat Asks
That Gunmen Be Turned Over To PLO, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at All, col. 2.
115. TIME, supra note 104, at 33.
116. Getting Even, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22 [hereinafter Getting Even].
117. Id. at 20, 22-23.
118. You Can Feel The Damage, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 26.
119. Kifner, Mubarak, Furious at U.S., Demands a Public Apology, N.Y. Times, Oct.
15, 1985, at A10, col. 1. "If Arafat didn't punish them, then he would be responsible before
the whole world." Id.
120. The U.S. Sends A Message, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22 [hereinafter U.S. Message].
121. Getting Even, supra note 116, at 24.
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forced the Egyptian aircraft to land at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air base in Sigonella, Sicily.12" At the tarmac in Sigonella,
the U.S. Navy tried to obtain custody of the terrorists in order to transfer
them to the U.S. to stand trial. 22 Italian authorities intervened and the
hijackers were ultimately taken into custody by the Italians. 2 " Subsequently, the Italian government asserted jurisdiction over the terrorists,
and thus denied a United States request for extradition.125 While some of
the hijackers were awaiting trial in Spolet, Italy, the Italians allowed Abbas to leave by way of Yugoslavia. 2 Following his departure, Italian
prosecutors issued arrest warrants for him. Although three of the thirteen
individuals ultimately indicted in Italy in connection with the hijacking
were given life sentences in absentia, the three other convicted hijackers
were sentenced to 15, 24, and 30 years. 27
V.

CIVIL SUITS ARISING OUT OF THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT

A. Klinghoffer Causes of Action Against Various Actors in the Achille
Lauro Incident
The Klinghoffer family has at different periods and in various manners, sued the PLO and other parties based on the Achille Lauro attack.128 More specifically, Mrs. Klinghoffer brought suits on behalf on
herself and her husband in both the Supreme Court of New York and a
federal district court, the Southern District of New York. Following her
death, Mrs. Klinghoffer's daughters maintained these suits in both jurisdictions on behalf of their parents and in their own privilege.' 2 9

122. U.S. Message, supra note 120 at 22; Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying
Hijackers; Fighters Divert It To NATO Base in Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying of
Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A10, col. 6. "President Reagan ... ordered the dramatic military action after hearing that Egypt had turned down repeated American pleas to
prosecute the four gunmen and was flying them to freedom." Id. (providing quote of Mr.
Larry Speaks, White House spokesman). See McGinley, supra note 75 at 708-713 (discussing jurisdictional claims of PLO to prosecute Achille Lauro hijackers).
123. Apple, Change In Course, This Time Reagan Let His Actions Do His Thinking,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
124. Id.
125. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at A6, col. 4. See generally Fuller, Extraditionof Terrorists: An Executive Solution to the Limitations of the Political Offense Exception in the
Context of ContemporaryJudicial Interpretations of American Extradition Law, 11 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 351 (1988).
126. Tagliabue, Italians Identify 16 in Hijacking of Ship, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1985,
at A3, col. 4; Hijacker To Be Tried As Minor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A10, col. 3;
Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 27, 1985, at 3A, col. 3; See McGinley, supra note 75, at 713-15
(discussing jurisdictional claims of PLO to prosecute Achille Lauro hijackers).
127. Suro, Italian Jury Gives Cruise-Ship Killer 30-Year Sentence, N.Y. Times, July
11, 1986, at Al, col. 4; Suro, Hijacking Verdicts Appealed, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1986, at 3,
col. 1.
128. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. Goldie, Legal Proceedings Arising
From The Achille Lauro Incident in the United States of America, MARITIME TERRORISM,
supra note 25, at 107-27.
129. Goldie, supra note 128, at 107.
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To get a better understanding of the scope of the Klinghoffer v. PLO
litigation, it is important to review the various suits brought against other
130
actors in the Achille Lauro incident.
1. All Klinghoffer Suits Except Those in Which the PLO is a
Defendant
a.

Suit by Mrs. Klinghoffer

This suit, filed in November 1985, alleged various grounds for recovery from the travel and transportation actors involved in the Achille
Lauro incident.' More specifically, Mrs. Klinghoffer brought causes of
action against: Commissaria of the Flotta Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinara; S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave
Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria (jointly referred to as
"Lauro"); Port of Genoa, Italy ("Genoa"); Club ABC Tours, Inc.
("ABC"); Chandris (Italy) Inc. ("Chandris"); and Crown Travel
Service."3 2
In her complaint, Mrs. Klinghoffer set out the events on the Achille
Lauro.' 33 Moreover, she described in graphic detail the harsh treatment
which she (and other passengers) received.3 Specifically, she claimed
that while on the Achille Lauro she was battered, assaulted, falsely imprisoned, and threatened with death.3 9 As a result of this harsh treatment, Mrs. Klinghoffer asserted that she should recover damages arising
from acute pain and mental anguish, humiliation, anxiety, fright, depression, and the subsequent physical ramifications.3 6
Mrs. Klinghoffer proffered two theories for relief against Lauro, the
owner of the ship. 37 First, due to Lauro's wrongful acts, recklessness, and
negligence, she suffered the aforementioned injuries and damages. 38
More specifically, Mrs. Klinghoffer noted that Lauro had failed to offer
its passengers sufficient security (i.e., it failed to provide a thorough check
and search of passengers, including their passports and belongings, during
initial boarding in Genoa (October 3, 1985) as well as during subsequent
stops)."3 9 Second, Mrs. Klinghoffer alleged that Lauro caused her severe
emotional distress by negligently permitting the terrorists to threaten her
life." 0

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 107-27.
Id. at 107.
No. 85 Civ. 9803 (LLS); Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 19:3

b. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. Lauro
Pursuant to the Death on High Seas Act,"' Mrs. Klinghoffer, on behalf of her husband, initiated suit against Lauro." 2 In that litigation she
asserted that her husband's death was a consequence of neglect, wrongful
acts, and recklessness of Lauro."13 In claiming damages, including those to
cover funeral expenses, the plaintiff asserted that during the takeover of
the ship, Mr. Klinghoffer suffered severe emotional distress and physical
pain, particularly when he was shot. Also, Mrs. Klinghoffer claimed recovery based on general maritime survival statutes and maritime wrongful
death legislation." 4
c.

Mrs. Klinghoffer v. ABC

In this cause of action, Mrs. Klinghoffer insisted that ABC Tours
breached its contractual obligations by failing to provide safe passage on
the Mediterranean cruise." 5 Such wanton behavior, Mrs. Klinghoffer as146
serted, was coupled with negligent security measures.
d.

Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. ABC

The plaintiff herein alleged that ABC breached its contractual obligations and failed to comply with warranty provisions. 147 As in Mrs.
Klinghoffer's case against ABC, plaintiff asserted that the travel agent
failed to arrange an adequately safe voyage and thereby acted outrageously and wantonly. 4 8 Also, a negligence claim was brought stating that
ABC knew or should have comprehended that the cruise had insufficient
security." 9 Lastly, this action rested on the allegation that ABC did not
sufficiently explicate the limited liability asserted on the cruise tickets.' 50
e.

Mrs. Klinghoffer v. Chandris

In this suit against the charterer and common carrier of passengers
on the Achille Lauro, Mrs. Klinghoffer stressed that Chandris was negligent in its failure to provide stringent inspection of persons, luggage,
passports, and other security items.' 51 Furthermore, Mrs. Klinghoffer alleged that the negligent acts of Chandris were directly responsible for the
emotional distress she suffered.' 52

141. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-66 (1982).

142. No. 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS); Goldie, supra note 128, at 109.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.

No. 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS); Id. at 109-10.
Id.
No. 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS); Id. at 110.
Id.

149. Id.
150. Id.

151. No. 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS); Id. at 110-11.
152. Id.
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f. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. Chandris
In this cause of action, the Estate of Klinghoffer alleged that the
death of Mr. Klinghoffer occurred as a result of wrongful acts, recklessness, and neglect by Chandris. 15 3 This suit was also based on the Death
on the High Seas Act.'"4
g. Mrs. Klinghoffer v. Port of Genoa, Italy
Mrs. Klinghoffer alleged that the port was negligent in not providing
appropriate security.'5 5 More emphatically, there was insufficient inspection of luggage, passports, and passengers when boarding of the Achille
Lauro.' 56 Furthermore, this subpar
inspection led to the emotional dis157
tress which the plaintiff suffered.

h. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. Port of Genoa, Italy
The Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer as in other causes of action, claimed
recovery pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act.5 8 Also, the Estate
sought compensation for pain and distress caused by the terrorists.5 9 Additionally, the Estate appended claims for recovery claiming wrongful
death, pursuant to general maritime legislation. 60
2. Klinghoffer v. PLO: Suits in the Supreme Court of New York and
Federal District Court (Southern District of New York)
The Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer also sued the PLO pursuant to the
Death on the High Seas Act.' 6 ' Several other theories for recovery were
also proffered: (1) recovery pursuant to the wrongful death precept in
New York's Estates Powers & Trusts Law;'"1 (2) maritime wrongful
death, pursuant to general maritime law; 63 (3) a tort claim of assault,
based on the PLO's intentional acts;'" (4) a battery claim; 65 (5) an allegation of false imprisonment; 666 7 (6) claims of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.

Mrs Klinghoffer asserted similar claims against the PLO, except for
153.
154.
155.
.156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 112-13.
Id.
Id.
Supreme Court of New York, New York County, Civil Action No. 27801/85.
New York Estates Powers & Trusts Law §§ 5-4.1 [hereinafter NYEPTL].
Goldie, supra note 128, at 114.
Id.; NYEPTL, supra note 164, §11-3.2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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'
those based on wrongful death. 68

B. Third Party Complaint of Chandris Against the PLO and the Port
of Genoa, Italy
In response to the suits filed against it by the Klinghoffers, Chandris
filed third-party complaints, in which it sought indemnity or contribution, from the PLO and the Port of Genoa, Italy.1 8 In this third-party
complaint, Chandris sought contribution or indemnity from the PLO,
based on its negligence, intentional conduct, wrongful acts, and
recklessness. 7 '
In classifying the PLO as an unincorporated association, Chandris
further stated that the terrorist organization "conceived, conspired, organized, authorized and directed its agents, servants, officers, employees
and operatives to willfully, wantonly and maliciously" capture the Achille
Lauro, and subsequently caused Mr. Klinghoffer's death. 71 Additionally,
Chandris proffered that the PLO's activities in the Achille Lauro affair
constituted a crime, an intentional tort, and an activity hostis humani
generis, thereby making the PLO responsible for damages in excess of
$10,000.172

Three jurisdictional prongs were used in this case: 28 U.S.C. section
1331 (providing federal jurisdiction due to federal question), 28 U.S.C.
section 1332 (establishing federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship), and 28 U.S.C. section 1333 (fixing federal jurisdiction due to
admiralty and maritime laws).'7
Lastly, Chandris stated that the Port of Genoa, Italy does not possess
the sovereign immunity defense, and consequently should indemnify or
contribute for its failure to sufficiently inspect the passengers of the
7
Achille Lauro.' '
VI.

THE JUNE 1990 ORDER OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN KLINGHOFFER

A.

v. PLO

Introduction

Passengers on the Achille Lauro, filed suits in federal district court in
New York, alleging that "the owner and charterer of the Achille Lauro,
travel agencies and various other entities" failed to notify passengers or
thwart the attack. 1 8 Among these suits was one brought by Mrs. Marilyn

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Goldie, supra note 126, at 114-15.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. AchiUe Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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In the Klinghoffer action, jurisdiction was proffered on several
prongs: the Death of the High Seas Act, 1 77 diversity of citizenship, and
state law. 178 In response to the suit, the Crown Service Travel, Inc. and
Chandris, Inc. impleaded the PLO, calling for contribution or indemnification for reparations imposed against them based on the passengers'
suits as well as for punitive and compensatory
damages for the PLO's
7 9
"tortious interference with their businesses.'
The PLO moved to dismiss the suit. They asserted that: (1) there
was no subject matter jurisdiction because this case presents a nonjusticiable political question; (2) there was no personal jurisdiction over the
PLO; (3) the PLO, assuming that it is an unincorporated association,
lacked the capacity to be sued; and (4) service of process on Mr. Terzi,
PLO Permanent Observer, in New York was insufficient. 80
Judge Stanton, in a pithy ten-page order, denied the PLO's motion
to dismiss. He first ruled that the PLO is not a foreign state, but rather
an unincorporated association. Next, the court concluded that the subject
matter of the case includes tort claims arising from federal admiralty law
and, as a result, the political question doctrine is inapplicable. 8 ' Additionally, the court determined that section 301 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.) granted it jurisdiction over the PLO, which
according to the statute was "doing business" in the state.'8 2 Furthermore, because "substantial, continuous, and purposeful contacts with
New York could be attached to PLO activity, the exertion of jurisdiction
over the terrorist organization amply accords due process."8 3 The court
denied PLO claims that its U.N. Observer status accorded it diplomatic
immunity under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement.8
Next, since the suit was brought under federal maritime law, federal
law is applicable for substantive issues, rather than the state law of where
the court sits.'8 5 Finally, the court upheld the service of process upon Mr.
Terzi finding that his position in the U.N. classified him as an agent of
the PLO under section 301 of New York C.P.L.R.' 8"

176. Id. at 856 n.1. The court noted that upon Mrs. Marilyn Klinghoffer's death, her
daughters lsa Klinghoffer and Lisa Klinghoffer Arbitter, were substituted as plaintiffs. Id.
177. 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761-767 (1982).
178. See S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 857 (citing various bases of jurisdiction in
Klinghoffer action). "Later, other Achille Lauro passengers filed two actions directly against
the PLO alleging diversity of citizenship jurisdiction." Id.
179. Id. at 857.
180. Id. at 858.
181. Id. at 858-60.
182. Id. at 860-63.
183. Id. at 865.
184. Id. at 863-5.
185. Id. at 865-6.
186. Id. at 867.
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B. The Nature of the PLO
Concerning its classification for litigation, the PLO implored the
court to adopt its self-description as a state.187 More specifically, the PLO
characterized itself as "the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian
people."18 8 Consequently, the PLO sought designation as a sovereign nation. Nevertheless, the court found the PLO to be an unincorporated association.189 Support for this classification was articulated through the citation of Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc.19° and Health Care Equalization
Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y.' 91

More persuasive than the court's finding that the PLO was an unincorporated association, however, was the court's finding that the PLO was
not a sovereign state. ' 92 The court determined that the PLO lacked the
key elements of nationhood, as articulated by international law. International law requires that a state must be "an entity that has a defined
territory, and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities."19 3 Because the PLO does not comport
with the standard definition of a state, for purposes of this litigation, the
PLO was classified as an unincorporated association. 9"
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court found subject matter jurisdiction on several bases. 9 5 Admiralty jurisdiction was established since the Achille Lauro incident involved torts, including wrongful death, on the high seas. 198 As 28 U.S.C.
section 1333 provides: "district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases and all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled.'19

7

Further support for the court's

187. Id. at 857-8.
188. Id. at 857, (citing Affidavit of attorney for PLO Ramsey Clark sworn to April 27,
1987, 6).
189. Id. at 858.
190. Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir. 1985)(citing Black's Law
Dictionary 111 (5th Ed. 1979)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033, 106 S. Ct. 596, 88 L.Ed. 2d 575
(1988). "An unincorporated association is defined as a body of persons acting together and
using certain methods for prosecuting a special purpose or common enterprise." Id.
191. Health Care Equalization Comm. of Iowa Chiropractic Soc'y v. Iowa Medical
Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 1980), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1988).
192. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 858.
193. Id. (citing National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551,
553 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 201 (1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535, 103 L.Ed.2d 840 (1989).
194. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 858.
195. Id. at 158-59.
196. Id. at 859.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). Also, the court determined that pursuant to the "savings
to suitors" clause (§ 1333), plaintiff can bring a cause of action for maritime torts in federal
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finding admiralty jurisdiction was provided by American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhory98 which noted that "every seizure by
force on the high seas is prima facie piracy, and hence, a maritime
tort."1 9 The court also determined subject matter jurisdiction exists over
the Klinghoffers' suits since the Death on the High Seas Act provides
jurisdiction over causes of actions for wrongful death on the high seas.200
D.

The Political Question Doctrine

The PLO also argued that this suit was not justiciable because it involved foreign policy questions which are outside the court's jurisdiction;
such issues, the PLO continued, are best left to other sectors of government.2 1 To support this political question argument, the PLO relied
upon Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.2 °2 In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit
dismissed civil suits arising from attacks on civilians by the PLO, other
Palestinian organizations, and Libya.2 0 3 The Tel-Oren court determined
that such suits would require political evaluations of "terrorism's place in
the international order" and therefore must be dismissed. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that a judgment on the activities of Libya and the PLO
could interfere with U.S. foreign
policy, an area exclusively controlled by
20
the President and Congress. '
However, Judge Stanton distinguished the facts of Tel-Oren from the
Achille Lauro setting, by noting that the potential harmful effects of assessing the justiciability of the Achille Lauro suit were minimal.20 Moreover, Judge Stanton explained that simply because political ramifications
and foreign affairs are involved does not mean that political questions
exist. 2 6 In sum, Judge Stanton held that seizure of the Achille Lauro,
resulted in non-political personal and property tort claims. Therefore, the

or state court. Id., citing Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.
1989).
198. 257 F.Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966).
199. Id. at 627.
200. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 859.
201. Id. The political question precept was well-described in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
202. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S. Ct.
1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985). In Tel Oren, 726 F.2d at 775, the suits were brought pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) which provided aliens with jurisdiction over torts committed by
aliens in circumvention of international law or U.S. treaties. See generally International
Terrorism: Beyond the Scope of InternationalLaw: Tel-Oren & Libyan Arab Republic, 12
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 505 (1986).

203. 726 F.2d at 823.
204. Id. at 824-25.
205. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 860. "None of those considerations [of those listed
in Tel-Oren] is present here. The PLO has condemned the Achille Lauro seizure and stated
that it was an act of piracy. It was not at war with either Italy or the United States. No
party asserts that the Achille Lauro seizure was legitimate." Id.
206. Id. at 860. To support this argument, Judge Stanton cited Baker v.Carr,369 U.S.
at 212, 82 S.Ct. at 710 ("The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not
one of political cases.").
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"policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for
resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch 07 would not be disturbed.
E.

Personal Jurisdiction

The Southern District of New York has stated several times that, in
admiralty claims, personal jurisdiction is set according to state law. Consequently, Judge Stanton explained that New York C.P.L.R. section 301
could legitimately confer personal jurisdiction over the PLO.20 8 Although
no court had specifically applied section 301 to an unincorporated association, nonresident individuals doing business in New York had been subjected to jurisdiction under this section by a federal district court.20 9 Additionally, New York general associations law permits suits against
unincorporated associations by designation of either its treasurer or president.210 This vital precept, in conjunction with reports that New York
C.P.L.R. 301 jurisdiction could be expanded, even to non-corporate defendants "doing business" in New York, lends
support to Judge Stanton's
211
subject matter jurisdiction determination.
Judge Stanton set out the relevant legal precedent prior to determining the applicability of section 301 and whether the PLO was "doing business" in the state.21 2 As described in McGowan v. Smith,2 1 3 defendants
who engage in continuous and systematic conduct may be classified as
"doing business" under section 301.21' Furthermore, Andrulonis v.
United States215 illustrated that should a court determine that, under
section 301, a defendant is doing business in New York, suits may arise
on claims whether or not they are connected to the New York activities. 216 In the present case, the court determined that the PLO's contacts
with New York are constant and substantial.1 7 More specifically, the
court noted that the PLO: owns a building in New York City, utilized
both as an office and residence; maintains bank accounts; has a telephone
listing; owns automobiles; and has employees in Manhattan. 218 Such purposeful and significant connections with New York adequately abide with

207. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S. Ct.
2860, 2865-66 (1988). S.N.C. Achille, 739 F.Supp. at 860. Bachrach v. Keaty, 698 F. Supp.
461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Cutco Industry, Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986).
208. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. 861.
209. Id.; See Diskin v. Starck, 538 F. Supp. 877, 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
210. Id.; N.Y. Gen. Ass'ns Law § 13 (McKinney 1942 & Supp. 1990).
211. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 862; 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil
Practice 1 301.15, at 3-30 through 31.
212. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F.Supp. at 862.
213. 52 N.Y.2d 268, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 943, 419 N.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1981).
214. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 861.
215. 526 F. Supp. 183, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
216. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 862.
217. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 863.
218. Id.
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the standards set out in section 301.219
F. PLO's Claim of Immunity
The court did not accept the PLO's claims of immunity from suit
due to its position as a U.N. Observer. 220 The PLO's suggestion that its

actions are immune from scrutiny because of section 15 of the U.N.
Headquarters Agreement was rejected. 21 As the court explained, section

15 of the Headquarters Agreement applies only to United Nations members; the PLO is not such a member. Also, other immunities and privileges accorded U.N. representatives and their staffs are limited to those
"performed in the exercise of the [PLO's] observer function" not "to
[those] matters completely unrelated to the presence."2"' Consequently,
the PLO's immunity defense was rejected.22 3
G. Due Process
Regarding due process implications of New York C.P.L.R. section
22 4
301, the PLO was deemed to have sufficient contacts with New York.
Thus, the causes of action initiated by plaintiffs in New York would not
infringe upon the standard of "traditional notions of fair play and subthe precept enunciated in International Shoe Co. v.
stantial justice,"
225
Washington.

H. Capacity to be Sued
Because these maritime tort suits are based on either admiralty or
diversity jurisdiction, federal maritime statutes, not state legal precepts,
are applicable. 221 Consequently, jurisdiction over the PLO is available
since case law provides that plaintiffs have a cause of action against an
unincorporated association in its own name, despite the lack of provisions
by state law. 227 Furthermore, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 17(b) allows
both plaintiffs to initiate suit against the PLO in its own name.22 '
I. Service of Process
The last issue before Judge Stanton was whether Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4 guidelines were followed during service of process on the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 863-64.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 864.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 865.
225. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
226. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 865-66.
227. Id. at 866 (citing Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73-74,
65 S. Ct. 142, 143-44, 89 L.Ed. 78 (1944).
228. S.N.C. AchiUe, 739 F.Supp. at 866 n. 9.
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PLO's agent Mr. Terzi2 " First, Judge Stanton stated that Rule 17(b)(1)
permits the cause of action against the PLO to be designated in its common name.2 30 Second, Rule 4(d)(3) authorized Mr. Terzi to receive service
process. " 1 Furthermore, federal law stipulates that "service is sufficient
when made upon an individual who stands in such a position as to render
it fair, reasonable, and just to imply the authority on his part to receive
service." ' " Therefore, the court observed, since Mr. Terzi was responsible
for the PLO's extensive New York functions, service upon the PLO complied with Rule 4(d)(3). 33

VII.

ANALYSIS OF KLINGHOFFER

v. PLO

In the Klinghoffer litigation, Judge Stanton ruled that the Death on
the High Seas Act was an appropriate springboard to obtain subject matter jurisdiction.234 Yet, complex arguments regarding the role of state law
in Death on the High Seas Act cases demonstrate the need for further
development of the law concerning this issue. 35 Section 7 of the Death on
the High Seas Act provides that "[t]he provisions of any State statute
giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be
23 6
affected by this chapter.
Recent cases have ascribed that even if the Death on the High Seas
Act applies, state courts may have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction. 2 7 More specifically, in Lowe v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,2 38 the
Southern District of New York determined that, in causes of action involving suits when deaths take place beyond territorial waters, the Death
on the High Seas Act is not the sole jurisdictional statute. 3 9 In fact, the
court in Lowe acknowledged that a plaintiff can bring suit based on state
law.2 0 Similarly, in Rairigh v. Erlbeck,24 1 the court determined that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in wrongful death
suits. 2 2 Support providing states with jurisdiction for wrongful death
suits on the high seas was- provided by a recent U.S. Supreme Court deci-

229. Id. at 866.
230. Id. at 867.
231. Id. at 867 (citing Montclair Elecs., Inc. v. Electra Midland Corp., 326 F. Supp, 839,
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) quoting American Football League v. National Football League, 27
F.R.D. 264, 269 (D.Md. 1961)).
232. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F.Supp. at 867. Once again, the Court also cited C.P.L.R. §
301, to emphasize that the PLO was "doing business" in the state. Id..
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
235. Goldie, Excurus of the Current State of the Admiralty Law on Wrongful Death in

the United States of America,
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
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46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982).
Goldie, supra note 235, at 129.
396 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id.
Id.
488 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id.

supra note 25, at 129-37.
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sion.2' s More specifically, in Morange v. State Marine Lines, Inc.,2" the
Supreme Court of the U.S. concluded that general maritime law acknowledges a cause of action for wrongful death on all navigable waters, including a state's territorial and internal waters, and on the high seas.""
Despite the apparent breadth of concurrent jurisdiction, Justice
O'Connor in 1986 reiterated the role of section 7 in the Death on the
High Seas Act."" More particularly, the U.S. Supreme Court advocated
2 4
in Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire
7 that "the language of section 7 and
its legislative history, as well as the congressional purposes underlying
DOHSA, mandate that section 7 be read not as an endorsement of the
application of state wrongful death statutes to the high seas, but rather as
a jurisdictional saving clause.24 8 Viewed in this light, section 7 serves not
to destroy the uniformity of wrongful death remedies on the high seas but
to facilitate the effective and just administration of those remedies. 24 9
This pronouncement supports Judge Stanton's finding of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act. 50
VIII.
A.

U.S.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Introduction

A bill recently considered by Congress, S.2465, for the first time creates a civil cause of action for U.S. victims of international terrorist incidents against the perpetrators of this violence. 51 Support for S. 2465 was
fervently expressed by two senators who introduced the bill in April 1990,
Senator Charles E. Grassley and Senator Howell Heflin.2 52 At the Senate
Subcommittee hearing on July 25, 1990, Senator Grassley explained that
the impetus for S. 2465 was the outrage and tragedy faced by families of
American victims of terrorism." 2 Namely, Senator Grassley stated:
We must understand that the victims of Pan Am 103, Mr. Klinghoffer, and others, were victims because they were Americans; they died
because they were Americans. We must do all we can to assist and

243. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970); Goldie, supra note 235, at 130.
244. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1979).
245. Id.
246. DOHSA, supra note 235, at 131-34.
247. 477 U.S. 207, 91 L.Ed.2d. 174, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
248. Id. at 231-32.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
251. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, 136 CONG. REC., Apr. 19, 1990, No. 43, at 54592.
252. Hearing On The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, (S.2465), Senate Judiciary Subcommittee On Courts and Administrative Practice, July 25, 1990 (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Grassley) [hereinafter Grassley]; Hearing On The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, July 25, 1990
(statement of Sen. Howell Heflin) [hereinafter Heflin]. The bill was co-sponsored by 13 senators including: Sen. Hatch, Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Biden, Sen. Specter, Sen. Simon, Sen.
Levin, Sen. Lieberman, Sen. Murkowski, Sen. Deconcini, Sen. Coats, Sen. Boschwitz, Sen.
Metzenbaum, and Sen. Helms. Grassley, supra note 252, at 2.
253. Grassley, supra note 252, at 2.
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comfort the family of American victims. And it also seems to me that
we ought to make it clear to the world how we feel about the taking of
2
American lives. 5'
While acknowledging that United States law, including 18 U.S.C. section 2331 (1988), allows for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction for acts
of international terrorism, Senator Grassley pointed out that legislation
providing comparable civil remedies do not exist.2"' The Senator concluded by stating that S. 2465 would provide a legislative tool by which
American victims of terrorist incidents could have a cause of action
2 56
against their attackers.
[S. 2465] sends a strong and clear message to the world on how the
American legal system deals-with terrorists ....S. 2465 empowers the
victims of terrorism to seek justice. It. gives them the right to have
their day in court to prove who is responsible for all the world to see.
S. 2465 is clear, express and equivocal: this legislation reaffirms our
commitment to the rule of law. With this law, the people of the
United States will be able to bring terrorists to justice the "American
Way." By using the framework of our legal system to seek justice
against those who follow no framework and defy all notions of moral57
ity and justice.2
Additionally, Senator Grassley agreed with the June 7, 1990, court
order in Klinghoffer v. PLO in which Judge Stanton held that the American judicial system has personal jurisdiction over the PLO.2 5 8 While noting that this case is a landmark event, the Senator declared his concern
that Klinghoffer might not be followed.2 59 Subsequently, Senator Grassley
opined that federal legislation, particularly S. 2465, was the only manner
in which to empower Americans with litigate responses to terrorism.2 ' 0 In
this way, "a strong warning to terrorists [is sent] to keep their hands off
Americans and an eye on their assets!" ''
Senator Heflin, co-sponsor of the bill, similarly stated his support for
S. 2465.262 Pointing to the past decade of American victimization by international terrorists, Senator Heflin pronounced that U.S. criminal sanctions must be complemented with civil remedies. 2 6 Consequently, Senator Heflin claimed that by amending 18 U.S.C. section 2331, S. 2465
would provide American plaintiffs civil causes of action in U.S. federal
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Id. at 1.

1991

MARITIME TERRORISM AND LEGAL RESPONSES

courts, for injuries sustained during a terrorist act. 6 " Only in this manner, Senator Heflin added, can victims of terrorism obtain some monetary
2 65
compensation for their physical and mental injuries.
B.

Comments on S. 2465 Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee,

Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practices
1. Terrorist Victims' Families
Adding some pathos and personal experience to the terrorism debate,
family members of victims of international terrorist activities were provided with a forum to express their views on S. 2465.266 The first panel
included Lisa Klinghoffer, daughter of Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer, victims of the Achille Lauro incident. 67 Speaking on behalf of the Leon and
Marilyn Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation League, Ms.
Klinghoffer stated that S. 2465 serves both symbolic and practical purposes. 2 68 On a global arena, the bill would support criminal sanctions for
international terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, while at the same time,
send a clear signal that Americans will not tolerate being the victims of
terrorism.266 Additionally, the bill would exhibit the legislature's commitment to fighting terrorism.17 0 On a practical level, the bill would provide
2 71
U.S. plaintiffs with clear statutory solutions.
Ms. Klinghoffer reviewed the difficulties which her family had in filing suit against the PLO. 7 2 Since U.S. statutes did not provide an explicit civil cause of action against terrorists, the Klinghoffers were forced
to litigate numerous procedural issues.272 The Klinghoffers finally obtained a ruling allowing for jurisdiction over the terrorist group, but only
after much difficulty. 74 The aforementioned bill would cure present deficiencies in U.S. law by also allowing civil suits against state-sponsors of
terrorism.2 75 Additionally, the bill would provide recovery of treble dam2 76
ages as well as permit the recovery of attorney fees.
The next family member of a victim of terrorism to testify on S. 2465

264. Id.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Hearings on The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, July 25, 1990, (statement of the Leon
and Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation League) [hereinafter
Memorial Foundation]; Statement of Rosemary Wolfe, [hereinafter Wolfe]; and Statement
of Paul S. Hudson [hereinafter Hudson].
267. Memorial Foundation, supra, note 266, at 1.
268. Id. at 1-2.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id.
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272. Id. at 2.
273. Id. at 4.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 4.
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was Rosemary Wolfe. 2 77 Ms. Wolfe was the stepmother of Miriam Wolfe,
a twenty-year-old college student who was one of the 269 passengers
aboard Pan Am 103 when it blew up over Scotland in 1988.78 In Ms.
Wolfe's view, prosecution and punishment of terrorists and their statesponsors are often not pursued by the U.S. government for political reasons. 27 9 For instance, Ms. Wolfe noted that although the "smoking gun"
from Pan Am 103 can be traced to both the government of Iran and Ahmed Jibril, it is a lack of political resolve which prevents these terrorist
perpetrators from being brought to justice. 80 The lack of faith in the U.S.
government's will to adequately punish terrorists led her to conclude that
"[flamilies of the victims of terrorism need . . . civil recourse in the
courts. For this may be our only recourse. "281
Another group representing the families of victims of Pan Am 103
described their support for S. 2465.282 Mr. Paul Hudson testified on behalf of the families and noted that S. 2465 would empower victims of
terrorism and break down the shields which have protected terrorists
from U.S. civil justice. s Furthermore, Mr. Hudson stressed his concern
that the U.S. government should act as co-plaintiff in civil litigation
against terrorists, although control of the suit should remain with the victims' families. 284 Without the strict support of this legislation, as well as
U.S. government approval, subsequent suits against extra-legal force
285
could yield "tragedy as well as frustration.1
2.

Department of State

The Department of State's position on S. 2465 was presented by Mr.
Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor.28 8 Mr. Kreczko noted that the
benefits of the Grassley-Heflin bill are manifold.2 8 7 First, the legislation
will give victims of terrorism civil remedies in U.S. courts, and present

277. Wolfe, supra at 266.
278. Id. at 1.
279. Id. at 2-3.
280. Id. "Mr. Sofaer, legal adviser to the Secretary of State from June of 1985 until last
month, acknowledges that Iran had responsibility in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988. Yet, for the past year and a half our government has refused to
point the finger of blame. The madmen who murdered our precious children and all our love
ones, including my stepdaughter Miriam Wolfe, go free and unpunished. In the process, we
refuse to deal with Iran's involvement. Can Iran's involvement in the bombing of Pan Am
103 be acknowledged by U.S. officials only once they have resigned?" Letter to the Editor,
Wolfe, Denying Iran's Role in Pan Am Flight 103, Wash. Post, July 13, 1990, at A20.
281. Wolfe, supra note 266, at 3.
282. See Hudson, supra note 266.
283. Id. at 1.
284. Id. at 2.
285. Id.
286. Hearing on the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, July 25, 1990, Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal
Advisor [hereinafter Kreczko].
287. Id. at 5.
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disincentives for terrorists. "8 Consequently the breadth of statutory tools
against terrorism would be augmented. Second, the potential of civil liability and asset confiscation could deter terrorist groups from both soliciting and maintaining assets in the U.S. " 9 Third, the Grassley-Heflin bill
could be mimicked by other national legislatures, thereby expanding international resolve against terrorism.2 90 Fourth, this civil cause of action
could be pursued in instances when criminal prosecution, due to a higher
evidentiary standard, would be precluded. 9'
While acknowledging general support for this legislation, Mr.
Kreczko asserted that further revisions were needed before the State Department could fully support the bill." More specifically, Mr. Kreczko
expressed his doubts about the practicability of the legislation, since he
believes that few terrorists could be caught travelling to the U.S. or holding assets in U.S. based banks. " 3
The major concerns, as expressed by Mr. Kreczko, are credible and
weighty."" Serious concern exists regarding the possibility that the
Grassley-Heflin bill would be used in suits against sovereign nations and
their officials.2 9 5 Thus, the State Department favored the addition of a
provision, section 2336(b), which would prohibit the bill from applying to
foreign states, defined under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as
well as "any offices or employees thereof."29' 6 The State Department's rationale was several fold.2 97 Most obviously, the feasibility of civil suits in
U.S. courts against foreign countries or officials, based on their alleged
terrorist acts, could generate severe terrorism against U.S. interests, including U.S. allies.2 8 A pronouncement by U.S. courts over foreign states
would be highly disfavored by a majority, if not all, of the foreign
states. 9 9 Moreover, Mr. Kreczko argued that such jurisdiction is violative
of the international principle of sovereign immunity recognized by U.S.
law."' 0 He similarly argued that a provision must be placed in the
Grassley-Heflin bill which would prevent plaintiffs from skirting through
suits against foreign government officials."0 '
Another argument voiced against a change in the sovereign immunity
precept vis-a-vis the Grassley-Heflin bill stems from the reciprocity of
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other legislation. 02 For instance, foreign countries, or their citizens, as
defendants to potential S. 2465 claims could respond with reciprocal statutory schemes which would ultimately serve to label the U.S. or its citizens as terrorists 03 Another drawback to allowing civil suits in U.S.
courts against nations or their officials charged with being terrorists is
that such strategic and highly sensitive positions should be articulated by
3 04
the U.S. government, rather than by private individuals.
Finally, Mr. Kreczko explained the State Department's uneasiness
with the possibility that frivolous and gadfly suits could arise based on
alleged terrorist activities by foreign officials and their governments.30 5
For instance, this tool could be utilized by dissident groups and others to
gain publicity while at the same time harming U.S. relations with other
governments." 6 Also, numerous lengthy suits initiated against foreign
governments and their officials could ultimately cause a severe financial
strains on them." 7
3.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice ("DOJ") also provided its view on S.
2465.08 Mr. Steven R. Valentine, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, explained that the DOJ generally supported S. 2465's design to redress harms to Americans caused by terrorists through civil litigation.80 9 Yet he stated that the DOJ also had reservations concerning
several provisions of the Grassley-Heflin bill.310 This apprehension dealt
with those suits that could result in conflicts between civil actions by private citizens and the law enforcement efforts of the United States.3 '
The DOJ feared that civil suits proposed under 18 U.S.C. section
2333 of the bill would obstruct criminal litigation." 2 Civil suits under the
bill would involve the testimony of vital government witnesses who could
compromise ongoing investigations or prosecutions. 3 Moreover, during
discovery proceedings, delicate information could be exposed, and prose-

302. Id. at 8.
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304. Id. at 8-9.
305. Id. at 9.
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308. Hearings on the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Steven Valentine, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, July 25, 1990 [hereinafter Valentine].
309. Id. "We support the major concepts embodied in S. 2465. The Department [of
Justice] supports legislation to provide a new civil remedy against terrorists and a federal
forum for the families and relatives of victims to pursue claims for compensatory damages.
Such a cause of action will assist in compensating victims, and have a deterrent effect on the
commission of acts of international terrorism against Americans." Id. at. 6.
310. Id. at 7.
311. Id. at 7.
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cutors would be forced to reply to time consuming civil discovery requests. 1' Thus, the DOJ proposed that a provision be included in the bill
to allow "the Attorney General to certify that discovery of the government's criminal investigative file in a terrorist incident ... will compromise the criminal investigation or national security interests. 3 1 5 Such a
certification would be forwarded to the court where the civil suit16would be
pending and thus preclude the discovery of such information.
Further safeguards proposed by the DOJ include amendments which
would insure that, if a civil cause of action interferes with national security interests or a returned indictment concerning the same amendment as
the civil action, "the Attorney General can, upon good cause shown, request the court were [sic] the civil litigation is pending to stay that litigation until completion of the criminal proceedings or the elimination of the
predicate national security interest concern. 31 7 The DOJ also recommended that the Attorney General should have the authority to serve
complaints and summons in civil suits.318 Potential detriment could result, however, since the Attorney General's participation in civil suits
would be limited. A stay of civil litigation would not exclude the commencement of a lawsuit within the statute of limitation period proposed
in 18 U.S.C. section 2335.319 Additionally, a stay of the civil suit would
actually assist the U.S. plaintiff because he could take advantage of proposed estoppel terms of 18 U.S.C. section 2333(b).320
Furthermore, the DOJ echoed the State Department's position that
the bill should neither apply to governments nor their officials. 33 ' The
DOJ also stated that S. 2465 provisions which permit jurisdiction against
foreign nation's officials to sue derivatively for acts of the foreign state
must be modified. The DOJ also shares the State Department's concern
about the potential for reciprocal action by other nations." 2
The DOJ proposed two other minor additions. First, it recommended
that district courts should have original and exclusive jurisdiction in suits
falling under 18 U.S.C. section 2333.'" s Second, it proposed to modify 18
U.S.C. section 2333 to permit the decedents, survivors, and heirs of terrorist victims, as well as those individually injured, to bring suit.3 2'
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Academic Testimony

Further comments on S. 2465 were provided by Professor Wendy
Perdue of Georgetown University Law Center. 25 Prof. Perdue's comments centered on jurisdictional issues. 26 This technical advice focused
on defendants in litigation, venue, and forum non conveniens.3s2 Prof.
Perdue noted that recovery of damages from terrorists will be related to
the scope of reachable assets in the United States.32 8 She stated that if a
reasonable recovery is envisioned, liability must reach "foreign governments or government run enterprises that engage in or support terrorism," rather than just the individual terrorist perpetrators.3 29 Prof. Perdue acknowledged that such a scenario would require modifications to the
3
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Prof. Perdue further remarked that suits could be brought, inter alia,
where "all plaintiffs reside. '331 Since a provision could result in duplicate
cases being tried separately, Prof. Perdue recommended that a preferable
venue scheme would be "where any plaintiff resides. ' 33 2 Similarly, she
found fault in the bill's language that "[venue is proper where] the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent. 3 3 3 She suggested that jurisdiction should be defined as the place "where any defendant resides or is
found."33 4 Prof. Perdue explained that there is a lack of clarity in the
language relating to where the terrorist would be served with process. 3 5
Furthermore, she suggested that the service of process provision would be
amended to read as follows: Proper service exists in any district where the
defendant resides, is found, or has an agent.3 36 Finally, Prof. Perdue
stated that the forum non conviens provision, section 2334(c), would revise the confusing alternative forum guidelines ("mere convenient or
more appropriate") to the standards proffered in Gulf Oil Corp. v.

325. Hearing on the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Professor Wendy Perdue, July 25, 1990.
326. Id. at 6-8.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 6.
329. Id. at 7.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 8. "Suppose, for example, a passenger from New York and one from New
Jersey are both injured in the same hijacking incident. It would seem sensible and efficient
for these two passengers to join together in one suit and if they did join into one suit there
is no reason why they should not be able to sue in either New York or New Jersey but only
where "the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent." This means that if the defendant
were not in the United States then it would be impossible for the New Jersey and New York
passengers to join together in one suit because there would be no place where venue was
proper."
333. Id.
334. Id. at 9.
335. Id.
336. Id.
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Gilbert."'7
C.

S. 2465 as Passed in October 1990

On October 1, 1990, the Senate unanimously passed the revised version of S. 2465, discussed on July 25, 1990, at the Senate Subcommittee
on Courts and Administrative Practice. 38 The bill was passed as an
amendment to the Military Construction Appropriations Bill.3 9
As the preamble to S. 2465 indicates, the bill "provide[s] a new civil
cause of action in federal law for international terrorism that provides
extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts abroad against United
States nationals. 3 4 0 The bill supplements existing legislation which extends criminal sanctions to international terrorist activities.3 4 1 Specifically, proposed 18 U.S.C. section 2333(a), would permit U.S. nationals, or
their estates, survivors, or heirs, whose person, business, or property has
been hurt due to an international terrorist incident, to sue in federal district court and obtain treble damages, as well as the cost of the litigation,
in conjunction with attorney's fees. 2 Moreover, special maritime or territorial jurisdiction is provided through 18 U.S.C. section 2334(b). 3"3
The bill provides that proper venue over potential defendants is
"where any plaintiff resides or where any defendant resides or is served,
or has an agent. 3 4 4 The bill also states that service of process may occur
"where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent. 3 45 Witnesses in a
18 U.S.C. section 2333(a) cause of action could also be served in the same
procedure as the defendant. 6 These broad provisions would substantially ease prospective plaintiff's jurisdictional and venue problems. 4
Moreover, said provisions address Prof. Perdue's concerns with the ambiguous language of early versions of the Grassley-Heflin bill regarding
service of process.34 '

337. Id. at 10; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed.2d
1055 (1947).
338. See Press Release, Sen. Grassley, "Grassley Anti-Terrorism Bill Clears Senate,"
Oct. 2, 1990 [hereinafter Press Release]; Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General to Rep. Bill Lowery (Oct. 17, 1990) at 1-2 [hereinafter Rawls]; Letter from Richard G.
Darman, Director, Office of Management and Budget to Rep. Silvio Conte (Oct. 12, 1990) at
2 [hereinafter Darman].
339. Id.
340. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, S.2465, as passed Senate, Oct. 1, 1990, preamble.
Obtained from Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice [hereinafter Antiterrorism Act].
341. See supra notes 255, 263 and accompanying text.
342. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, §2333(a).
343. Id. §2334(b).
344. Id. §2334(a).
345. Id. §2334(c).
346. Id. §2334(a).
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who sue terrorists in the U.S. as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 would have provided.
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Prof. Perdue's misgivings relating to forum non conveniens also appears to have been addressed by proposed section 2334(d).149 For instance, this provision would provide that a court not dismiss a section
2333 action merely because a plaintiff chose an inappropriate or inconvenient forum.350 However, if the court determines that three thresholds
have been met, then dismissal is proper. 8 1 The circumstances which justify expulsion of the suit include: "(1) The action may be maintained in a
foreign court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over all the
defendants; (2) the foreign court is significantly more convenient and appropriate; and (3) [the] foreign court offers a remedy which is substan352
tially the same as the one available in the courts of the United States.
It is necessary to note that proposed sections 2334(d)(1)-(3) are drafted in
a highly pro-plaintiff, anti-case dismissal approach. A case in point is present under section 2334(d)(3)'s language that would not permit dismissal
unless the plaintiff could obtain similar remedies elsewhere. 353 At the
same time, it is unlikely that U.S. nationals could receive civil damages
for acts of international terrorism committed against them, their property
or business.3 5 4 Additional ammunition to a plaintiffs cause of action is
available under 18 U.S.C. section 2333(a). That provision prevents a defendant from disclaiming culpability relating to essential elements of a
criminal charge, once he has been found guilty in a criminal proceeding."' This benefits plaintiffs by using criminal actions to strengthen civil
suits.356

The revised Senate bill tried to sooth some of the concerns regarding
possible foreign reciprocal legislation as well as foreign sovereign immunity.35 For instance, in order to quell fears that S.2465 would be utilized
by some parties with suits alleging "war crimes," proposed 18 U.S.C. section 2337 did not permit proposed suits "for injury by reason of an act of
war." ' Also to avoid potential difficult foreign policy concerns in suits
against the U.S. government, its officials, foreign governments and its officers, proposed section 2337 provides a blanket provision denying suits
against government officials.3 5 9 It provides in pertinent part:
No action shall be maintained

. . .

against (1) the United States, or an

349. See supra note 338 and accompanying text; Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, §
2334(d).
350. Antiterrorism Act, supra note 340, §§ 2333, 2334(d).
351. Id.
352. Id. § 2334(d).
353. Id. § 2334(d)(3).
354. See supra notes 302-3 and accompanying text. Since the Department of State
fears that the U.S. (or its officials) will be sued under reciprocal legislation, and such an
existing foreign law was not cited, it is presumed that they do not exist.
355. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, § 2333(a).
356. Id.
357. See supra notes 302-3, 321-2, 354 and accompanying text.
358. Id.; Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, § 2337.
359. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, § 2337.
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officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting
within his official capacity or under color of legal authority; or (2) a
foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of
a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his official capacity
or under color of legal authority.360
Notwithstanding the fact that the Bush Administration agreed with
the basic thrust of the Grassley-Heflin bill in October 1990, it repeated
concerns expressed by the Department of Justice and Department of
State officials."6 ' After S. 2465 was incorporated into the Military Construction Appropriations Act, the Department of Justice reiterated its op36 2
position to the proposed anti-terrorism legislation..
These sentiments were expressed by Assistant Attorney General
Rawls, reaffirming Deputy Assistant Attorney Valentine's testimony in
calling for a provision in the bill permitting the Attorney General certificate to preempt discovery of prosecution files on terrorist incidents when
disclosure would compromise an investigation. 63 Furthermore, the Assistant Attorney General Rawls suggested adding a provision permitting the
Attorney General, upon good cause, to request a judge to delay a civil suit
until the summation of the criminal case. 6 4 Indeed, such a stay would be
requested only when the criminal case is based on the same terrorist inci3 65
dent as the civil suit.
The House of Representatives version of S. 2465 was introduced by
Rep. Feighan and Rep. Hyde. 6 6 Due to sharp objections by Rep. Brooks,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, "the Anti-Terrorism Act of
1990" was abandoned in committee. 37 Despite this defeat and some
shortcomings,368 another legislative measure, encompassing similar components of S. 2465, will likely be introduced in the next Congress. 6 9
IX.

RECENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO MARITIME TERRORISM

Following the grave attack of the Achille Lauro, governmental discussions commenced to establish another response to international terrorism,
an agreement on maritime terrorism.370 Rather than mimicking the defi-

360. Id.
361. See Rawls, supra at 339; Farman, supra at 339.
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Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice:
367. Id.
368. For strengths and weaknesses of legislation see supra notes 251-360 and accompanying text.
369. Telephone interview with Diane Cohen, Minority Counsel, Senate Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice (Oct. 17, 1990).
370. Treves, The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
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nitional focus of piracy in the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention, the I.M.O. Convention outlined the arena in which
states should have jurisdiction."' The I.M.O. Convention also outlined
the activities that individual states had to sanction,3 72 and provided the
upon finding a maritime offender, to either
rule that required states,
3 73
prosecute or extradite.

The preamble to the I.M.O. Convention stipulates that the document
is drafted in order "to develop international cooperation between States
in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of all unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, and
the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators.""7 " Article 3 of the
I.M.O. Convention sets out the offenses by first describing the substantive
offense and then establishing a secondary list which includes threatening,
attempting, and being an accomplice or an abettor to the defined offenses.3 75 Article 3 of the I.M.O. Convention states:
1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat
thereof or any other form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroy a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which
is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or
cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities
or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission
or the attempted commission of any of the offenses set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).376
Article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph g, would apply to the Achille
Lauro case, in light of the brutal murder of Mr. Klinghoffer. Such an
Safety of Maritime Navigation, MARITIME TERRORISM, supra note 25, at 69-90; Halberstam,
supra note 75, at 270.
371. I.M.O. Convention, supra at 75.
372. Id.; Treves, supra note 370, at 70-1.
373. Treves, supra note 370, at 79.
374. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, at preamble.
375. Id. art. 3.
376. Id.
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international legal framework to fight maritime terrorism is indeed
important.
With reference to the location of the ship during a terrorist attack,
article 4 provides that the I.M.O. Convention is triggered "(1) if the ship
is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral
limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States .. . [or] (2) when the
offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State party
other than the State referred to in [the earlier portion of the sentence]." 3" Thus, the international nature of a voyage, as well as its direction pursuant to article 4 of the I.M.O. Convention, is established by the
overall itinerary of its voyage.3 78 Additionally, paragraph 2 provides that
an alleged criminal is located on a vessel which is "navigating (or is
scheduled to navigate) at the time the offence was committed. 3 79
Another pertinent article of the I.M.O. Convention is article 6, which
outlines when a state has jurisdiction over the offender. This Article
provides:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 3 when
the offence was committed:
(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the
time the offence is committed; or
(b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or
(c) by a national of that State.
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence
is in that State; or
(b) during its commission a national of that State is seized,
threatened, injured or killed; or
(c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or
abstain from doing any act.38 0
Article 6 of the I.M.O. Convention provides use of several of the five
bases of jurisdiction available in international law, namely: nationality,
("determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the offence");
territoriality ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where
the offence is committed"); protective principle ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offence"); passive
personality ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or
national character of the person injured by the offence"); and universality

377. Id. art. 4; Treves, supra note 370, at 73-4.

378. Id.
379. Id.
380. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 6.
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principle ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the
person committing the offence")."" In article 6, paragraphs 1(a) through
(b) and 2(a), it appears that the territoriality principle is cited. In contrast, it seems that the nationality concept is enunciated in article 6, paragraph 1(c). Also, in article 6, paragraph 2(b) the passive personality precept is utilized. Lastly, in article 6, paragraph 2(c), the protective
principle is implemented." ' It must be remembered that the crime of
piracy, although not mentioned by the I.M.O. Convention, is viewed by
most nations as affording universal jurisdiction.38
Turning again to the Klinghoffer case, under article 6, paragraph
2(b), the U.S. would have jurisdiction over the Achille Lauro 3 84 Thus, the
I.M.O. Convention greatly strengthens government responses to maritime
terrorism by providing a means for criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of such acts. 8 '
Also, article 8 of the I.M.O. Convention deals with the obligation or
authorization of a nation to establish jurisdiction over an incident.388 Article 8 provides that "[t]he master of the ship of a State Party (the "flag
State" may deliver to the authorities of any other State Party (the "receiving State") any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has
committed one of the offenses set forth in article 3. ' 387 Despite hortatory
language, this provision codifies the requirement that alleged offenders be
handed over to proper authorities for prosecution. Furthermore, article 8
describes that refusal to accept delivery of the offender must be explained
in full by either the flag nation or receiving nation. 388
As in article 7 of the Hague Convention on Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft and the Montreal Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, article 10 provides that a State in which an offender is found
must either extradite him or immediately initiate prosecution." As a result, the obligations of a state signatory to the I.M.O. Convention would
be to either commence criminal proceedings against a terrorist offender or
extradite to a nation which would prosecute. If the I.M.O. Convention
would have been in force at the time of the Achille Lauro incident, and
had Egypt been a signatory, then Egypt's obligations under international
law would have been strictly set out.3890 Keeping in line with the provisions of article 10, article 11 states that extradition can occur either with
or without an extradition treaty. 8 '

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Halberstam, supra note 75, at 296 n. 12.
Id.
See generally McCredie, supra note 98, at 443-5.
I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 6.
See generally id.
Id. art. 8; Treves, supra note 370, at 81.
I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 6.
Id.
Treves, supra note 370, at 81-2.
I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 11.
Id.
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In sum, the I.M.O. Convention is a vital and necessary step that the
world community has taken to demonstrate its resolve against terrorism.
X.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion and analysis leads to several conclusions.
First, the increasing role of civil litigation to respond to terrorism is both
real and vital. As the Klinghoffer litigation illustrates, terrorist groups'
accountability can be set forth effectively through the civil courts. Second, U.S. legislative proposals, such as S. 2465, will certainly strengthen
the legal tools available to the victims of terrorism. Third, multilateral
legal instruments such as the I.M.O. Convention, are additional guidelines which can be used to combat terrorism. In sum, national and multilateral legislation, rooted at decreasing the specter of terrorism, must continue to flourish in the 1990's. Otherwise, the perpetrators of extra-legal
violence will continue to carry out their destructive activities, and thereby
threaten the fabric of modern society.
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The Securities Market and Regulation of
Mexico
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§1 INTRODUCTION

Mexico has an emerging economy, a rapidly developing securities
market, and a comprehensive system of securities regulation firmly in
place. The economy was beset by crisis in the early 1980's due to the
collapse of the international oil market and other factors, but toward the
end of the decade the economy began an impressive recovery. The securities market includes a primary market and a growing secondary market
based at a new, automated stock exchange facility in Mexico City. The
securities market has changed considerably in recent years, with, for example, mutual funds becoming much more active participants.1 Foreign
investment restrictions applicable to financial services (as well as other
sectors) have also changed markedly. The system of securities regulation
also has changed significantly in recent years, the early 1990 amendments
being viewed as "the most radical since 1975. " 1 Securities regulation in
* Special Counsel, Holme Roberts & Owen; A.B., Brown University; J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; S.J.D. Candidate, University of Wisconsin Law School.
Formerly, Deputy Chief, Office of International Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission. Mr. Wolff conducted part of the research for this article under a Post-Doctoral
Fellowship from Yale University.
** Partner, Von Wobeser Y Sierra, S.C.; Law Degree, Escuela Libre de Derecho; Assistant Professor of Corporate Law, Escuela Libre de Derecho; Professor of Foreign Investment Law, Universidad Panamerica.
The discussion of Mexico's securities law, Ley del Mercado de Valores, in-this article is
based, in part, on partial translations of the law by Leah Sylar in 1985 and 1986 and Juan
Redondo in 1990. Previous versions of this article appeared in the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw and Doing Business in Mexico.
1. See generally Equity Financing - General, Bus. INT'L FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, Oct. 1, 1989 [hereinafter Equity Financing];see generally infra notes 162, 213.
2. Mexican Regulators Seek Bilateral U.S. Disclosure Pact, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. 7
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Mexico is comprehensive and includes regulation of public Offerings, periodic disclosure, broker-dealers, investment companies, and insider trading. The securities law is administered by a federal securities commission
vested with ample enforcement power. s Mexico joined GATT in 1985," reentered international capital markets in 1989,8 and signed securities-related agreements with the United States in 1990.6
Mexico is a representative, federal republic consisting of thirty-one
states and a federal district." Its Constitution vests legislative power in a
bicameral Congress, executive power in the President, and judicial authority in a court system comprising of the Supreme Court of Justice,
circuit courts, courts of appeal, district courts, and state courts.' The federal government dominates the state governments, and within the federal
system the executive branch is the most powerful of the three branches. s
Mexico is a civil-law jurisdiction with codes constituting the primary
source of law, although a significant body of legislation, including financial law, is not in code form.' 0 A large part of the law of business organi-

(May 7, 1990)(quoting Jaime Alvarez Soberanis, former legal advisor to the Mexican Securities Commission). The federal securities statute, Ley del Mercado de Valores [hereinafter
Securities Market Law], was amended twice in 1990 - in January and July. See D.O., July
18, 1990; D.O., Jan. 4, 1990. The Securities Market Law was enacted by the Mexican Congress in 1975 and amended numerous times since then. D.O., Jan. 2, 1975; D.O., Dec. 30,
1980; D.O., Dec. 28, 1983; D.O., Feb. 8, 1985; D.O., Apr. 3, 1985; D.O., Dec. 27, 1985; D.O.,
Dec. 30, 1985; D.O., Dec. 31, 1986.
3. See, e.g., Indictments in Mexico, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at D2, col. 3; Mexico
Moves Against Brokerages as Salinas Continues to Assert Power, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1989,
at All, col. 2. The Commission's power derives from article 40 of the Securities Market
Law, which provides that the Commission is the agency in charge, within the terms of the
Law and the regulations thereunder, to regulate the stock market and to enforce the observance of said law and regulations.
4. Mexico: Financial Services and the Economic Recovery, FIN. WORLD, June 26,
1990, at 28.
5. Mexico Penetrates the Capital Market, Bus. MEXICO, Jun. 1990, at 20 ("Mexico is
back in the world's capital markets"). Mexico had borrowed in international capital previously but not for several years or more.
6. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also SEC, Mexico Sign
Memorandum on Securities Enforcement, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 22, 1990, at
A-11. The United States and Mexico have also agreed in principle to begin negotiations on a
free trade agreement. See Mashek, U.S., Mexico Set Free Trade Talks, Boston Globe, June
12, 1990, at 2.
7. Mexico's current political system is based upon a constitution dating from the
Revolution of 1910. Perez, An Introduction to the Legal Structure of Mexico for the Foreign Investor, 4 CAL. W.L. REV. 236, 244 (1968); See generally Wolff, A Study of Mexico's
Capital Markets and Securities Regulation, 20 VAND. J.'TRANSNAT'L L. 385 (1987); The
Mexican Constitution was promulgated on February 5, 1917. The country's modern financial

history began with the Revolution. M.
BANKS 31 (1973).
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8. Perez, supra note 7, at 244.
9. Brinsmade, Mexican Law - An Outline and Bibliography of English Source
Materials Relating to Certain Aspects Thereof, 6 INT'L LAW. 829, 830-31 (1972).
10. H. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO: LAWS & POLICIES 33 (1971).
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zations, for example, is statutory but not part of the Commercial Code.'
Though essentially part of the capitalist group of nations,"2 Mexico has
considerable state participation in business and finance.'" Since World
War II, the Mexican economy has grown rapidly and has become much
more diversified and industrialized,14 and its rate of economic growth in
the postwar era has been unsurpassed by any other developing country. 6
Today the financial system is one of the most advanced in Latin
America.'" Nevertheless, the country did experience an extended period
of financial turmoil beginning in 1982.'1
The government nati6nalized a number of industries and indirectly
owns many enterprises.' s The banking system was nationalized on September 1, 1982, by President L6pez Portillo in the final days of his administration and during the height of the financial crisis.' 9 On December

11. Id.
12. Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institution for Mexican Development: A Legislative History, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 175 (1978); Colloquium on CertainLegal Aspects of Foreign
Investment in Mexico: Regulation of Capital Investment, Patents and Trademarks, and
Transfer of Technology, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Colloquium];
Speech by President Lopez Mateos reprinted in The Mexican Market 1960-1961, 13 INTERCONTINENTAL, S.A., Jan. 24, 1961, at 1.
13. Gordon, supra note 12, at 175; Gavin, Mexico, Land of Opportunity, 39 POL'Y REV.
32, 34 (1987); R. AUBEY, NACIONAL FINANCIERA AND MEXICAN INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF THE
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF MEXICO 13
(1966); R. VERNON, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE OF MEXICO 13-15 (1964).
14. Y. MARONI, MEXICO'S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RECORD 23 (1966) (Study by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); Post-Effective Amendment No. 9 to
Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1983 of the United Mexican States, No.
2-70553 (Nov. 16, 1983) [hereinafter Mexican Registration Statement].
15. H. PARKES, A HISTORY OF MEXICO 436 (1969).
16. See D. BROTHERS & L. SOLIS, MEXICAN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (1966); F. LEES &

M.

ENG, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND FU-

372 (1975).
17. See generally Rowe, The Latin Debt Crisis Drones On: After 5 Years, Debtor Nations and the Global FinancialSystem Remain Vulnerable, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1987, at
TURE PROSPECTS

G2, col. 1 [hereinafter Rowe, Latin Debt Crisis]; Rowe, Bank Details Latin American Cri-

sis, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1986, at A18, col. 1; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 3 Country
Report-Mexico (July 28, 1986); Mexico in Trouble, 33 WORLD PRESS REV. 25 (July 1986);
Nacional Financiera, La Situacibn Econbmica Nacional, 9 EL MERCADO DE VALORES 197
(Mar. 3, 1986); Stockton, Broad Talks on Mexican Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1986, at D7,
col. 1; Welt, Latin America: A Region in Debt. MGT. REV. (Feb. 1986); Hormats, Mexico
Needs Special Help, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, at A23, col. 2; Berg, Bankers Expect Mexican Debt Plea, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at D10, col. 4; Stockton, Ailing Mexico Seeks
New Terms on its Debt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1986, at A5, col. 1 (hereinafter Stockton,
Debt]; Stockton, Fall in Oil Prices Is Called a Spur to Mexico Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1986, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter Stockton, Fall]; Banco Nacional de Mbxico, Review of the
Economic Situation of Mexico (Feb. 1986); Nacional Financiera, Diagnostico de la Situati6n
Ecofhmica de Mexico en 1985, 50 EL MERCADO DE VALORES 1169 (Dec. 16, 1985); Mexico:
Still Suffering, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1985, at 77. Economic conditions improved moderately
in 1987, see Rowe, The Latin American Debt Morass: Five Years Later, the Crisis Has
Faded But the Problem Remains, Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 1987, at Hi, col. 6.
18. F. LEES & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 359.
19. See generally supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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1, 1982, Miguel de la Madrid was sworn into the office of the presidency
and began the implementation of his own economic plan which included
the reduction of the government's participation in the economy. Since
1982, Mexico has sold, merged, or liquidated over 800 state-owned companies.2 0 In 1990 the government moved to privatize most of the banking
industry.2 1 Numerous other industries or companies in Mexico have been
privatized or slated for privatization. For example, the large Mexican
mining company, Cananea, was auctioned to private investors in October
1990, and at the same time preparations were being made for the sale of
22
Telmex, the national telephone company.

§2

REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

[a] Securities Commission
La Comision Nacional de Valores (hereinafter, the "Mexican Securities Commission" or the "Commission") is the principal governmental authority responsible for regulating the Mexican securities market. Its history dates back to the 1930's. In 1939 the Mexican Congress enacted
legislation governing the sale of securities and authorizing the establishment of an agency to regulate the securities market.2 ' The 1939 Act required federal approval of the public offering of securities, except for securities quoted on an exchange, fixed-rate securities, and certain other
securities. 25 An agency within the executive branch was to administer the
Act.26 The 1939 Act empowered the agency "to grant authorization for
public offerings and to intervene somewhat in the supervision of the companies whose shares are offered for public sale. ' 2 7 In 1946, the Mexican
Congress formally established the National Securities Commission.28 The

20. Laurie, Oxygen of Recovery, THE BANKER, Apr. 1990, at 49; Playing the Next Country Fund, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 20, 1990, at 15.
21. Johns, Mexico Picks First Banks for Privatization,Fin. Times, July 18, 1990, at 26;
Banking Bill Sent to Senate, Wall St. J., July 12, 1990, at 8, col. 6; Tricks, Mexican Government Unveils Bank Privatization Bill, Reuters, Reuters Business Report, June 28, 1990;
Banks to be Returned to Private Ownership, Bus. LATIN AM., May 14, 1990; Evans and
Kraus, Mexico's Privatization Plan Wins Praise, AM. BANKER, May 7, 1990, at 14 (since
nationalization in 1982, the number of banks in Mexico has shrunk from 60 to 18).
22. Shoreham, Latin America: PrivatizationGains New Momentum, EUROMONEY, Mar.
1990, at 105-109 (Telmex Compalia Minera de Cananea); see generally Telmex to Go on
Sale, Bus. Irr'L, May 7, 1990; New PrivatizationDeals Announced, Bus. LATIN AM., Mar. 5,
1990 (The national airline, Mexicana, was partially privatized in 1989).
23. Ley que Establece los Requisitos para la Venta al Publico de Acciones de
Sociedades Anonimas, D.O., Feb. 1, 1940.

24. P.

HERMOSILLO, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITIES COMMISSION:

1939-

1956 7 (1956) [hereinafter P. HERMOSILLO, DEVELOPMENT].
25. Id. at 7-8; Corte & Ritch, The Public Sale of Shares in Mexico, 2 STUD. IN L. &
EcON. DEV. 25-26 (1967) [hereinafter Corte].
26. P. HERMOSILLO, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 12.
27. Corte, supra note 25, at 26.
28. Decreto que Crea la Comision Nacional de Valores (Decree Creating the National
Securities Commission), D.O., Apr. 16, 1946; Corte, supra note 25, at 26. See generally
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National Securities Commission included representatives from a number
of organizations, including the Bank of Mexico, Nacional Financiera, and
the Mexican Stock Exchange.2 Although the 1939 Act contemplated regulation by an agency within the executive branch, the National Securities
Commission was an independent Commission."0 The 1946 legislation gave
the National Securities Commission the authority, among other things, to
approve the sale of both equity and debt securities, establish a range of
interest rates on certain debt securities, and regulate investment companies. 1 Regulations under the 1946 Act 3

2

authorized the establishment of

the National Securities Register for the registration of various classes of
securities.8 3
Reform legislation in 1953 expanded the powers of the National Securities Commission." Under the new law, the Commission could, among
other things, regulate stock exchanges, authorize securities for institutional investment, and approve Mexican securities offered abroad or foreign securities offered in Mexico."' The 1953 Act consolidated a number
of laws, rules, and regulations into one compilation."6 Legislation in 1954
and 1955 granted the National Securities Commission additional powers
over investment companies."
The 1975 Securities Market Law abolished the National Securities
Commission and established in its place La Comision Nacional de
Valores (as above, "Mexican Securities Commission" or "Commission"). s
The Commission is an independent agency under the general supervision
of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 9 which is responsible for
Hermosillo, Characteristicsof the Securities Market in Mexico, 31 PROC. NAT. ASSN. SEC.
ADMIN. 89 (1948) [hereinafter Characteristics];Hermosillo, Comparison of the SEC and the
Comision Nacional de Valores, 32 PROC. NAT. ASSN. SEC. ADMIN. 47 (1949) [hereinafter
Comparison].
29. P. HERMOSILLO, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 18.
30. Corte, supra note 25, at 26.
31. P. HERMOSILLO, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 20-21, 37.
32. Regulations for the Decree Creating the National Securities Commission, D.O.,
Sept. 7, 1946.
33. Corte, supra note 25, at 27-28.
34. Ley de Ia Comision Nacional de Valores, D.O., Dec. 31, 1953. See generally Carrillo,
Control Estatal de la Venta Publica de Valores en Mexico, 15 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO DE MEXICo 335 (1965), reprinted in WRIGHT, COMMERCIAL LAW OF MEXICO AND THE
UNITED STATES: SELECTED Topics 117 (1966).
35. M. HERRERA, LA COMISION NACIONAL DE VALORES (2d ed. 1960).
36. P. HERMOSILLO, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 43.
37. Ley de Sociedades de Inversion (D.O., Dec. 31, 1954, amended Dec. 31, 1955, Dec.
31, 1963, Dec. 30, 1965) [hereinafter Investment Company Law]. See Hermosillo, Les
societes d'investissement: Resume de l'evolution legislative du Mexique, 1958 REV. DE LA
SocmTE FRANCAIES D'ETUDES & EXPANSION 109 (1956) [hereinafter Hermosillo, Les Societe].
38. Creel & Del Campo, A Public Stock Offering in Mexico, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 305, 333 (1984) [hereinafter Creel].
39. Id. (citing A. ROMERO, DERECHO BANcARio 42-44 (1978)); Gomez Gordoa, Marco
Juridico y Estructura Institucional del Mercado de Valores, Revista de Investigaciones
Juridicasde la Escuela Libre de Derecho, No. 5 (1981); J. LA CASCIA, CAPITAL FORMATION
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the overall formulation and coordination of Mexican financial policies.40
The Commission has primary responsibility for regulating the securities
market and overseeing compliance with the Securities Market Law."' The
Ministry of Finance, however, has final administrative authority to interpret the Securities Law.42 The Commission's powers include, registration
authority over securities and brokers, inspection and oversight responsibilities with regard to brokers,4' 3 and rule-making power. 44 When circumstances so require, the Commission may intervene administratively in the
5
market or may take a variety of other enforcement measures.4
The Commission is composed of the Governing Board (the supreme
authority of the Commission), the President, and the Consulting Committee.4 The Governing Board consists of eleven members, five of whom are
designated by the Ministry of Finance.4 One of these five designees will
be appointed President of the Commission.' s Two members are designated by the Bank of Mexico, and one each by the Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development, the National Banking Commission,
the National Commission on Insurance and Bonding, and Nacional
Financiera(the government development bank)."9 For each regular member an alternate is appointed. The President of the Commission represents the Commission, executes resolutions of the Governing Board, and
generally administers the affairs of the Commission."0 Within the Commission are various staff bureaus under the general supervision of the
President." '
The National Registry of Securities and Securities Brokers (the
"Registry"), is a public registry under the authority of the Commission.
The Registry is divided into three sections: the Securities Section, the
Securities Brokers Section, and a "Special Section." 2 Only documents
registered in the Securities Section may be publicly offered.5" The public

AND

ECONoMIc

DEVELOPMENT IN

MExIco 46 (1969).

40. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 29.
41. Creel, supra note 38, at 308.
42. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 8.
43. Creel, supra note 38, at 308 n.18 (citing A. ROMERO, supra note 38, at 59).
44. The Securities Market Law grants rule-making authority to the Commission to be
exercised for the purpose of promoting certainty and clarity with regard to obligations created by the law. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, arts. 3, 41. The rule-making power set
forth in these provisions is quite broad. For example, the Commission has the authority to
set capital and record-keeping requirements applicable to brokers and specialists and to
make general regulations to promote "healthy" market practices. Id.
45. Id.
46. Comision Nacional de Valores, Memoria de Labores 35 (1984) [hereinafter Memoria
de Labores]; Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 43.
47. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 43.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Creel, supra note 38, at 309.
51. Memoria de Labores, supra note 46, at 35.
52. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 10.
53. Id. art. 11.
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offering abroad of securities issued in Mexico or by Mexican companies is
subject to registration in the Special Section of the Registry. 4 The Brokers Section records registration of all brokers by categories of either natural persons or corporations." Detailed rules regarding registration are
set forth in the Regulation of the National Registry of Securities and Brokers. It is the Commission's responsibility to organize the Registry to
carry out the functions of the Securities Market Law.3
[b] Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
Overall authority for the regulation of Mexico's financial system is
vested in the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit which operates under
the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration. The Ministry of
Finance has final authority over the administration of the securities market and the interpretation of the Securities Market Law.57 In addition,
the Ministry of Finance supervises other governmental institutions that
have a more direct role in regulating the market, such as the Mexican
Securities Commission and the National Registry of Securities and Securities Brokers. 8 The Ministry of Finance has primary responsibility in
Mexico for the financial system, including the formulation of policies regarding public debt and fiscal policy. 9
[c] Other FinancialInstitutions
The government established the Institute for the Deposit of Securities ("Indeval" or "Securities Depository") in 1978, although it did not
commence operations until 1980.60 Indeval, a clearinghouse and depository for securities traded in Mexico, eliminates the need for physical
62
transfer of securities.6 Re-organized in 1987 as a private corporation,
Indeval provides for the "safekeeping, administration, compensation, liquidation and transfer of securities."' s It uses a fully automated securities
64
clearance system.

54. Id.
55. COMISION NACIONAL DE VALORES, LEYEs Y DISPOSICIONES DEL MERCADO DE VALORES

282-83 (1982).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit also has authority over the Bank of
Mexico and the National Banking Commission and the National Insurance and Bonding
Commission. See F. LEES & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 359-64; J. LA CAscIA, supra note 39,
at 46.
59. Prospectus of the Emerging Mexico Fund, Inc. 1-23 (Oct. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Prospectus EMF].
60. Prospectus of the Mexico Fund, Inc. 18 (Nov. 17, 1983) [hereinafter 1983
Prospectus].

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 37.
Creel, supra note 38, at 310.
Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 29.
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Several other institutions involved in various aspects of Mexico's financial system include the Mexican Securities Exchange, the Bureau of
Foreign Investment and Transfer of Technology, the National Foreign Investment Registry, 5 the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development, and the Ministry of Communications and Transportation. The National Banking Commission inspects and supervises banks (credit
institutions) and generally oversees compliance with the federal banking
statute. Similarly, the National Insurance and Bonding Commission regulates insurance companies and administers federal insurance legislation.
Nacional Financiera,the government development bank, acts as an investor and intermediary in the Mexican market." Banco de Mexico, the
central bank, formulates and implements monetary policy. 7 The Mexican
Association of Brokerage Firms, a self-regulatory organization, is involved
in the regulation of Mexican broker-dealers; 8 the Mexican Institute of
Public Accountants oversees the accounting profession; and the Bank
Disincorporation Committee is supervising the privatization of the banking industry. 9
§3

SECURITIES LAWS AND RELATED LAWS

The principal securities law in effect is the Securities Market Law.
The Securities Market Law regulates the public offering of securities, the
operations of brokers in selling securities, and the activities of those responsible for regulating the market.7 This law, which became effective as
of January 3, 1975, and has been amended numerous times," is an advanced, comprehensive statement of securities regulation.
The law on Investment Societies72 provides for the organization and
functioning of various types of investment companies. This law repealed
the Law on Investment Corporations that was published in 1955."8 The
Law on Investment Societies was amended in January 1990 to facilitate

65. Regarding the National Foreign Investment Registry, see A. HOAGLAND, COMPANY
FORMATION IN MEXICO 29 (1980) [hereinafter A. HOAGLAND, FORMATION]; Creel, supra note
38, at 311; Camp & Rojas, Recent Developments Under the Mexican Foreign Investment
Law and The Law Regulating the Transfer of Technology, 8 LAW. AM. (1976); H. MAY & F.
ARENA, IMPACT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MEXICO (1971); Trevino, Mexico: The Present
Status of Legislation and Governmental Policies on Direct Foreign Investments, 18 INT'L
LAW. 297 (1984).
66. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 36.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 37.
69. See generally Banks Ready for Privatization, Finance Liberalization Seen, Bus.
EUROPE, Oct. 1, 1990.
70. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 1.
71. D.O., July 18, 1990; D.O., Jan. 4, 1990; D.O., Dec. 31, 1986; D.O., Dec. 27, 1985;
D.O., Feb. 8, 1985; D.O., Apr. 3, 1985 (errata); D.O., Dec. 28, 1983; D.O., Dec. 31, 1981; D.O.,
Dec. 30, 1980; D.O., May 12, 1978; D.O., Nov. 28, 1977.
72. D.O., Jan. 14, 1985, as amended.
73. Library of Congress, Hispanic Law Division, Index to Latin American Legislation
(Sept. 18, 1990) (abstract, hereinafter referred to as "Latin American Index").
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the formation of investment companies and encourage foreign investment
in this area. "'
The Law to Regulate Financial Groups7 5 permits the formation of
"financial groups" comprising at least three different types of financial
entities, including brokerage firms, banks, insurance companies, and investment companies, among others.
Under the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, the
Ministry of Finance is responsible for the coordination, supervision, and
formulation of policy for Mexico's financial system.7 s
There is also a body of administrative law that is pertinent to the
securities market of Mexico. For example, the Commission has internal
regulations 7 circulares,7 8 rules, 7 9 and instructions 0 that supplement the
Securities Market Law. The Regulation of the National Registry of Securities and Brokers elaborates upon the duties of the National Registry."1 For example, the Regulation contains a detailed explanation of the
registration process.
Foreign investment in Mexico is governed principally by the Law to
Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment 2 and the
Regulations of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate
Foreign Investment."3 In some cases foreign investment in specialized industries is also governed by provisions in the laws specifically pertaining
to that industry.8 ' In terms of foreign investment in financial services, the
foreign investment law has been superseded, in part, by provisions in the
laws governing specialized industries.8 "

74. Mitchell, Foreign Investment in the Mexican Financial System, N.Y.L.J. 28 (May
23, 1990).
75. D.O., July 18, 1990.
76. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 1-23.
77. Disposiciones del Mercado de Valores, in Comision Nacional de Valores, Leyes y
Disposiciones del Mercado de Valores (1980).
78. See Creel, supra note 38, at 338, explaining that "[c]irculars are the legal instrument used by the Mexican Securities Commission to interpret the Securities Market Law
and other related legislation, as well as to establish the criteria applicable to all companies
that wish to have their stock traded in the stock exchange." Id. n. 195.
79. See, e.g., Reglas a las que habran de ajustarse las Casas de Bolsa en sus Operaciones
con Certificados de la Tesoreria de la Federacion, in Comision Nacional de Valores, Leyes y
Disposiciones del Mercado de Valores (1980).
80. See, e.g., Instructions for Applying for Registration of Stocks in the Securities Section of the National Registry of Securities and Securities Brokers, discussed in Creel, supra
note 38, at 320 n. 71.
81. Regulation of the National Registry of Securities and Intermediaries D.O., Nov. 22,
1979.
82. Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera, D.O.,
Mar. 9, 1973.
83.. Reglamento de la Ley pars Promover Is Inversion Mexicans y Regular la Inversion
Extranjera, D.O., May 16, 1989.
84. See generally infra § 6(g). The foreign investment law was enacted in 1973.
85. Id.
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Financial laws include the General Law of Credit Institutions;8s the
Organic Law of the Bank of Mexico; the Law on Guaranty Institutions;
and the Organic Law of Nacional Financiera.Negotiable instruments are
governed primarily by the General Law of Credit Instruments and Operations. Currency is governed primarily by the Monetary Law. Corporations
are subject to, inter alia, the General Law of Commercial Companies and
the Commercial Code. Insurance companies are governed by the General
Law of Insurance Companies.
§4

SECURITIES

As explained further below,"7 the Securities Market Law regulates
public offerings and brokerage in the securities market in addition to
other activities. Clearly, the regulation extends to "securities" as defined
in article 3. However, rather than adopting the approach taken by the
United States and developing the scope of regulation through the definition of "security," Mexico extended its regulation statutorily in keeping
with the civil law tradition: "the system that the current law establishes
for securities and the activities undertaken with them shall also be applicable to credit instruments and other documents that may be the object
of [a] public offering or of intermediation in the securities market, that
grant to their title holders rights of credit, property, or participation in
the capital of corporations."88
Securities are defined to include shares, obligations (bonds, debentures), and other credit instruments that are issued in series or in mass.89
This definition would include common and preferred stock, debt instruments including cetes (see below) or convertible debt, irrespective of
whether it is senior or subordinated, or secured or unsecured, and other
"credit instruments" such as promissory notes that are issued "in mass"
or "in series." Thus, the definition of "security" is very broad. As noted,
however, the law is not limited to "securities," but also includes other
credit instruments and "documents" that may be the objects of a public
offering or intermediation and that grant to their title holders rights of
credit, property, or participation in the capital of corporations. Taken together, these two provisions are so broad as to forestall the type of litigation common in the United States concerning whether an instrument is a
"security." Most financial instruments in Mexico that are publicly offered
or sold through brokers in the securities market would be covered.
In practical terms, the Mexican securities market consists of debt
and equity sectors, but debt completely dominates the market.9 0 In 1966
86. See Mitchell, Foreign Investment in the Mexican FinancialSystem, N.Y.L.J. 3-4
(May 23, 1990).
87. See infra § 7.
88. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 3.
89. Id.
90. The debt market may be further divided into the fixed-income sector and the
money market. The principal distinction between these two markets is the maturity of the
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approximately ninety-five percent of all trading on the Mexico City Stock
Exchange was in fixed-income securities. 1 In 1984 this figure was almost
ninety-eight percent" and was ninety-seven percent in 1989." Certificados de la federacion"' (colloquially, "cetes"), which are similar to
United States treasury .bills, dominate the Mexican debt market. In 1977
the Mexican Congress authorized the issuance of treasury bills to improve
the federal government's access to internal financial resources."" The government issued cetes as an instrument for short-term finance and control
of the money supply." Cetes are issued through Banco de Mexico, have a
maximum maturity of one year,9" and are liquid investments which brokers sell at a discount from face value at maturity.9 8 Cetes are auctioned
weekly by Banco de Mexico and traded on the Mexican Stock
Exchange. 9
In 1980 the Commission approved commercial paper and bankers' acceptances for issuance by Mexican companies, expanding the types of
money market instruments available. 10 0 "Commercial paper consists of
promissory notes issued by a corporation, obligating it to pay principal
plus interest to the holders within a specified period. 10 ' It is unsecured,
short-term indebtedness sold primarily to institutional investors at a discount from face value. 02 Petrobonds, government-issued debt securities
which began trading on the Stock Exchange in 1977, are three-year obligations collateralized by Mexican oil."0 ' Other fixed-income instruments
include notes, corporate bonds and debentures,"" bank indemnity bonds,
mortgage bonds, time deposits, bills of exchange, certificates of deposit
and pledge bonds, real estate certificates, and urban renovation bonds.
In 1989 the Mexican government announced the approval of a variety

instrument.
91. J. LA CASCIA, supra note 39, at 50. See also A. BASCH & M. KvsAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 68 (1970). During the 1940's, the major financial instruments in
Mexico were deposit and savings accounts. D. BROTHERS & L. SOLIS, MEXICAN FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT 32 (1966).
92. Memoria de Labores, supra note 182, at 17.
93. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 31.
94. The contribution of the cetes to total financing in Mexico was 18% in June 1984
and 27% in June 1985. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, 4 Q. ECON. REV. MEx., infra
note 106, at 13.
95. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 31.
96. 1983 Prospectus, supra note 60, at 14.
97. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 31.
98. Baird, Betting on the Peso, Barron's, Dec. 1, 1980, at 35-36.
99. See generally Short-term Investment Instruments, Bus. INT'L FINANCING FOREIGN
OPERATIONS, Oct. 1, 1989. The yield on cetes has replaced the average cost of bank funds as
the basis for determining the prime rate.
100. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 31.
101. Creel, supra note 38, at 306.
102. Baird, supra note 98, at 47.
103. Id. at 50.
104. See Ross, Mexican Securities are Making Progress,55 BANKING 48 (1963) [herein-

after Ross, Progress].
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of new financial instruments, the most popular of which were the socalled "adjustable bonds."' 0 These instruments are three-year, adjustable-rate bonds issued by the government.0 " Treasury bonds are government issued fixed-interest instruments denominated in free-rate dollars. 10 Treasury promissory notes are similar to Treasury bonds, except
the notes are pegged to the controlled-dollar rate.1' 8 Bank industrial development bonds are government-issued ten-year bonds designed to fi0 9
nance specific industrial development projects."
Equity securities are issued in Mexico, and a number of classes of them trade on the stock
exchange."1 Foreign investors are permitted to purchase debt securities
in Mexico, except for cetes which may only be purchased by Mexican nationals."' Foreign investment in equity securities is, however, subject to
numerous restrictions under the Foreign Investment Law."'
§5

SECURITIES MARKETS

The principal securities market in Mexico is the stock exchange, La
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, S.A. de C.V., which has a long legacy. At
present, there is no over-the-counter market for unlisted securities in
Mexico." ' The first physical stock market in Mexico was established in
1880, when people met in the offices of the Mexican Gas Company to
trade mining stocks."" Meetings of this type became customary in other
'' 5
places, including "the back of a shop run by the widow of one Genin. 1
Mexico's first formal, though unofficial, stock exchange, La Bolsa de
Valores de Mexico, was organized in 1894 but it dissolved in the early

105. Newman, Confidence Creates New Options, Bus. MEXICO, Mar., 1990, at 16
(ajustabonos).

106. Id.
107. Id. at 18 (tesobonos).
108. Id. (pagafes). These instruments are auctioned weekly with cetes. Short-term Investment Instruments, Bus. INT'L FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, Oct. 1, 1989.
109. Id. at 19 (bondis).
110. See Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 28.
111. Id.
112. See infra § 6(g).
113. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 29; PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN
MEXICO 82 (1989). The Securities Market Law prohibits stock exchange members from trading listed securities other than on the exchange. See Securities Market Law, supra note 2,
art. 31, § VIII(f). Historically, prior to securities legislation prohibiting it, Mexico had an
over-the-counter market that was active in comparison to the stock exchange. See Wolff,
supra note 7, at 415-416. See also Ross, The Changing Mexican Market, FIN. ANALYSTS J.
149-150 (1964) [hereinafter Ross, Changing].
114. Corte, The Public Sale of Shares in Mexico, STUDIES IN LAW AND ECONOMIC DEveLoPmENT 23-24 (1967). See 0. MOORE, EvOLUCION DE LAS INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS EN
MEXICO (1963). See generally A. LAGUNILLA INARRITU, HISTORIA DE LA BOLSA DE MEXICO
1895-1933 (1973); A. LAGUNILLA INARRITU, HISTORIA DE LA BOLSA DE MEXICO 1933-1970

(1976).
115. Corte, supra note 25, at 24, (citing La Bolsa de Valores de Mexico, S.A. de C. V.,
Que Es La Bolsa de Valores (What is the Securities Exchange?)).
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1900s." The second formal market, La Bolsa Privada de Mexico, was
organized in 1907 and changed its name in 1910 to Bolsa de Valores de
Mexico, S.C.L.'" Mexico extended official recognition to the stock exchange in 193218 when the legislature dissolved Bolsa de Valores de
Mexico, S.C.L., and created the present stock exchange, La Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, S.A. de C.V., located in Mexico City." 9
The government established a second stock exchange in 1950 in
Monterrey, La Bolsa de Valores de Monterrey, S.A. de C.V.120 In 1960
the Secretary of the Treasury and the National Banking Commission authorized the establishment of a third exchange, La Bolsa de Valores de
Occidente, S.A. de C. V., in Guadalajara.1 2' The three exchanges existed in
Mexico until 1976122 at which time the authorities decided it would be
more advantageous to have only one stock exchange in Mexico.' 23 At the
end of 1975 the Mexican Securities Commission ordered the Guadalajara
and Monterrey exchanges to cease operations as of the beginning of the
following year, 2 " at which time the two regional exchanges merged with
the Mexico City Stock Exchange. 2 ' Many of the securities formerly
traded on the two regional exchanges have since been traded on the Mexico City exchange. 2 6 The Securities Market Law generally prohibits
members of stock exchanges from trading listed securities off the
exchange. 2 '
Trading on the exchanges has primarily been in fixed-income securities. 128 In 1960 only three percent of all transactions on the Mexico City
Stock Exchange were trades in equity shares. 29 This percentage has remained relatively constant: the proportion of equity securities to all securities traded on the Mexico City Stock Exchange was 4.9 percent in

116. Id.; See generally Molina, El Mercado de Valores en Mexico, 14 EL TRIMESTRE
EcONOMICO (1947).

117. Corte, supra note 25, at 24.
118. Id.
119. Id,
120. F. LEES & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 378.
121. 13 Intercontinental, S.A., The Mexican Market 5 (June 15, 1960).
122. Id.
123. Creel, supra note 38, at 333.
124. Id. at 333.
125. NACIONAL FINANCIERA, STATISTICS ON THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 329 n.2 (1977).
126. Id.
127. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 31(f). See generally infra note 389 and
accompanying text.
128. Equity Financing, supra at 1; J. La Cascia, supra note 39, at 50; F. LEES & M.
ENG supra note 16, at 374; R. AUBEY, NACIONAL FINANCIERA AND MEXICAN INDUSTRY: A
STUDY OF THE FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

OF MEXICO 80 (1966).
129. 1 Intercontinental, S.A., The Mexican Market 1 (1960). For a discussion of market
characteristics in the 1960's, see supra at 113; Ross, The Mexican Stock Market - An
Appraisal, FIN. ANALYSTS J. (1962) [hereinafter Ross, Appraisal];Ross, Progress, supra note
104, at 48.

VOL. 19:3

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'V

1966;131 2.1 percent in 1970,1"1 2.5 percent in 1971;132 3.2 percent in
1975;188 4.4 percent in 1976; and 4.4 percent in 1985.183 For several years
in the late 1970s, trading in equities increased to 18 percent in 1978, 26
percent in 1979, and 16 percent in 1980.135 Beginning in 1981, however,
investment in cetes increased dramatically and trading in equities fell to
1.9 percent in 1982,136 2.5 percent in 1984,137 and 4.4 percent, in 1985. For
the first eight months of 1989, stock trading represented less than 1 percent of the value of the entire securities market.1 8
The overall volume of trading on the Exchange, however, has increased steadily. In 1971 transactions on the Mexico City Stock Exchange
were 38 billion pesos compared to 5 billion pesos in 1960139 and 54 million
pesos in 1950.140 Transactions totalled 113 billion pesos in 1975;141 308
trillion in 1987;12 966 trillion in 1988;148 and 1,170 trillion in 1989.144
Trading volume in U.S. dollars is set forth below for the periods
indicated:
TABLE 1
Trading Volume
Year Ending December 31,

Total
Volume

130. J.

1985
($mil)

1986
($mil)

1987
($mil)

1988
($mil)

1989
($mil)

81,987

118,642

219,081

421,775

471,234

LA CASCIA,

supra note 39, at 50.

131. NACIONAL FINANCIERA, supra note 125, at 321.
132. F. LEES & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 374.
133. NACIONAJ FINANCIERA, supra note 125, at 321.

134. Id.; Nacional Financiera, Comportarnientodel Mercado de Valores en 1985, 46 EL
MERCADO DE VALORES 153 (1986) (1985 data).

135. 1983 Prospectus, supra note 60, at 14.
136. Id.
137. Memoria de Labores, supra note 46; at 17.
138. Equity Financing,supra at 1.
139. F. LEES & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 377.
140. NACIONA FINANCIERA, supra note 125, at 317.
141. Market data from 1940-1975 are set forth in NACIONAL FINANCIERA, supra at 125.
Data from 1978-1981 are contained in Prospectus of the Mexico Fund, Inc. (June 3, 1981).
Data from 1985-1989 are from Prospectus EMF, supra at 59. See also reports of the Comision Nacional de Valores or from various issues of Nacional Financiera, El Mercado de
Valores. For early market data and characteristics, see Comision Nacional de Valores,
Memoria Anual; Id., Boletin; Id., Informe de Actividades de la Comission Nacional de
Valores 1975 (1976); Id., Los Bancos y el Mercado de Valores. See also Boletin Estadistico
(quarterly); Cuaderno de Information Bursatil (monthly); Memoria de Labores (annually).
142. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 31.
143. Id. See generally El Comportamiento del Mercado de Valores en 1989, EL MERCADO DE VAoiRs 32 (June 1, 1990).
144. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 31.
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The Mexico City Stock Exchange began publishing a price index for
equity securities in 1959, with the 1959 base year set at 100.145 From 1959
through 1967, the price index fluctuated from a low of 90 (1962) to a high
of 116 (1965).14" The stock index was 128 in October 1971147 and 199.5 in
February 1973.148 In 1978 the Exchange began compiling a new index 16
consisting of 40 actively traded stocks issued by companies in various economic sectors. 8 0 Following are high and low index values respectively, as
of the dates specified:1" 1
1981
1985

1,490 - 765
11,445 - 3,493

1986

47,103 - 10,826

Along with other world markets, Mexico's stock market crashed in October 1987.1"2 The market plummeted from a high of 373,2161"8 on October
6, 1987 to 95,48414 on November 17, 1987. The drop of over sixty percent
brought total market capitalization from $35 billion to $15 billion. 155 The
high and low index values for 1988 were 230,094 - 86,607.16 The values
for 1989 were 443,029 - 203,715.157 These data have not been adjusted for
inflation which was rampant in Mexico in the 1980's. The total capitalization of the Mexican market as of July 1990 was approximately 42.2 billion
U.S. dollars.1"'
A primary market in Mexico exists, obviously, but is relatively small
compared to that of developed countries. Primary offerings dropped from
117 in 1987 to about half that number in 1988.16 One source reports that

145. See A. BASCH & M. KYBAL, supra note 91, at 79.
146. Id.
147. F. LEE & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 377.
148. Id. at 378.
149. 1983 Prospectus, supra note 60, at 15.
150. Prospectus of Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A. (May 24, 1985).
151. Data are derived from Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A., Prospectus, supra note
150; various issues of Nacional Financiera, El Mercado de Valores; Nacional Financera, Indicadores del Mexicado de Valores (Apr. 1989); The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Report -

Mexico.

152. See generally Wild Week in Mexico: Peso Crumbles, Barron's, Nov. 23, 1987, at
72; Mexico Moves to Prop Up Stock Prices, Barron's, Nov. 16, 1987, at 66; Rates Fall
Sharply Once More: Credit Markets Expect FurtherEasing by Fed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
1987, at Dl, col. 3; Fading Prospects:Mexico's Turnaroundof Sagging Economy Now Seen
Imperiled, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1987, at 1.
153. National Financiera, El Comportamiento del Mercado de Valores en 1987, EL
MERCADO

DE

VALoRms 52 (Feb. 1988).

154. Wild Week, supra note 152, at 72.
155. Mexico Moves, supra note 152, at 66; See also The Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report - Mexico No. 1, Feb. 12, 1988, at 13 (the fall in Bolsa was accelerated by
U.S. market events).
156. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 30.
157. Id.
158. Acciones y Valores de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., El Mercado 28 (Sept. 1990).
159. See generally Stock and Bond Financing,1989 Bus. INT'L FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, Aug. 1, 1989.
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during the six-month period which ended June 30, 1990, only two new
issues had been brought to market. 160 Another source, without distinguishing between primary and secondary public offerings, reports eight
public offerings of equity, aggregating 799 million U.S. dollars, as of September 1990.6' Also recorded for the same period are 23 public offerings
of bonds and debentures aggregating 369 million U.S. dollars; six public
offerings of banking bonds aggregating 104 million U.S. dollars; and public offerings by mutual funds, of both debt and equity securities, of 2.5
billion U.S.. dollars.1 62 A futures market was authorized in 1983 but trading remains minimal or non-existent. 6
As of 1990 there were 25 brokerage firms that were members of the
stock exchange and authorized to trade on the floor.1 6' Trading on the
exchange takes place from 10:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. each weekday and is
effected by open outcry.1 6 5 Recent legislation recognized the position of
securities specialists, but as of 1990 there were none. 66 Traditionally, the
market has operated without specialists or other formal market-makers; 67 instead, brokers execute transactions directly with other brokers.' 6
The stock exchange operates an automatic suspension system to regulate
price volatility. 6 '
Listing requirements, which are coordinated between the Commission and the Exchange, include the preparation of a prospectus, five-year
financial statements and a one-year forecast, 70 to be included with supporting material in a listing application.1 7 1 Majority foreign-owned corpo7
rations are not allowed to list."
A prerequisite to listing is registration of
the subject shares with the Commission. Listing applications are passed
on by the Governing Board of the Mexican Stock Exchange. 7 Listed
companies must release annual audited financial statements and
unaudited quarterly financial statements. 7

160.
161.
common
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Prospectus EMF, supra 59, at 29.
Acciones y Valores de Mexico, supra note 158, at 68 (These amounts do not reflect
stock offerings of mutual funds).
Id. at 69.
See Equity Financing,supra at 1.
Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 28.
Id. at 28, 29.
Id. at 36, 29.
Id.
Id. at 36.

169. Id. at 28.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 37.
Creel, supra note 38, at 333.
Listing Procedures, Bus. INT'L, Oct. 1, 1989.
Creel, supra note 38, at 335.
PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 65.
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§6 INTERMEDIARIES
[a] Banks
Historically, the most important intermediaries in the Mexican financial arena were commercial banks.' From the inception of the Mexican
banking system in the mid-1800's until its unexpected nationalization in
1982, the Mexican banking system developed gradually and in a relatively
stable manner. Mexican banks began to form in the mid-1800's when silver banks and working capital loan companies were established to finance
mining ventures and operations. The first private bank, the Bank of
London, Mexico and South America, was founded in 1864.178 The government established the National Banking Commission in 1924, and the
Bank of Mexico in 1925.11 It promulgated banking regulations in 1897,
1915, 1924, and 1932.17 The most important laws regulating banks since
that time, prior to the enactment of new banking legislation in 1985,179
were the Organic Law of the Bank of Mexico and the General Law of
Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Organizations.
At the end of August 1982, Mexico's banking system consisted of
public and private sector banks. The principal public sector banks included the Bank of Mexico, Nacional Financiera,and Banco Nacional de
Obras y Servicios Publicos (a national foreign trade bank). 80 The Central
Bank is Banco de Mexico, chartered in 1925.181 The Bank of Mexico, as
the central reserve bank, controls credit, provides funds for programs,
purchases securities, issues and regulates currency, regulates interest
rates, establishes reserve requirements, and provides discount facilities."8 '
"Through these means, Banco de Mexico regulates loan operations and
investments of banks and is instrumental in channelling financial resources into selected areas of the economy."18
Nacional Financiera,or "Nafinsa," established in 1934, is a national
credit institution chartered to promote economic development. Nafinsa is
one of the largest sources of financing in Mexico. 8 4 One of its principal
objectives is to channel credits into economic sectors not having ready

175. Saldafia, Mexican Financial Institutions: A Banker's Viewpoint, 4 CAL. W. L.
REV. 306, 307 (1968). See generally MOORE, EVOLUCION DE LAS INSTITUCIONEs FINANCIERAS
EN MEXICO (1963); D. SHELTON, THE BANKING SYSTEM: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN MEXICO

(1967).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Saldafla, supra note 175, at 307.
Id. at 308.
Saldafla, supra note 175, at 307-08. See A. ROMERO, supra at 39.
Ley Reglamentaia del Servicio Publico de Banca y Cr~dito (Jan. 14, 1985).
A. HOAGLAND, supra note 65, at J-1 through J-9.
Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 30.
Id. See J. LA CASCIA, supra note 39, at 133; BETETA, THE CENTRAL BANK, INSTU-

MENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO, IN MEXICO's RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH 75

(Lopez ed. 1967).
183. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 30.

184. See generally R. Aubey, supra note 128, at 1.
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access to private financing. 185 Toward this end, Nafinsa makes loans to
companies and utilities, guarantees debts, invests capital by purchasing
securities (subsequently selling shares when the enterprise becomes profitable), rediscounts commercial paper, and furnishes other discounting facilities to banks.18 Nafinsa represents probably the most original contribution by Mexico to the types
of institutions promoting growth and
1 87
development in Latin America.
As of August 31, 1982, Mexico's then private banking system included twelve depository banks, thirty-five multi-service banks, seven financial banks, one credit mortgage institution, and five long-term credit
banks. "8 Other banks that have existed from time to time in Mexico include private development banks, capitalization banks, savings and loan
institutions, and trust companies. 89 Over the years, Mexican banks "developed their commercial capabilities to a very substantial degree and
[became] increasingly active in industrial, housing, tourism, transport and
export financing and recently, in agricultural development financing."""
Then, on September 1, 1982, in his state of the union message, lame-duck
President Jose Lopez Portillo announced the nationalization of the private Mexican banking institutions, and several days later declared them
National Credit Societies owned entirely by Mexico."1
In 1986 and 1987 the government began a privatization program, selling many non-bank subsidiaries of banks and a large portion of bank
stock itself back to the private sector." 2 The privatization of the banking
sector continued and has accelerated under the initiatives of the Salinas
administration. 193 As of 1990, there were 20 commercial banks operating
in Mexico.1 94 These were, in addition to the other principal types of banks
9
operating in Mexico, development banks.1 5
At present, banks are not allowed to operate as brokers in the Securi-

185. See D. BROTHERS & L. SOLIS, supra note 91, at 12.
186. J. LA CASCIA, supra note 39, at 39; F. LEES & M. ENG, supra note 16, at 366.
187. R. GOLDSMITH, THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO 21 (1966). New legislation
regulating Nafinsa was passed in 1986. Ley Organica de Nacional Financiera (Organic Law
of Nacional Financiera), D.O., Dec. 26, 1986. See Ley Organica De Nacional Financieria, El
Mercado de Valores 1 (Jan. 12, 1987).
188. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 30.
189. See BETETA, supra note 182, at 74; J. LA CASCIA, supra note 39, at 46; D. BROTHERS
& L. SOLIS, supra note 91, at 30.
190. A. HOAGLAND, FORMATION, supra note 65, J-1.
191. Mexican Registration Statement, supra note 14, at 31. See Decreto Que Establece
La Nacionalizacion de la Banca Privada, D.O., Sept. 1-2, 1982. Subsequent to nationalization, an unofficial, private banking system developed. Sarmiento, Mexico's Phantom Bankers Come Out of the Shadows, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1987, at 19, col. 3; THACKRAY, COMMERCIAL PAPER: PARALLEL BANKING BEATS BARTER, EUROMONEY, Jul.

1986, at 87.

192. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - Mexico 1987-1988, at 26
(Aug. 1987).
193. See generally infra notes 258-272 and accompanying text.
194. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 1-24
195. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 79.
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ties Market, and may not, directly or indirectly, have a share in their
capital stock, except as trustees for qualified persons. 9 " In fact, a bank's
own transactions (and those of its clients) must be effected through brokers. Thus, banks do not, at present, have a direct role in the securities
market inasmuch as they have no access to it. Indirectly, however, they
do have an impact due to the size of their portfolios and the effect of
their trading on market prices. Just as banks may not own brokerage
firms, brokerage firms are not allowed to own banks in Mexico.
[b] Brokerage Firms
The stock market departments of several commercial banks played
important roles as intermediaries in the Mexican stock market, 197 but the
Securities Market Law provided for independent brokerage firms to operate in the market. Under present law, "intermediation" may be performed only, with certain limited exceptions, by corporations registered
in the Brokers Section of the National Registry of Securities and Brokers.198 "Intermediation" includes: (i) brokerage, agency, and any other
transaction or activity undertaken for the purpose of connecting the supply and demand for securities; (ii) transactions for the account of a person with securities issued or guaranteed by third parties that have been
the object of a public offer; and (iii) the management of portfolios of securities owned by third parties. The general rule is that banks may not
engage in the business of brokerage, and brokerage firms may not engage
in the business of banking. Brokers, among other things, may buy and sell
securities, hold funds, render investment advice, and provide safekeeping
facilities. 9 Recent legislation in Mexico allows Mexican brokers to open
subsidiaries abroad 0° and to act as intermediaries on behalf of investment companies.2 0' In 1980 twenty-four corporate brokerage firms were
registered with the Commission.2 2 This number remained relatively constant throughout the decade.2 0° The rules and regulations governing bro-

196. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 17.
197. A. HOAGLAND, FORMATION, supra note 65, at J-32; Ross, Changing, supra note 113,
at 149, 150. See also Wise, Buoyant Bolsa: Investors Shrug Off Political Uncertainties,
Barron's, Mar. 10, 1975, at 9 (Banco Nacional de Mexico and Banco de Comercio had significant role in stock market).
198. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 12. The 1985 amendments require registered brokers to be corporations, although the law contains a grandfather clause for
individuals.
199. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, arts. 22, 23 (Previously, Mexican brokers
were able to extend margin, a practice halted in 1987 but said to be under re-consideration
by the Commission); Equity Financing,supra at 1.
200. See infra at 38.
201. Mexican Regulators Seek Bilateral U.S. Disclosure Pact, supra at 2.

202. A. HOAGLAND,

FORMATION,

supra note 65, at J-32. Certain financial, operating, and

statistical information concerning Mexican brokerage firms is set forth in Nacional Financiera, Information Financiera, Operativa y Estadistica de las Casas de Bolsa, 48 EL MERCADO
DE VALORES 1134 (Dec. 1, 1986).
203. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 28.
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kers in Mexico are discussed further below.2"
[c] Investment Companies
The Mexican Congress enacted legislation in 1951,"05 subsequently
amended,206 providing for the establishment of investment companies in
Mexico. The Mexican Investment Company Law authorized the Commission to approve the formation and regulation of investment companies. 07
The law was amended in 1965 to incorporate "the general reforms
designed to preserve control of financial institutions in Mexican nationals; foreign governments or groups or persons ... were accordingly forbidden to acquire shares of regulated investment companies. ' 20 8 Numerous
investment companies subsequently were formed under this law. 09 A
1970 study summarizes the record of Mexican investment companies:
[Investment companies] have had a successful record of operations, as
shown by substantial increases in their investment portfolios, which
has been reflected in growing net operating earnings. With a continuation of successful management and the expanding securities market in
Mexico, mutual funds thus promise to become an increasingly important vehicle for funneling savings into the capital market.21 0
In 1985 the Mexican Congress enacted a new Investment Companies Act
which was subsequently amended in 1990. The amendments facilitate formation of investment companies as well as foreign investment in them.2 11
Since that time, the government has continued to support the mutual
fund industry.2 1 2 The number of mutual funds increased from 117 in 1988
to 174 in 1989.211 In 1990 there was substantial activity by mutual funds
in the Mexican primary market.2 1'4 In order to operate in Mexico, investment companies must receive approval from the Ministry
of Finance.2"5
21 6
They may be operated by brokerage firms or banks.

204. See infra §15.
205. Ley que Establece el Regimen de las Sociedades de Inversion (Act Establishing
Rules for Investment Companies), D.O., Jan. 4, 1951.
206. D.O., Dec. 31, 1955; Id., Dec. 31, 1963; Id., Dec. 31, 1965.
207. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 166 (1961). See generally Batiza, New Law on
Investment Companies, 5 Am.J. CoMP. L. 625 (1956); Batiza, Las Sociedades de Inversion,
8-10 EL FORO 105 (1955); Hermosillo, Les Societes, supra note 37, at 109; S. Martinez, Las
Sociedades de Inversion en Mexico, 8 REv. DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MExico 233
(1958).
208. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION IV 2290. (2d ed. Supp., 1969).
209. See A. BASCH & M. KYBAL, supra note 91, at 133; J. LA CASCIA, supra note 39, at
52; Comision Nacional de Valores, Leyes y Disposiciones del Meracado de Valores 268-269
(1982).
210. A. BAscH & M. KBAL,supra note 91, at 133.
211. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 28.
212. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 35.

213. Id.
214. Acciones Y Valores de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., El Mercado (Sept. 1990). See also
Equity Financing, supra at 1.
215. PRIcE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 81.

216. Id.
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The Mexico Fund, Inc. is a diversified, close-ended investment company registered under the United States Investment Company Act of
1940."1' Incorporated under Maryland law in 1981, the Mexico Fund invests primarily in equity securities listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange.218 A Mexican corporation, registered as an investment adviser
under the United States Investment Advisers Act of 1940, advises the
Fund.2 19 The Fund makes investments through a trust, organized under
Mexican law, of which Nafinsa is the trustee. 220 The Mexico Fund was
structured to comply with Mexico's foreign investment laws. Because
Nafinsa holds and votes securities acquired by the Fund, the Mexican
Foreign Investment Commission ruled that "record ownership of equity
securities by the Trust is deemed to be ownership by a Mexican investor,
even though the Fund, which is the sole beneficiary of the Trust, is a
United States corporation. ' '22 1 In addition to regulation of the Mexico

Fund under the United States Investment Company Act and the adviser
to the Fund under the United States Investment Advisers Act, the activities of these entities are also regulated by the Mexican Securities Commission. 222 Prior to beginning operations, the Mexican Securities Commission approved (1) investment of brokerage houses in the investment
adviser; (2) the companies in which the Fund could invest; (3) the naming
of the fund as the sole beneficiary of the Trust; and (4) general investment rules applicable to the Trust. 28 The Mexico Fund or its affiliates
also obtained various approvals of confirmations from, among others, the
Bureau of Foreign Investment and Transfer of Technology, the Ministry
of Finance and Public Credit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, and the National Banking Commission. Sev224
eral similar funds have been or are currently being organized.
[d] Auxiliary Credit Institutions
The Mexican financial system includes other types of institutions involved in various financial activities. 225 Auxiliary Credit Organizations,
governed by the General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Credit
Organizations, are warehouse corporations, financial leasing companies,

217. 1983 Prospectus, supra note 60, at 10.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3, 10.
221. Id. at 10-11.
222. Id. at 11.
223. Transcript of The Mexico Fund, Inc. Offering of 10,000,000 Shares of Common
Stock (1981) (available at the library of the Mexican Securities Commission, Mexico City).
224. Two New Specialized Funds Should Attract Investors, Bus. INr'L, June 18, 1990.
See also Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 1 ("a newly organized, non-diversified, closedend management investment company seeking long-term capital appreciation through investment primarily in Mexican equity securities").
225. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 3-4.
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credit unions, factoring companies, and entities involved in foreign exchange activities. " 6 These institutions play a significant role in the financial system generally, though less of an important role in the securities
market. Recent legislation permits these companies to be part of "financial groups" with other financial institutions in Mexico.
[el Specialists
Specialists are financial intermediaries recognized by the January
1990 Amendments to the Securities Market Law.2 17 Securities Specialists
may effect transactions with broker-dealer corporations, other specialists,
and the general public, although in the latter case only when authorized
by rules of the Commission.2 8 Specialists may only trade for their own
account and not for the account of others. 29 Detailed rules governing specialists were set forth in the January 1990 amendments and are analyzed
further below; 230 however,
as of 1990 there were no specialists operating
281
in the Mexican market.
[f] Financial Groups
The January 1990 amendments to the Securities Law provided for
the organization of "financial groups," which may include broker-dealers,
financial warehouse corporations (secured lenders), leasing corporations,
foreign exchange houses, factors, bonding institutions, insurance companies, and investment fund operating companies.28 2 New legislation regulating financial groups was enacted in July 1990.28 The "Law to Regulate
Financial Groups ' '231 was part of the reform package of the summer of
1990 that continued the dramatic liberalization of Mexico's financial system. Under the Law to Regulate Financial Groups, the entities that may
become members of a financial group are deposit warehouses, leasing
companies, brokerage firms, exchange firms, factors, multiple bank institutions, bonding companies, insurance companies, and operating companies of investment companies. 2 5 Each group must have at least three of
these entities not counting operating companies of investment companies. " Two or more entities of the same class may not participate in the
same group, except for operating companies of investment companies
and, in certain cases, insurance companies.
The Ministry of Finance,

226. Id.
227. Id. at 28. See Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 22(B).
228, Id. at 28 n. 17.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 28.
See generally supra at 38.
See supra at 16.
Mitchell, supra note 74, at 28.

233. Law to Regulate Financial Groups, D.O., July 18, 1990.

234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id. art. 7.
Id.
Id.
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through rules of a general character, will authorize other firms that are
able to form part of these groups.
The financial entities that form a group may act jointly toward the
public and offer complementary services;. 88 may use the same name or
phrases that identify it to the public as a group, but should use the words
"Financial Group" in the title;23 9 and may operate through the offices of
other group members in conformity with general rules to be dictated by
group members opthe Ministry of Finance.2 10 In no case, however, may 21
erate through the offices of the controlling company.
The incorporation of a new firm and constituent group, as well as the
merger of two or more groups, require approval of the Ministry of Finance, after considering the opinion of the Bank of Mexico, the National
Banking Commission, the Securities Commission, and the Insurance and
Bonding Commission.242 The control of shareholders' meetings and the
administration of each group must be in a controlling or holding company.2 48 This company must at all times hold at least 51 percent of the
capital of each group member.2 " The holding company shares must be
in a securities depository regulated by the Securities Market
maintained
2 45
Law.
The shares of the holding company must be divided into three series:
Series A, to represent 51 percent; Series B, to represent 49 percent; and
Series C, that may represent up to 30 percent of the capital of the company, which may be issued only with the approval of the Ministry of Finance. 246 Series A shares may be acquired only by Mexican persons and
the Banking Fund for Protection of Savings. 47 Series B shares may only
be acquired by Mexican legal entities whose articles contain clauses excluding directly and indirectly foreigners and by certain institutional investors.24 8 Series C shares may be issued to foreign persons, natural or
legal, if proper approvals are obtained as specified above.24 9 Foreign governments and officials however, are ineligible to participate.25
[g] Foreign Investment in FinancialServices
Mexico's post-Revolutionary backlash against foreign ownership
culminated with the enactment of extremely protectionist legislation in

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 8.

art. 10.
art. 15.
art. 18.
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1973.251 Even before the banks were nationalized in 1982, foreigners could
not own stock in them and could not operate branches in Mexico.2 52 In
the mid-1980's Mexico began to relax its restrictions on foreign investment.25 2 This policy of liberalization was reflected in new foreign investment regulations promulgated in 1989.25 As a general proposition, under
the foreign investment rules companies may issue Series A shares, which
may be held only by Mexican nationals, and Series B shares which may
be held by anyone."' Broadly speaking, B shares may represent up to 49
percent of capital.2 56 Pursuant to regulations adopted in May 1989, foreign investment in listed companies may also be made through the
purchase of ordinary certificates of participation issued by trust institutions in trusts the corpus of which consists; of shares of listed companies
denominated as Series N shares.25
The relaxation of foreign investment restrictions has continued to ac-

251. Ley Para Promover La Inversion Mexicana Y Regular La Inversion Extranjera,
D.O., Mar. 9, 1973. Before the Revolution of 1910, foreign ownership of the means of production in Mexico was extensive, particularly in the mining and petroleum industries. See
generally J.

COCKCROFT, MEXICO: CLASS FORMATION, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND THE STATE

86 (1983)(foreigners began to dominate much of economy in the late 1800's). For example,
in 1910 foreigners owned over 25% of the land, 60% of mining, 70% of oil production, and
indeed dominated almost every industrial sector except agriculture. Murphy, Expropriation
and Aftermath: The Prospects for Foreign Enterprise in the Mexico of Miguel de la Madrid, 18 TEX. INT'L L. J. 431, 433 (1983). After the Revolution, a policy against unrestrained
foreign investment evolved based on a theory that foreign economic domination was a threat
to national sovereignty. Colloquium, supra note 12, at 40. See also Schill, The Mexican and
Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 437, 44849 (1974). Mexican investment policies thus derive from concepts in the 1917 Constitution.
Gordon, supra note 12, at 173. A decree of 1944 authorized the government to prohibit
foreign ownership of more than 49% of any Mexican corporation. H. PARKS, supra note 15,
at 363. The 1973 legislation which technically is still in effect (but which has been eroded by
regulations) followed from these precepts. For a translation of the 1973 legislation, see PALACIO, ANALISIS DE LA LEY DR INVERSION EXTRANJERA EN MEXICO (1974). See generally Murphy,
The Echeverrian Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign Investment and Licensing in Mexico,
17 TEX. INT'L L. J. 135 (1982); The ForeignInvestment Transactionin Mexico, 8 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. J. 67 (1985); Vizcaino, The Law on Foreign Investment, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 34 (1977); Radway, Doing Business in Mexico: A Practical Legal Analysis, 14
INT'L LAW. 361, 374 (1980). Regarding the initial phase of the easing of restrictions, see
Rohan, An Improved Climate? Restrictions Easing on Foreign Operations, 221 INDUS. WK.
24-25 (1984); New Resolutions for Foreign Investment, INT'L FIN. L. Rav., Dec. 1986, at 47;
Approval of Foreign Investment Assured, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1986, at 46.
252. Darling, Mexico to Allow Foreigners to Buy Into Banks, L.A. Times, June 29,
1990, at D2, col. 2. An exception to this rule is Citibank, which was established in Mexico
prior to the enactment of the Banking Law in the 1930's; PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note
113, at 83.
253. New Resolutions for Foreign Investment, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 47 (Dec. 1986); Approval of.Foreign Investment Assured, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 46 (Oct. 1986).
254. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversion Mexicana Y Regular ta Inversion Extranjera, D.O., May 16, 1989.
255. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 27.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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celerate under Salinas, who became President of Mexico in December
1988. In January 1990, Mexico enacted new legislation permitting foreign
investment in financial services.25 Under this legislation banks are permitted to issue "Series C" shares which may be held by foreigners.25 9
These shares, which do not carry voting rights, may be issued to foreign
investors in amounts aggregating up to 34 percent of the total amount of
the equity which may be held by the private sector.2 6 0 Foreign investors

also may hold a 49 percent position in auxiliary credit institutions including financial warehousing companies, bonding companies, foreign exchange houses, insurance, leasing, and factoring companies. 281
In the summer of 1990 a bill was proposed that would allow the Ministry of Finance to authorize foreign investment in brokerage firms up to
a 30 percent limit, not to exceed 10 percent per person. 2 The bill also
allowed foreign investment in financial groups (this bill preceded the legislation on financial groups discussed above) up to the same limits, as well
as foreign investment in the commercial banks being privatized."' s This
legislation was also enacted in July 1990.264 Article 17 of the Securities
Market Law specifies the requirements for capital stock limited liability
companies to be registered as brokers in the National Registry. As
amended in July 1990, foreign government or foreign governmental
branches may not be registered, 6 " but the Ministry of Finance may authorize foreign investment in brokerage firms, up to a limit of 30 percent
of capital.26 6 With one exception, the foreign investment in question may
not exceed 10 percent of the shares of the brokerage firm. A foreign brokerage firm may not, itself, register as a broker in Mexico.26 7 Foreigners
making these investments are considered, for these purposes only, as a
258.
259.
260.
261.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, Mexico - Country Report No. 1 - 1990, at 11.
Id.
Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 1-24.
Id.; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Mexico - Country Report No. 1 - 1980, at

11.
262. Darling, supra at 252.
263. Banking Bill Sent to Senate, supra note 21, at 8, col. 6; Mexico Picks First Banks
for Privatization,supra note 21, at 26; Evans & Krans, Mexico's Privatization Plan Wins
Praise,Am. BANKER, May 7, 1990, at 14; Darling, supra at 252; Tricks, Mexican Government
Unveils Bank PrivatizationBill, supra at 21. The privatization of the banks is being implemented by a "Bank Disincorporation Committee" formed in 1990. See Banks Ready for
Privatization,Finance Liberalization Seen, supra at 69.
In 1987, private investment in the commercial banks that had been nationalized in 1982
was permitted up to 34% of capital. At the time foreign investors were excluded from participating in this equity. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 1-24. As mentioned in the text
above, the law was changed in 1989 to permit some foreign investment in the equity that
had been made available, in 1987, for private sector investment. Id. The 1990 legislation to
which the text accompanying this footnote refers to the portion of bank stock being privatized that had been, heretofore, owned by the Mexican government.
264. Mexico Picks First Banks for Privatization,supra at 21.
265. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 17, § II(b).
266. Id.
267. Banks ready for Privatization,Finance Liberalization Seen, supra at 69.
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Mexican citizen. 8 The statute purports to prevent appeals by the foreign
investor to his own government for assistance, upon penalty of forfeiting
the shares in question to the Mexican nation. 269 These restrictions generally mirror those applicable to multiple service banks under the July 1990
Law of Credit Institutionss2o and the corresponding law governing financial groups mentioned above. The July legislation applicable to credit institutions also loosened but did not eliminate the restrictions on branch
banking.271
Another vehicle for foreign investment in Mexico is a temporary
trust. Subject to the Commission's resolution and in special circumstances, the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development, may authorize foreign investors to acquire beneficiary rights through a temporary trust which will not be in existence for more than twenty years, in
any proportion of shares of companies that carry out specific economic
272
activities.
§7

APPLICABILITY OF SECURITIEs LAW

The Securities Market Law regulates the public offering of securities,
the operations of brokers in selling securities, the activities of those responsible for regulating the market, the National Registry of Securities
and Brokers, and the rendering of services generally in the securities market.27 The policy that the Securities Market Law establishes for securities and the activities relating to them is also applicable to credit instruments and other documents that may be the object of public offerings or
of intermediation in the securities market, and that grant to their holders
rights of credit, property, or participation in the capital of corporations.2 7 4
The Securities Market Law defines "securities" as shares of stock, bonds,
and other credit instruments that are mass issued or serialized. 275 The
Securities Market Law charges the regulatory authorities with promoting
a balanced and competitive securities market.2 76 Mexico's commercial
laws, commercial and stock exchange practices, and Civil Code for the

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Ley de Instituciones de Cr~dito, D.O., July 18, 1990 (Multiple service banks may
perform a variety of services and may have foreign ownership up to 30% if approved by the
Ministry of Finance. In contrast, development banks may not have any foreign ownership).
271. See Tricks, supra at 263.
272. See Moffett, Mexico Opens Much of Market to Foreign Capital Through a Trust
Fund by State Development Bank, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1990, at C12; Suggan, The Bolsa
Booms Again, FORBES, Apr. 16, 1990, at 54; Darling, Mexico's Market Goes More Public,
L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1990, at D10; Laurie, supra note 20, at 50.
273. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 1.
274. Id. art. 3.
275. Id. ("Securities are the shares of stock, bonds and other credit instruments that
are mass issued or serialized.")
276. Id. art. 1 ("In the application of the present law, said authorities should endeavor
to obtain the balanced development of the securities market and a healthy competition in
the same.")
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Federal District and Federal Civil procedure
are supplemental to the Se277
curities Market Law in the order cited.
The Securities Market Law is applicable to a wide range of activities
and persons performing them. Most importantly it applies to public offerings of securities,278 generally prohibiting them absent prior approval by
the Commission, and to brokerage activities.2 79 Firms engaging in brokerage or intermediation activities are subject to the law and are classified
either as brokers or stock exchange specialists. The trading of securities
by credit institutions, auxiliary credit institutions, insurance companies,
and investment companies is governed by both the Securities Market
Law and by specialized provisions that are applicable to them. 8 0 The Securities Market Law also regulates advertising relating to securities or
brokers, securities and broker registration, insider trading, stock exchanges, securities regulators, depositories, and clearing houses.
§8 PUBLIC

OFFERING OF SECURITIES

A "public offering" of securities is made through some means of mass
communications or to "unspecified persons" in order to subscribe, sell, or
acquire securities or documents defined in article 3 of the law.2 8 The registration provisions are found in articles 2 and 11. Article 2 provides that
"[t]he public offering of securities and documents to which this law refers
are required to be previously approved by the National Securities Commission. ' ' 2s 2 Article 11 provides that only documents registered in the Securities Section can be subject to public offering.28 3 These provisions form
the core of Mexican securities regulation by giving the Commission the
power to review securities offerings and determine when and under what
circumstances securities may be offered to the public. Article 11 provides
further that the public offering in foreign countries of securities issued in
Mexico or by Mexican corporations is subject to registration in a special
section of the National Registry of Securities and Brokers. 8 " Advertising
and other information directed to the public about securities, and about
the services and operations of brokers, also are regulated by the Commission.28 5 Article 3 of the law provides that the public offering of any document that is not among those mentioned in the article is prohibited. Article 3 provides that "securities" include shares, bonds (obligations), and

277. Id. art. 7.
278. Id. arts. 2, 11.
279. Id. art. 12.
280. Id. art. 60.
281. Id. art. 2 ("A public offering is considered to be that which is made through some
means of mass communication or to an unspecified person in order to subscribe, sell or
acquire securities or documents [defined in Art. 3]"). The law directs the Commission to
establish general criteria to determine whether an offering is "public." Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. art. 11.

284. Id.
285. Id. art. 5.
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other credit instruments that are issued in series or in mass. This article
also provides that the law is applicable to documents that grant to their
title holders rights of credit, property, or participation in the capital of
corporations, as well as to other documents that, because of their characteristics, may be susceptible to a public offering.
The preparation for a public stock offering in Mexico is extensive
and includes matters such as preparation or review of bylaws, agreements,
stock certificates, minute books, encumbrances, financial statements, and
resolutions. 8 6 A registrant must fulfill several requirements to obtain registration with the National Registry of Securities and Securities Intermediaries. 28 7 First, an issuer must file a registration application with
the Mexican Securities Commission.2' The issuer must pay a registration
fee that varies according to the size of the offering.2 89 In the application
the issuer must provide considerable information about itself, the securities, and numerous other matters.2 90 For example, the application must
contain legal information supported by voluminous documentation;2 91 economic information prepared by a credit rating institution or independent professional auditor;2 92 financial information, including audited financial statements for the previous year; in certain cases, interim
financial statements; 292 and information regarding the form of the proposed public offering.294 The Commission reviews the information
presented in the prospectus and other documents, and may request additional information or clarifications.29 Corrections of the prospectus must
be made in accordance with the observations of the Commission.2 96 The
purpose of these requirements is to protect investors by requiring the disclosure of adequate information about the shares that are being offered
and their issuers.2 97 The review process thus appears to be similar to that
in the United States. The process takes about two months before a company is given permission to make a public offering.29 8 In 1989 the Commission authorized a form of registration similar to shelf registration in
the United States, which allows a company to make a public offering any

286. Creel, supra note 38, at 312-19.
287. Id. at 320.
288. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 14; Creel, supra note 38, at 320 n.71.
289. Listing Procedures, Bus. INT'L, Oct. 1, 1989. There are also fixed fees to pay for
investigations by the Commission and the Exchange.
290. Creel, supra note 38, at 320.
291. Id. at 322.
292. Id. at 324.
293. Id. at 325; PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 65 (Additional information is
required for the five most recent years).
294. Creel, supra note 38, at 320 (The Company must provide detailed financial analysis of itself as well as, among other things, a description of its technology and employment);
Listing Procedures, supra at 289.

295. Creel, supra note 38, at 331-32.
296. Id. at 331.
297. Id. at 309-10.
298. Listing Procedures, supra at 289.
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time up to six months following registration with the Commission.'"
Mexican accounting principles as expressed by the Institute of Public
Accountants, through the Accounting Principles Commission, are generally similar to those of the United States, except in the areas of accounting for inflation and deferred taxes.300 Generally, Mexican accounting
principles require a balance sheet, income statement, statement of
changes in stockholders' equity, statement of changes in financial position
on a cash basis, and notes. 0 ' Listed companies are required to publish
their annual financial statements in a major newspaper.30 2 All issuers incorporated under Mexican law must appoint statutory auditors who are
representatives of the shareholders.303
In addition to the information requirements, issuers must satisfy several other important requirements in order to obtain and maintain registration of securities in the Securities Section.304 Among other things, the
characteristics of the securities and the terms of their placement must
permit significant circulation that will not prejudice or disrupt the market. s" 5 It must appear to the Commission that the issuer is solvent and
liquid.306 To obtain and maintain registration of securities, the issuer
must follow policies, in respect of its participation in the securities market, congruent with the interests of investors.3 0 7 Issuers must furnish the
Commission, the stock exchange, and the public with information specified by the Commission through general rules. 0 8 Article 14 of the law also
requires, as a condition of obtaining and maintaining registration, that
the issuer not carry out transactions that artificially modify the return on
the securities.30 9 Issuers of securities representative of their capital must
issue certificates for the securities within 180 days of funding of the issuer
in respect of the shares or from the date on which the issuance of exchange has been declared." 0 The statute directs the Commission to promulgate regulations governing issuances by brokerage firms. "

299. Id.
300. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 130.
301. Id. at 131.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 126.
304. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 14.
305. Id. art. 14., § II.
306. Id. art. 14, § IV.
307. Id. art. 14, § V. The Law directs the Commission to issue general regulations relating to, inter alia, corporations of "variable capital" and companies controlling other
companies.
308. Id. art. 14, § VI.
309. Id. art. 14, § VII. Issuers may not "concede to the holders benefits that do not
derive from the proper nature of the securities .
310. Id. art. 14, § VIII.
311. Id. art. 14, § IX. Such regulations are to have the following objectives: (a) the
prevention of trading that may produce conflicts of interest; (b) the orderly development of
the market; (c) the adequate capitalization of the broker; and (d) "the continuity of an
organization with high levels of technical and administrative efficiency."
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Registration of the securities with the Commission does not, under
the law, imply certification of the merit or worth of the securities or the
solvency of the issuer. 13 This provision must be stated in the documents
through which public offerings of securities are made."'3 After registration
with the National Registry of Securities, securities may be listed for trading on the Exchange s 4 if they meet the requirements of the Exchange.
Securities issued or guaranteed by the Federal government of Mexico, by credit or insurance institutions, by auxiliary credit organizations,
and by investment companies must also be registered in the Securities
Section of the National Registry. 15 Under the statute, registration for
these issuers is effected by notice to the Commission.1 '
Prior to 1982, only shares sold to foreigners or shares issued by companies in certain industries were required to be in registered (as opposed
to bearer) form. 1 7 Under present law, all listed shares must be in registered form.3 '8 The January 1990 amendments permit issuers of registered
securities to issue non-voting shares.319

§9

EXEMPT OFFERINGS

Under no circumstances may public offerings be made in Mexico
without prior Commission approval. As discussed above, the law considers a public offering to be an offering made through mass means of communication (such as newspaper, radio, television, etc.) or to an undetermined person. The converse is a private offering: an offering made by
direct contact with a specific person. Mexican law does not impose any
specific conditions on these offerings. Rather, only the general concepts of
honesty and good faith apply.32 0
The general rule established by the Securities Market Law is that
only documents registered in the Securities Section of the National Registry can be the subject of trading in the securities market.3 1 However, the
statute provides for an exemption for trades in securities that, "without
constituting a public offering," may have as their object (i) the subscription of stock; (ii) the merger or reorganization of corporations; (iii) the

312. Id. art. 14, § VII.
313. Id.
314. Id. art. 33.
315. Id. art. 15.
316. Id. In the case of stocks or certificates of patrimonial contribution issued by national credit corporations, it is necessary to comply with III, V, VI, VIII of article 14. However, registration is authorized without fulfillment of such requirements in the case of securities issued by credit institutions that may, in the judgement of the Bank of Mexico, achieve
"ample circulation." See id. art. 15.
317. Listing Procedures,supra at 289.
318. Id.
319. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 14 bis II.
320. See generally Diez, Problems in Selling Securities in Latin America, 4 INT'L FIN.
L. REv. 28-31 (June 1985).
321. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 13.
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sale of substantial portions of the assets of a business; or (vi) the brokering of documents to which reference is made in the second paragraph of
article 3.22 Thus, if the documents in question are not sold in a public
offering, but rather are the object solely of intermediation, an exemption
would appear to be available. Likewise, so long as trades in securities do
not constitute a public offering, the subscription of stock, merger or reorganization of a corporation, and sale of important portions of the assets of
a business would be exempt from the requirement that only registered
documents can be traded in the securities market.
§10

TRADING BY AFFILIATES AND SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS

A secondary distribution refers to a public offering of outstanding
shares. 28s Typically, a secondary offering involves a block of stock too
large to sell in the routine trading market. 2 4 A secondary public offering
would require prior approval of the Commission. 2 5 As explained above,
article 2 requires all public offerings of securities (and other documents
covered by law) to be previously approved by the Commission. The statute does not distinguish between primary and secondary distributions. A
different result is achieved, as indicated above, in the case of certain sales
of securities not constituting a public offering.311
§11 CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE

In order to maintain registration in the Securities Section, issuers
must furnish the Commission, the Exchanges, and the public, with information specified by the Commission in its general rules and regulations.32 7 The law thus generally authorizes the Commission to set periodic
reporting requirements. The Commission has issued circulares requiring
corporations to provide periodic financial, legal, accounting, and other information to the Commission and the public. 8 ' One such circular requires
corporations to furnish annual reports with audited financial statements
2
and unaudited quarterly reports with specified financial information. '

322. Id.
323. Sim, The New Issues Market, HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: Sacuarrms, OP-

TIONS AND FuTuREs 124-125 (1986). In a secondary placement, the original stockholders offer
their shares for sale. Creel, supra note 38, at 319.
324. Sim, supra note 323, at 125. For an example of a secondary distribution made in
the 1960's, see 9 Intercontinental, S.A., The Mexican Market 2 (Oct. 15, 1960).
325. Cf. Rule 144A under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, which permits resales of securities to qualified institutional buyers irrespective of the number of them, if the conditions of the Rule are met. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1990).
326. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 13.
327. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 14, § VI.
328. Creel, supra note 38, at 338. "Circulars are the legal instrument used by the Mexican Securities Commission to interpret the Securities Market Law... as well as to establish
the criteria applicable to all companies that wish to have their stock traded in the stock
exchange." Id. at 338 n.195.
329. Id. at 338-41. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 65.
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This circular, 11-11, requires economic, legal, administrative, and accounting information to be presented on an annual and quarterly basis
and also, in some cases, within a short time period after the occurrence of
specified events.
The audited financial statements must contain an opinion of a Mexican certified public accountant. 3 0 Issuers, the stock of which is listed for
trading on the stock exchange, must also satisfy exchange requirements.
These include quarterly and annual reporting requirements.3 31 Listed
Mexican issuers must incorporate the effects of inflation in their accounting records and financial statements.3 8

§12 SECURITIES LAW VIOLATIONS

-

REMEDIES

As discussed below, the Securities Market Law prohibits insider trading. A person damaged by another person's insider trading may bring a
lawsuit for rescission of the trade and payment of damages. 3 33 The statute
of limitations for such an action is six months from the date the inside
information was divulged to the public. In addition, persons who have
violated the insider trading proscriptions may be fined and incur administrative sanctions.
If a purchaser of securities is defrauded in a private sale of stock in
which there is direct dealing between the purchaser and the seller, the
investor would be able to inform the District Attorney who could institute proceedings in a local (State or Federal District) court. This assumes
that deceit or some element of cheating or dishonesty were involved in
the transaction. The investor also has the possibility of filing a complaint
in a Civil Court to obtain a recovery.
If the investor were defrauded in a public offering of securities in
which there were no direct contact with the issuer, it is the public that
would be considered to have been defrauded. Indeed, the Commission itself would be considered the object of the fraud in that it was induced to
authorize the public offering. In this event, the District Attorney would
institute criminal proceedings; jurisdiction would lie with the federal
courts because of the federal law violation. The investor could also file a
civil action to attempt recovery.
The Securities Law provides an arbitration system that is obligatory
for brokerage houses and voluntary for investors.33 4 The system is
designed to provide for international 835arbitration toward the objective of
attracting foreign investment inflow.

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Prospectus EMF, supra 59, at 37.
Creel, supra note 38, at 344-345.
Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 20.
Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 16 bis, § IV.
Mexican Regulators Seek Bilateral U.S. Disclosure Pact, supra at 2.
Id. at 8.
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§13

ADMINISTRATIVE FINES AND PENALTIES; CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS

The Securities Law sets forth detailed provisions relating to administrative fines, penalties, and criminal punishment. The Securities Market

Law authorizes sanctions of a prison term of two to ten years as well as a
fine for persons who offer unregistered securities or other documents covered by the law to the public.886 The same criminal penalties apply 887
to
persons who engage in brokerage activities without proper registration.
Another class of offenses is created for miscellaneous activities that
generally involve some element of intent. "8 Thus, brokerage firm employees who intentionally engage in malfeasance viz-a-viz their customers are
subject to sanctions of imprisonment from two to ten years and a fine.8 89
These crimes may only be pursued at the petition of the Ministry of Finance with the prior opinion of the Commission. 8'0 These sanctions do
not preclude other punitive measures deriving from applicable laws. 8"'
Infractions of the Securities Market Law, or the general rules thereunder, may, in addition to the criminal penalties discussed above, result
in administrative fines to be imposed by the Commission." 2 The Commission may impose fines for the following activities, among others: (i) unauthorized use of designations such as broker, brokerage firm, or stock exchange specialist, that by law require a license, registration, or
approval;84 83 (ii) the failure of issuers of registered securities to comply
with the conditions of registration set forth in article 14 of the Securities
Market Law or the furnishing of false information."4 Numerous other
fines are authorized under the statute, mostly for the failure to observe
8 45
affirmative obligations of the law.
§14

INSIDER TRADING

The Securities Market Law was amended in 1983 with the adoption
of article 16 bis, which prohibits insider trading. This provision has subsequently been amended several times.84 6 Under article 16 bis of the Se-

curities Law, persons who have privileged information concerning an issuer of registered securities must abstain from carrying out transactions
in any securities of the issuer for their own benefit or the benefit of third
parties as long as the information is non-public.4 7 "Privileged informa336. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 52, § II.
337. Id. art. 52, § I.
338. Id. art. 52 bis.
339. Id.

340. Id. art. 52 bis 2.
341. Id.
342. Id. art. 51.
343. Id. art. 51, § I.
344. Id. art. 51, § II.
345. See Id. art. 51, §§ III - XI.
346. D.O., Dec. 31, 1986; D.O., Jan. 4, 1990.

347.. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 16 bis.
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tion" is defined as that stemming from the issuer and of which the public
does not have access, and the knowledge of which could influence the
prices of securities issued by the same company or another company." 8
The statute calls on the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, at the
proposal to the Commission, to issue rules governing these matters.

49

For purposes of the Securities Market Law, the following persons,
among others, are presumed to have access to privileged information: (i)
administrators, officers, factors, and secretaries of associated institutions
of issuers of registered securities; (ii) ten percent shareholders;6 0 (iii) persons who provide advisory services to issuers or their assistants and other
agents of the issuer under specified circumstances; (iv) ten percent shareholders of brokerage firms and stock specialists when they are affiliated
with or provide services to the issuer. 5 1 As a preventative measure, the
Securities Law imposes a requirement on the persons previously specified
not to trade in securities of the issuer within certain periods from the
previous trade.352
The statute grants the Commission the authority to investigate alleged infractions of the insider trading provisions.58 The Commission
may impose an administrative fine on a person who has violated the insider trading provisions. 8" A fine may only be imposed after a hearing
has been held. For insider trading violations, the Securities Law installs a
six-month statute of limitations.
The Commission is using a monitoring system said to be "virtually
identical" to that used by the New York and American stock exchanges
to track trades. 5 The Commission has instant access to market data on
prices and volume, as well as detailed information on realtime trading
activities of local brokerage firms.8 56 "When margins get too wide, a yellow or red warning flag is raised and the operation behind the trading is
singled out for investigation," according to a Commission official.8 57
The Securities Market Law does not contain a general anti-fraud
provision prohibiting misstatements or omissions of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, although the general fraud
rules of the civil and criminal law would apply pursuant to their terms.

348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Art. 16 bis 1 imposes a reporting requirement on 10% shareholders in the case of
transactions causing the acquisition or disposition of a 10% block.
351. Id. art. 16 bis 1, § IV.
352. Id. art. 16 bis 2.
353. Id. art. 16 bis 3.
354. Id. art. 16 bis 4.
355. Mexican Regulators Seek Bilateral U.S. Disclosure Pact, supra at 2.

356. Id.
357. Id.
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§15

REGULATION OF BROKERS

The Securities Market Law, as enacted in 1975, provided for the brokerage function to be performed by natural persons or corporations, both
of which were required to be registered in the Brokers Section of the National Registry of Securities and Brokers (with certain limited exceptions). 58 The law was amended to provide that only corporations could
in the market, but contained a grandfather proviserve as intermediaries
59
sion for individuals.
As indicated above, brokerage, or "intermediation," in the Mexican
securities market may only be undertaken by corporations registered in
the Broker's Section of the National Registry3 60 (an exemption from this
rule is provided for operating companies of investment companies). 61
"Intermediation" includes brokerage, agency, or other transactions or activities undertaken for the purpose of connecting the supply and demand
for securities; transactions for the account of a person with securities issued or guaranteed by third parties that have been the object of public
offer; and the management of portfolios of securities owned by third parties. To obtain registration as a broker, the applicant must be a corporain
tion (subject to the grandfathering provision discussed above) and use'362
"
specialist.
exchange
"stock
or
firm"
"brokerage
phrases
its name the
The corporation must meet minimum capital requirements set by the
Minister of Finance based upon the recommendation of the Commission
made through general rules. Banks are not allowed to perform brokerage
services. Their own transactions or those of their clients must be effected
through brokerage firms.
The following persons are ineligible to participate in the capital stock
of the broker:
(a) brokerage firms or stock exchange specialists;
(b) foreign governments or foreign governmental branches;
(c) credit institutions (banks), except when acting as a fiduciary for
beneficiaries who are eligible to be shareholders of brokers in the securities market and certain other requirements are met;
(d) insurance companies, bonding companies, auxiliary credit institutions, currency houses, and investment companies;
(e) other legal entities (except for the holding companies specified in
the law for Regulating Financial Groups and any others authorized by
the Commission through general rules; and

358. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 12.
359. Id. art. 17; D.O., Feb. 8, 1985; D.O., Dec. 27, 1985.
360. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 12 (subject to the grandfathering provision noted above).
361. Id.
362. Id. art. 17.
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(f) ten percent shareholders of specialists and the administrators and
factors of such issuers. "
Under the July 1990 amendments, as mentioned above, the Minister
of Finance may authorize foreign investment in brokerage firms up to 30
percent of capital, as long as the foreign investment is not for3 64
any one
participant greater than 10 percent of the shares of the broker.
Corporations must meet minimum capital and certain other requirements. 66 Corporate brokerage firms must have a board of directors comprised of at least five persons. 6 6 The charter and bylaws of corporate
firms are subject to the approval of the Commission. 67 Directors must
submit to the Commission a general program of administration that must
include, at a minimum, a feasibility study and a business plan. 68 The
merger of two or more brokerage firms must be approved by the Commission, and will take effect at the time of registration in the Public Registry
corresponding to the corporate domicile. 69
The Commission may cancel the authorization granted under article
17.370 The Commission may also veto persons, for 3 months to 5 years,
from serving with brokerage firms when they are disqualified under the
statute or when they seriously or repetitively violate the statute.3 7 1 A
hearing would be required for this purpose.3 72 The Commission can suspend or cancel the registration of brokers in the National Registry when
they: (1) fail to satisfy conditions of registration; (2) violate the law or
any regulations promulgated thereunder; (3) engage in trades not in conformity with ethical and sound practices; (4) fail to undertake proper
functions of intermediation; or (5) trade in securities not registered in the
National Registry of Securities (except for transactions exempted under
article 13).171
Registered intermediaries are permitted to trade securities, receive
funds,3 7 4 render investment advice, and perform related services. 7' They

363. Id. art 17.
364. Id.
365. Id. See Nacional Financiera, Nuevos Capitales Minimos Para las Casas de Bolsas,
El Mercado de Valores (Feb. 3, 1986).
366. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 17 (The board members must be Mexican citizens or have "immigrant status.").
367. Id. (After, obtaining such approval, the charter must be filed in the Registry of
Commerce).
368. Id. art. 17.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. art. 20.
374. Id. art 22 (When a broker is not able to apply customer funds for the intended
purpose by the next working day after receipt thereof, it must deposit them in a credit
institution in a separate account.).
375. Id. art. 22.
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may also engage in underwriting, placement, and stabilization activities, 7 e provide safekeeping services,37 form service corporations, and act
as specialists, subject to the provisions of law regulating the same. 878 In
79
addition, brokers may act as common representatives of debtholders
and holders of other securities;8 8 may administer the reserves for pension
or retirement funds; and engage in similar activities authorized by the
Minister of Finance upon the recommendation of the Commission
through general rules.8 81 Short selling was illegal s" but beginning in 1990
is now permitted. 888 Brokerage firms that are members of financial groups
are able to offer complementary services with credit institutions and to
use names that are similar to investment companies, operating companies
88
of investment companies, and currency exchange houses. '
Brokerage firms that are not part of financial groups, in accordance
with general rules to be issued by the Ministry of Finance, upon the opinion of the Bank of Mexico and the Commission, shall be able to acquire
shares of general deposit warehouses, financial leasing companies, and operating companies of investment companies.8 88 These acquisitions will require the previous approval of the Ministry of Finance. 8 8 Furthermore,
brokerage firms that are not part of financial groups are able to use the
same or similar names as these affiliated financial companies and to offer
complementary services with them. 87 Such brokerage firms may undertake complementary services with national credit institutions.M Trading
of listed securities otherwise than on the Exchange by stock exchange
members is prohibited, 8 " as is the trading of unregistered securities by

376.
377.
378.
379.
ture Act
380.
381.
382.
383.

Id. art. 23.
Id.
Id. art. 22, §IV(g).
Id. art. 22, §VI (Mexico does not have a statute analogous to the U.S. Trust Indenof 1939).
Id. art. 22, §VI.
Id. art. VII.
Equity Financing,supra at 1.
Short Selling Regs Should Make Stock Market More Appealing, Bus. EuR., Oct.

1, 1990.

384. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. VIII.
385. Id. art. 18.

386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. art. 31, § VIII(f) (An exception is provided for Mexican brokers trading in
foreign markets). Off-exchange trading of listed securities was not always prohibited in
Mexico. See also Ross, Changing, supra note 113, at 149-50 ("Bolsa has no rule compelling
members to transact business in listed securities on the floor").
Off-exchange trading recently has been a subject of international consideration. At the
14th annual conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the
Technical Committee of IOSCO concluded that off-exchange trading threatens the integrity
of international markets and recommended that disclosure of such trades be required. See
Karmel, The IOSCO Venice Conference, 202 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1989). Members of IOSCO were
thus urged to adopt requirements to ensure disclosure of volume and price information concerning off-exchange trades. Id. See also U.K. Will Ask Venice Meeting to Use British
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intermediaries (unless an exception is available).39 0

In 1990 amendments to the Securities Law expand areas in which
brokerage firms may operate. " 1 The 1990 legislation gives brokerage firms
greater flexibility to operate in areas previously reserved for banks, such
as working capital financing and foreign exchange services. 92 Brokerage
firms are also now permitted to act as intermediaries on behalf of investment companies3 93 and to open subsidiaries abroad. 94 Registered securities agents are responsible for the authenticity of securities they negotiate.3 9 5 Securities agents must furnish periodic statistical information to
the Commission about their activities.3 96 Mexican brokers are also subject
to rules of the Mexican Association of Brokerage Firms, a self-regulatory
organization. 97
§16 SPECIALISTS

Mexican law now recognizes a type of financial intermediary known
as a "specialist," or "stock exchange specialist." This is a new type of
intermediary recognized under Mexican Law.39 The Securities law allows
brokerage houses, in accordance with Commission rules, to serve as specialists, provided they comply with regulations regarding the same set
forth elsewhere in the law. 99 In order to serve as a specialist, registration
by the stock exchange is required with respect to the securities being
traded. 00 A specialist may only trade for its own account,4 " and only
with respect to securities listed on a stock exchange of which they hold an
equity share.40 2 Specialists may trade with brokerage firms, other specialists, and with the general public in accordance with rules of the Commission.403 In accordance with central bank rules, specialists may borrow
Rules as Model, INT'L SEc. REG. REP. (Sept. 13, 1989) (growing recognition that off-exchange
dealings could damage credibility of exchanges). Off-exchange trading has also been controversial in the European Community. See Clarkson, EC States Continue War Over Investment Regime, Reuters (Dec. 14, 1990); Pan-EuropeanShare Markets, THE EcONOMIST, Dec.
8, 1990, at 86.
390. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 13.
391. Mexican Regulators Seek Bilateral U.S. Disclosure Pact, supra at 2.
392. Id. at 8.
393. Id.
394. Darling, Mexico's Market Goes More Public, L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1990, at D10;
see, e.g., Mexico-Based Financial Services Giant Opens Manhattan Office: Probursa Cites
Growing U.S. Investor Interest in Mexico as Impetus, PR Newswire, Nov. 5, 1990.
395. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 26. The acquisition of control of 10% or
more of the equity securities of a corporate securities firm, through one or more trades, must
receive the prior approval of the Commission.
396. Id. art. 27.
397. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 37.
398. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 28.
399. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 22, § V(g), as amended Jan. 4, 1990.
400. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 28.
401. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 22 his I.
402. Mitchell, supra note 74, at 28.
403. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 22 his I.
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from credit institutions or certain other institutions in order to engage in
their business of trading in securities for their own account.40 ' In accordance with Commission rules, specialists may effect transactions in order
to contribute to price stability, address imbalances in buy-sell orders and
ease conditions or illiquidity in the market. 0 5 Specialists may, further, in
accordance with Commission rules, invest in shares of subsidiary or special purpose corporations that would engage in activities complementary
establish
to those carried out by the specialist. 0 6 The Commission may
07
by general rules other permissible activities for specialists.
Specialists are subject to restrictions with respect to other transactions they may engage in with issuers of the securities they trade. 08 For
example, specialists are prohibited from engaging in stock transactions
with their shareholders. 09 Specialists also are subject to limitations on
their ability to refuse to deal in the stocks as to which they serve as specialist. 10 The Commission, after obtaining the opinion of the Bank of
Mexico, is empowered to issue administrative orders against any specialist whose actions contravene the Securities Market Law.'

§17

INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Investment companies are regulated by federal legislation, Ley de
Sociedades de Inversion, enacted on January 14, 1985. These companies
function to give access to the securities market to small and mid-size investors. Their organization and functioning is subject to the supervision
and control of the Commission.
Mexican law recognizes three types of investment companies: common, which invests in equity securities; fixed-income; and investment
companies of capital which invest in start-up or other risky ventures. Investment companies must be organized as stock corporations and managed by a board of no fewer than five directors. They must also have an
investment committee. No natural or legal person may own more than 10
percent of the paid-in capital. Investment companies, except capital-type
companies, may only invest in securities approved by the Commission
and registered in the National Registry. Investment companies may issue
their own shares only in accordance with general rules of the Commission.
Management services to investment companies may be provided by special companies approved by the Commission or by brokerage companies
or banks.

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
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art. 22
art. 22
art. 22
art. 22
art. 22
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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§18 ENFORCEMENT
The Commission is given a number of enforcement and related powers in the securities law.41 Most of its powers in this regard are contained
in chapter five of the law, 18 although others are scattered throughout the
statute.4 1 4 The Commission has the general power to investigate violations of the law and to make inspections of suspected violators. 415 The
power to inspect and review the operations of brokerage firms, stock exchange specialists, and stock exchanges is granted by the statute.4 1 6 The
Commission also has the power to inspect and oversee issuers of registered securities, but only in matters relating to the obligations imposed
on them by the Securities Market Law. 417 This provision, generally, would
not authorize the Commission to investigate or question the routine corporate affairs of the issuer. Should a person engage in an unregistered
public offering, the Commission may suspend their operations and carry
out an audit of their affairs.4 18 Such administrative actions are also authorized when a person, without due authorization, acts as a broker in the
securities market. 4 9 The Commission may suspend the improper use of
advertising and the registration of securities or brokers in the National
Registry.
The Commission is given broad powers with respect to the operation
of brokerage firms and the market. The Commission may intervene in the
affairs of brokers and issue administrative orders in the event of violations of the registration provisions of the law. 420 The statute empowers
the Commission to audit the affairs of brokers and stock exchanges in
order to cancel or normalize activities that may threaten their stability or
liquidity. 421 The Commission may suspend quotations in securities when
disorderly or chaotic conditions exist in the market for that security, or
when transactions are carried out that do not follow "healthy" uses or
practices.422 The Commission may order increases in the capital of brokers and stock exchanges and intervene in the affairs of stock exchanges
in certain cases.42 When, in spite of intervention by the Commission in

412. Mexico recently entered into a memorandum of understanding with the United
State covering enforcement matters. See SEC, Mexico Sign Memorandum on Securities
Enforcement, Daily Report for Executives, Oct. 22, 1990.

413. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, chap. 5.
414. See, e.g., Id. chap. 1, art. 5; chap. 2, art. 16; art. 16 bis 3, 7, 20; chap. 3, art. 27;
chap 4, arts. 32, 38.
415. Id. art. 41, § III.
416. Id. art. 41, § I.
417. Id. § II.
418. Id. § VIII.
419. Id.
420. Id. art. 41, § VIII.
421. Id. § VII (The Commission may cancel administratively activities of brokers or
stock exchanges that violate the law).
422. Id. § VI.
423. Id. art. 38.
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the affairs of a stock exchange, irregularities persist, the Ministry of Finance may cancel the franchise of the exchange. 4
When a person is determined to have violated securities registration
or broker registration provisions of the law, or when a brokerage firm,
specialist, or stock exchange is determined to have engaged in transactions endangering their solvency, stability, or liquidity, additional enforcement powers are available to the Commission. 42 5 In these cases, taking into account the irregularities they have observed, the Commission
may (i) issue an administrative order necessary to normalize the situation
and set a deadline for compliance; (ii) order suspension of illegal activities; (iii) designate an auditor to be in charge of canceling or normalizing
illegal transactions; and (iv) designate a general auditor to manage the
entire enterprise with all attendant executive powers.42
The procedures established in the Securities Market Law for authorization, registration, inspection, surveillance, intervention, and suspension
or cancellation of authorizations and registrations "are of public interest. ' 42 7 Parties affected by administrative actions may appeal for a hearing before pertinent authorities.4 2 s Aggrieved parties must exhaust their
administrative
remedies before resorting to any other kind of legal
29
defense.4
An example of remedial powers exercised under the statute occurred
in 1988 and 1989. In December 1988 (several months after the 1987 market crash), the Commission suspended futures trading, assumed administrative control over four brokerage firms, and levied fines for a variety of
irregularities against a large number of companies and institutions. 4 0 In
1989, four top officers from two of Mexico's largest brokerage firms were
indicted on charges of illegal trading and criminal fraud""' and adminis82
trative actions were instituted against a number of market officials.'

§19

TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS

Mexican law recognizes that its nationals, and others subject to its
jurisdiction, participate in international securities transactions. For example, article 13 of the Securities Market Law provides that public offerings
in foreign countries of securities issued in Mexico or by Mexican corpora-

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id.
Id. art. 47.
Id.
Id. art. 50.
Id.

429. Id.

430. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report - Mexico No. 1, at 13 (Feb. 12,
1989). Earlier that year, Mexico discovered irregularities at the stock exchange, and two
officers resigned. Mexican Exchange Missing Funds, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1988, at D10,

col. 3.
431. Indictments in Mexico, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at D2, ol. 3.
432. Mexico Moves Against Brokerage Abuses as Salinas Continues to Assert Power,
Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1989. at All, col. 2.
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tions shall be subject to registration in a Special Section of the National
registry. Article 13 indicates that brokerage firms, when dealing with securities registered in the Special Section, are subject to the laws of the
country in which the trades take place. The general prohibition of offexchange trading by stock exchange members 3" specifically does, not apply to brokers trading in foreign markets. " The requirement of article
11, set forth above, that requires registration in Mexico in the case of
public offerings abroad of securities issued in Mexico or by Mexican corporations, appears to purport to give the Mexican registration provisions
43 5
an extraterritorial effect.
The internationalization of Mexico's securities market has become
increasingly manifest in the last several years. While Mexican companies
and the government itself have borrowed in international debt markets in
the past, such financing markedly increased in 1989 and 1990.436 Many of
these financings have been Euromarket offerings. 43 7 As of 1990, the securities of four Mexican issuers are traded in ADR form in the United
States. 3 8 Mexican law allows banks to open overseas branches and engage
in banking transactions with foreigners as well as nationals.4 3 9 These
events can be seen as part of the overall globalization of world capital
440
markets.
Mexico has also been a participant in various international processes
that generally reflect the globalization of securities regulation. " 1 The
Mexican Securities Commission has begun negotiations with the Securities and Exchange Commission to enter into a multi-jurisdictional disclosure system with the United States. 4 2 Mexico also participates in the

433. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 31, § VIII(f).
434. Id.
435. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1990) (as interpreted by the SEC in SEC Release 33-4708
(1964), now superseded by SEC Regulation S, adopted in 1990).
436. Latin American Corporate Finance:Can Pay, Will Pay, THE EcONOMIST, June 2,
1990, at 83 ("Latin American companies are flocking back to the international capital markets"); Zellner, Mexico Penetrates the Capital Market, Bus. MEXICO, June, 1990, at 20
("Mexico is back in the world's capital markets").
437. Id. (Euromarket offerings by Banco Nacional de Comercio and Pemex in 1989).
438. Prospectus EMF, supra note 59, at 36 (In July 1990, Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de
C.V. privately placed $150 million of Rule 144A eligible notes through U.S. placement
agents).
439. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 83.

440. See Nacional Financiera, Globalization of Capital Markets, El Mercado de
Valores (Jan. 15, 1990).
441. For example, the governing body of Mexico's accounting profession, the Mexican
Institute of Public Accountants, is a founding member of the International Accounting
Standards Committee. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 113, at 128.
Regarding the globalization of securities regulation generally, see Hawes, Internationalization Spreads to Securities Regulators, 9 PA. INT'L Bus. L. 202 (1987). The Securities Law
gives the Commission the power to participate in international organizations working in the
securities area. Securities Market Law, supra note 2, art. 41, § XIX.
442. See Mexican Regulators, supra note 334, at 7. For a discussion of the multi-juris-

dictional proposal between the United States and Canada, see Comment, Taking that First
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International Organization of Securities Commissions and, in fact, the
President of the Mexican Securities Commission chairs IOSCO's developing markets working group.4' Mexico became a full member of GATT in
1985,'" and as a member of GATT, Mexico will be required to liberalize
its restrictions on financial services in accordance with the General Agreement on Trade in Securities (GATS), now in draft form.4" Finally, Mexico and the United Stated decided in June 1990 to begin negotiations on a
free trade agreement between the two countries4 46 that could have an impact on trading in financial services. In November 1990 Mexico announced it would join other Latin American nations and Spain in an effort to establish an electronic regional trading system. ""7
Mexico's enforcement powers and interests have also been affected
by the internationalization of the securities markets. On October 18, 1990,
Mexico entered into a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission governing a range of enforcement
matters. The two countries agreed, among other things, to provide access
to their enforcement files to each other and to assist with the procurement of testimony and documents from individuals.

Step: The Securities and Exchange Commission's Proposed MultijurisdictionalDisclosure
System, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 44 (1990); Proposed U.S. Canadian Disclosure Rules
Will Save Issuers Time and Money, SEC. WEEK, Jan. 15, 1990, at 5; Karmel, SEC Regulation of MultijurisdictionalOfferings, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 3 (1990). The multijurisdictional system was proposed with Canada on July 26, 1989. See Rel. 33-6841, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,432, at 80,281 (July 26, 1989), and re-proposed in Release 33-6879, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) (Oct. 16, 1990). On the subject generally, see Breeden Says Several Nations
Interested in FacilitatingCross-Border Offerings, 21 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. 1847 (CCH) (Dec.
22, 1989).
443. Mexican Regulators Seek Bilateral U.S. Disclosure Pact, supra at 2; Nacional
Financiera, Reunion del Comite de Desarollo de la Organizacion Internacional de Comisiones de Valores, El Mercado de Valores (June 15, 1990).
444. Mexico: Attracting ForeignInvestment, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1990, at S8.
See Aperture of Opportunity, THE BANKER, Apr. 1990, at 54; Mexico: Financial Services
and the Economic Recovery, FIN. WORLD, June 26, 1990, at 28.
445. See GATT and Services: Closer, Closer, THE ECONOMIST, July 14, 1990, at 70; Aperture of Opportunity, supra note 444, at 53.
446. Graham, At Stake in Trade with Mexico, Wash. Times, June 29, 2990, at F3; Mexico: Attracting ForeignInvestment, supra note 444, at S8 (speculation on "North American
Common Market"); Miller, Mexico Trade Talks, L.A. Times, June 9, 1990, at 3; Mashek,
U.S., Mexico Set Free Trade Talks, Boston Globe, June 12, 1990, at 2; From the Yukon to
the Yucatan, THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 1990, at 47; A NACM: Programand Obstacles, Bus.
LATIN AMERICA (Apr. 30, 1990). In September 1990 President Bush presented to Congress a
proposal for free trade negotiations with Mexico. Hersh, Mexico Stock Exchange Chief Says
Free Trade Urgent, UPI (Oct. 2, 1990).
447. Latin America Plans Electronic Securities Market, Reuters, Nov. 13, 1990.

FACULTY COMMENT

Assassinating Saddam: A Post-War View
From International Law
Louis RENA

BERES*

As the Gulf crisis turned into the Gulf War, Americans looked with
renewed interest to quick-fix solutions. Predictably, one of the most popular solutions centered on assassination of the offending figure, Iraq's
Saddam Hussein. Whether or not such high-level political killing would
have been in the overall best interests of the United States or its allies is
certainly a vital question, but one I will now leave for others. The question to be considered here asks only if such an assassination would have
been permissible under international law.
Understood as tyrannicide (killing a tyrant) within a country, assassination has often been accepted as lawful. Support for such a form of
assassination can be found in Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives, and
Cicero's De Officiis. According to Cicero:
There can be no such thing as fellowship with tyrants, nothing but
bitter feud is possible: and it is not repugnant to nature to despoil, if
you can, those whom it is a virtue to kill; nay, this pestilent and godless brood should be utterly banished from human society. For, as we
amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have ceased to
circulate, because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who
under human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast,
should be severed from the common body of humanity.'
The 18th Century Swiss scholar, Emmerich Vattel, in his The Law of
Nations, recalls "the essential object of civil society" is to "work in concert for the common good of all." Hence, he inquires:
Could the society make use of its authority to deliver irrevocably itself
and all its members to the discretion of a cruel tyrant? Surely not,
since it would lose all rights of its own if it undertook to oppress any
part of the citizens. When, therefore, it confers the supreme and abso-

Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University; B.A., 1967,
Queens College of New York; Ph.D., 1971, Princeton University.
1. CicERo, DE OFFICIlS (cited in THE TERRORISM READER 16 (W. Laqueur ed. 1978)).
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lute power of government without express reserve, there is necessarily
an implied reserve that the sovereign will use that power for the welfare of the people and not for their destruction. If he makes himself
the scourge of the State, he disgraces himself; he becomes no better
than a public enemy, against whom the Nation can and should defend
itself. And, if he has carried his tyranny to the extreme, why should
the life itself, of so cruel and faithless an enemy, be spared? 2
Even before Vattel, the English poet, John Milton accepted the argument of tyrannicide in justifying the execution of Charles I. According to
Milton's Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, "[t]yrannicide, that is the
killing of a tyrant, is not only lawful, but also laudable. ''3 Of course, as a
practical matter, the criteria that can clearly distinguish tyrannical from
non-tyrannical rule are very difficult to identify. When John Wilkes
Booth leaped onto the stage at Ford Theater after assassinating President
Lincoln, he shouted: "Sic semper tyrannis." Thus always to tyrants!
Without appropriate criteria of differentiation, judgments concerning
tyrannicide are inevitably personal and subjective. The hero of Albert
Camus' The Just Assassins, Ivan Kaliayev, a fictional adaptation of the
assassin of the Grand Duke Sergei, says that he threw bombs, not at humanity, but at tyranny. How shall he be judged? Seneca is reputed, to
have said that no offering can be more agreeable to God than the blood of
a tyrant. But, who is to determine authoritatively that a particular leader
is indeed a tyrant? Dante confined the murderers of Julius Caesar to the
very depths of hell, but the Renaissance rescued them and the Enlightenment even made them heroes. In the 16th century, tyrannicide became a
primary issue in the writings of the Monarchomachs, a school of mainly
French Protestant writers. The best-known of their pamphlets was
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, published in 1579 under the pen name of Junius Brutus.'
The most well-known British works on tyrannicide are George
Buchanan's De Jure Regni Apud Scotos, published in London in 1579,
and Saxby's Killing No Murder, which appeared in 1657. Juan de Mariana, in The King and the Education of the King, says:
[B]oth the philosophers and theologians agree, that the prince who
seizes the state with force and arms, and with no legal right, no public, civic approval, may be killed by anyone and deprived of his life
and position. Since he is a public enemy and, afflicts his fatherland
with every evil, since truly, and in a proper sense, he is clothed with
the title and character of tyrant, he may be removed by any means
and gotten rid of by as much violence as he used in seizing his power.5

2. E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 18 (1844) (cited in BOOK I, C. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington, at 24, (1916)).
3. J. MILTON, TENURE OF KINGS AND MAGISTRATES (1648).
4. The pen name, Junius Brutus, was probably Duplessis Mornay, a political advisor to
the King of Navarre.
5. J. DE MARIANA, THE KING AND THE EDUCATION OF THE KING (1699).
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In the 19th century, a principle of granting asylum to those whose
crimes were "political" was established in Europe and in Latin America.
This principle is known as the political offense exception to extradition. A
specific exemption from the protection of the political offense exception
- in effect, an exception to the exception - was made for the assassins
of heads of state and for attempted regicides. At the 1937 Convention for
the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism, the murder of a head of
state, or of any family member of a head of state, was formally designated
6
as a criminal act of terrorism.
The so-called "attentat" clause, which resulted from an attempt on

6. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, reprinted in 13 I.L.M.
43 (1974) (entered into force for the United States, Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95;
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force for the United
States, Dec. 4, 1969); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 (entered into force for
the United States on Jan. 26, 1973); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/3446 (1979)
(entered into force for the United States, Dec. 7, 1984); European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. 90. On December 9, 1985, the U.N.
General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as
"criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was
left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and attacks on
internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom and conventions. See United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, G.A.Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/4053 (1985).
7. The "attentat" clause, included in many treaties, provides that the killing of the
head of a foreign government or a member of his family is not to be considered a political
offense. Some treaties extend the exclusion to any murder or to attempts on any life. Here,
the political offense exception to extradition is excluded wherever any killing has taken
place. In the absence of an attentat clause in a particular treaty, a state may refuse to
extradite persons requested by another state on the grounds that the crime in question was
political.
According to the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, Europ. T.S. 24,
359 U.N.T.S. 273, 3, "The taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State or a
member of his family shall not be deemed to be a political offense for the purposes of this
Convention."
Most extradition treaties deny extradition of persons accused or convicted of relative
political offenses (i.e., offenses involving one or several common crimes connected with a
political act). Assassination is an example of such an offense. The courts of particular states
solve the problem of applicability of nonextradition of political criminals by ascertaining the
degree of connection between the common crime and the political act. Whether or not the
degree of connection required for the act is to be regarded as political, and thus nonextraditable, depends entirely upon the particular test adopted by each individual state.
There are three fundamental tests here: (1) the "incidence test" of Anglo-American law,
which requires that the crime be part of, or incidental to, a political revolt or disturbance
(although Anglo-American decisions involving East European refugees have indicated that
extradition will be denied even in the absence of a political revolt or disturbance when the
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the life of French Emperor Napoleon III, and later widened in response
to the assassination of President James Garfield in the U.S., limited the
political offense exception in international law to preserve social order.
Murder of a head of state or members of the head of state's family was
thus designated as a common crime, and this designation has been incorporated into article 3 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.
Yet, we are always reminded of the fundamental and ancient right to tyrannicide, especially in the post-Holocaust/post-Nuremberg world order.
It follows that one could argue persuasively under international law that
the right to tyrannicide is still overriding and that the specific prohibitions in international treaties are not always binding.
From the standpoint of international law, assassination can become
an international crime (possibly an instance of terrorism) when it is carried out against a state official, by a national of the same state and within
the territory of the state, only where the assassin flees to another state
and requests for extradition are issued. If, however, the assassination is
carried out by a national of another state, whether the location of the
killing is the territory of the victim, the territory of the perpetrator, or
some other state altogether, it is immediately a matter of international
law. Although such an assassination is almost always a crime under international law, it could conceivably be an instance of a very limited right of
"humanitarian intervention." For this to be the case, it would be necessary, inter alia, that the victim was guilty of egregious crimes against
human rights, that these crimes were generally recognized and widelydocumented, and that no other means existed to support the restoration
of basic human rights.
To this point we have been dealing with assassination as tyrannicide
(i.e., with the killing of a head of state or high official by a national of the
same state). We have seen that support for such forms of assassination
can be found in certain established traditions in political philosophy but
that there is virtually no support in the prevailing international law of
extradition. Although some treaties are vague enough that such assassination might be interpreted as a political offense, and therefore not subject
to extradition requests, others subscribe to the attentat principle which
provides a specific exception to the exception - cases which involve the
assassination of heads of state or their families.
Another possible line of support for assassination as tyrannicide can

possibility of political persecution can reasonably be demonstrated), (2) the "political objective test" of French law, which requires that the crime be directed against the political
organization or structure of the state; and (3) the "political motivation test" of Swiss law,
which requires that the crime be assessed in light of the predominant surrounding circumstances and especially the motivations of the offender.
A number of treaties in force stipulate that, for purposes of extradition, political offenses shall not include crimes against humanity, certain crimes of war identified in the
1949 Geneva Conventions and comparable violations of the laws of war not already provided
for in these conventions.
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be extrapolated from the current international law of human rights." Despite the existence of a well-developed and precisely codified regime of
human rights protections, victims of human rights abuse in particular
states have little, if any, redress under international law. Indeed, in the
absence of an effective centralized enforcement capability, international
law relies upon insurgency9 and humanitarian intervention'0 as the ultimate guarantors of essential human rights. It follows that where humani-

8. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954). This Convention
should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted
by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966, and entered into force Oct. 4, 1967. See also
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No.
8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the United States, July 7, 1976); Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res 1514 (XV), 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, G.A.Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S: Off. Rec. OEA/
Ser. L/VIII. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
673 (1970). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - known collectively as the International Bill of Rights - serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human
rights.
9. International law makes clear that not all forms of insurgency are impermissible
(i.e., terroristic). Although the U.N. General Assembly and specially constituted U.N. committees have repeatedly condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that derive from "the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the
organs of the United Nations." This exemption, from the 1973 General Assembly Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, is corroborated by Article 7 of the General Assembly's 1974 Definition of-Aggression. In this connection, see Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on InternationalTerrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 355, U.N. Doc. A/
9028 (1973); Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A.Res. 3314
(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 710 (1974). Article 7 refers to the Oct. 24, 1970, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. G.A.Res. 2625
(XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 1292 (1970). For a comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of international law concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-determination, see Aureliu Cristescu, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development
on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981).
10. See generally F.TEsoN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1988); Nanda, Humanitarian
Military Intervention, 23 WORLDVIEW, Oct. 1980, at 23.
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tarian intervention cannot be reasonably expected, individuals within
states have only themselves to provide for proper enforcement of their
codified human rights.
What about "humanitarian intervention" and assassination? Can
agents of one state legally assassinate officials of other states under the
rules of humanitarian intervention? Or is such assassination always a per
se violation of international law?
To a certain extent, the answers to these questions depend upon the
absence or presence of a condition of belligerency (war) between the
states involved.1 1 In the absence of this condition, assassination of political figures in another state may represent a crime of aggression or terrorism. Regarding aggression, Article 1 of the 1974 U.N. Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression defines this crime, as ". . the use of armed force
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition."' 2 In view of
the binding rule of nonintervention codified in the Charter that would
normally be violated by transnational assassination, such killing would
generally qualify as aggression. Moreover, assuming that transnational assassination constitutes an example of "armed force," the criminalization,
as aggression, of such activity may also be extrapolated from article 2 of
the Definition of Aggression: "The first use of armed force by a State in
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an
act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with
the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has
been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant cir-

cumstances ....

13

Let us now turn to the status of transnational assassination under
international law when a condition of war exists between the states in-

11. Under international law, the question of whether or not a state of war actually exists between states is somewhat ambiguous. Traditionally, it was held that a formal declaration of war was a necessary condition before "formal" war could be said to exist. Hugo
Grotius, for example, divided wars into declared wars, which were legal, and undeclared
wars, which were not. (See GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, BK. III, ch. iii, V and XI).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the position that war obtains legitimacy only
after a conclusive declaration of war by one of the parties was codified by Hague Convention
III. More precisely, this convention stipulated that hostilities must not commence without
"previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. (See
Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 1907, 3 NRGT, 3 series, 437,
article 1.) Currently, of course, declaration of war may be tantamount to declarations of
international criminality (because of the criminalization of aggression by authoritative international law), and it could be a jurisprudential absurdity to tie a state of war to formal
declarations of belligerency. It follows that a state of war may exist without formal declarations, but only if there is an armed conflict between two or more states and/or at least one
of these states considers itself at war.
12. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974).
13. Id.
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volved. According to article 23(b) of the regulations annexed to the fourth
Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land: "It is
especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously, individuals be-

longing to the hostile nation or army."' " The U.S. Army Field Manual has
incorporated this prohibition authoritatively linking Hague article 23(b)
to assassination at paragraph 31: "This article is construed as prohibiting
assassination, proscription or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price
upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead or
alive.' "s

From the point of the convergence between international and U.S.
municipal law,"6 the Hague Convention IV is a treaty of the United States
that has received the advice and consent of the Senate and is, therefore,
the "supreme law of the land" under article 6 of the Constitution (the
"Supremacy Clause"). Indeed, even if Congress were to enact a statute
that expressly repealed the rule found at Hague Regulation article 23(b),
that would not permit U.S. officials to legalize assassinations. This is because, among other things, the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945) expressly
ruled that the obligations codified at the Hague Regulations had entered
into customary international law as of 1939."'
It appears, then, impossible for any state to legalize assassination,
and the leaders of any recalcitrant state would seem to be subject to prosecution (as hostes humani generis, "common enemies of mankind") in
14. The Hague Convention IV, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(b), 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536,
reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1908).
15. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, 31.
16. There are many sources that point to the convergence of national and international
law. According to article 6 of the Constitution, "All treaties made.., under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land .... " Although article 6 refers
exclusively to treaties, the process of incorporationhas also been extended by several decisions of the Supreme Court to international law in general. As this means that all of the
international rules against assassination are now the law of the United States, any attempt
to "modify" prohibitions against assassination would also appear to be in violation of American municipal law.
Those who would ask for a broader "right" of assassination should also be reminded
that the president of the United States has taken an oath required by article 2, section 1,
clause 7 of the Constitution "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." Article 6 and pertinent Supreme Court decisions signal that the President is sworn
to uphold the international law prohibitions concerning assassination. Similarly, article 2,

section 3 requires the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," a charge
that normally extends to respect for the lives of public officials in other states, even those
we may find objectionable.
17. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946), at 1144. From the point
of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obligations are, in a sense, doubly binding.
This is the case because these obligations represent not only current normative obligations
of international law, but also the higher law obligations engendered by the American political tradition. By its codification of the principle that fundamental human rights are not an
internal question for each State, but an imperious postulate of the international community,
the. Nuremberg obligations represent a point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and the jurisprudential/ethical foundations of the American Republic.
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any state that claimed appropriate jurisdiction.' s Significantly, U.S. law
recognizes and reinforces these obligations under international law. Accbrding to paragraph 498 of The U.S. Army Field Manual, any person,
whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits an act
that constitutes a crime under international law, is responsible for the
crime and is liable to punishment. 9 Paragraph 501 of the same manual,
based upon the well-known judgment of Japanese General Yamashita,
stipulates that any U.S. government official who had actual knowledge, or
should have had knowledge, that troops or other persons under his control were compliant in war crimes and failed to take necessary steps to
protect the laws of war was himself guilty of a war crime.2" Finally, paragraph 510 denies the defense of "act of state" to such alleged criminals by
providing that, though a person who committed an act constituting an
international crime may have acted as head of state or as a responsible
government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from responsibility for
that act.2'
These facts notwithstanding, there are circumstances wherein the expectations of the authoritative human rights regime must override the
ordinary prohibitions against transnational assassination - both the
prohibitions concerning conditions of peace and conditions of war. The
most apparent of such circumstances are those involving genocide and
related crimes against humanity.22 If, after all, the assassination of a

18. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between States in the fight against crime. It is mentioned in: Coapus JuRis CIVILIS II 265
(1932); GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS I, ch. 20; VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS I 101 (1844).
The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever extradition is difficult or
impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked in
Armed Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S.
135, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
This treaty unambiguously imposes upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to
punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction was committed or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. See Convention No. 1, art. 49; Convention No. 2, art. 50; Convention No. 3, art. 129; Convention No. 4, art. 146. In further support
of universality for certain international crimes, see II M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 6 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984); 18 U.S.C. § III 6(c) (1982).
19. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 15, V 498.
20. Id. 1 501.
21. Id. 1 510.
22. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). The
Convention was submitted to the Senate by President Harry S. Truman in June 1949. The
Convention languished in that body until Feb. 19, 1986, when the Senate consented to ratification with the reservation that legislation be passed that conforms U.S. law to the precise
terms of the Treaty. This enabling legislation was approved by Congress in October 1988,
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Hitler or a Pol Pot could save thousands or even millions of innocent
people from torture and murder, it would be a far greater crime not to
attempt such an assassination than to actually carry it out.
What about Saddam? Our real objection to Saddam Hussein had little or nothing to do with his brutal pre-war reign of terror in Iraq. When
Saddam first destroyed large numbers of Kurds and other allegedly dissident Iraqis, there was barely a murmur in Washington. Indeed, the Bush
administration and certain members of Congress deliberately overlooked
these monstrous violations of human rights in the presumed interests of
an American Realpolitik.
Why, precisely, might we have sought to rid the world of this particular tyrant? Since "humanitarian intervention" did not apply, what
grounds for assassination, if any, might have existed under international
law? 2" To answer this question authoritatively, we should return to the
explicitly stated pre-war goals of the United States in dealing with Iraq's
aggression. As outlined by Secretary of State Baker before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, they were:
FIRST, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 660;
SECOND, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
THIRD, the protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage
by Iraq, both in Iraq and in Kuwait; and
FOURTH, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian
gulf."4

and signed by President Reagan on Nov. 4, 1988. This legislation amends the Criminal Code
of the United States to make genocide a federal offense. It also sets a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act defined by the law. This follows
the practice of implementing legislation already well-established with respect to other categories of crimes under international law.
23. Ironically, the United Nations, which is responsible for most of the post-Nuremberg
codification of the international law of human rights, has sometimes been associated with
increased limits on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. These limits, of course, flow
from the greatly reduced justification for the use of force in the Charter's system of international law, especially the broad prohibition contained in article 2(4). Yet, while it cannot be
denied that humanitarian intervention might be used as a pretext for naked aggression, it is
also incontestable that a "too-literal" interpretation of 2(4) would summarily destroy the
entire corpus of normative protection for human rights - a corpus that is coequal with
"peace" as the central objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the important nexus
between peace and human rights, a nexus in which the former is very much dependent upon
widespread respect for human dignity, a "too-literal" interpretation of 2(4) might well impair the prospects for long-term security. It must be widely understood that the Charter
does not prohibit all uses of force and that certain uses are clearly permissible in pursuit of
basic human rights. Notwithstanding, its attempt to bring greater centralization to legal
processes in world politics, the Charter system has not impaired the long-standing right of
individual States to act on behalf of the international legal order. In the continuing absence
of effective central authoritative processes for decision and enforcement, the legal community of humankind must continue to allow, indeed must continue to require humanitarian
intervention by individual States.
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These goals were, without doubt, entirely legitimate and wellgrounded in the expectations of international law. At the same time, the
U.N. Charter provides a variety of institutional collective remedies that
might have ensured Baghdad's compliance, including of course, the largescale military operations that were ultimately used. And even if the U.S.
and its unprecedented coalition of allies had decided to resort to "selfhelp" remedies outside the bounds of the United Nations, we could,
under certain conditions, have done so lawfully through appropriate measures of "self-defense" (i.e., without resorting to assassination).
In the final analysis, there is only one scenario wherein the U.S.-ordered assassination of Saddam Hussein could have been consistent with
international law. This is the case in which Saddam's recognized and documented crimes against Kuwait could not have been punished and corrected by U.N. action or by U.S.-led measures of "collective self-defense."
In such a case, where the only alternative to assassination would have
been to leave the aggressor undisturbed in Kuwait, a compelling brief for
killing the Baghdad tyrant might have been based on the following "general principle of law recognized by civilized nations: 25 Nullum crimen
sine poena; "no crime without a punishment." Although it would normally be unjust to deal with Saddam by assassination, it would be even
26
more unjust to let his wrongs go unpunished.
Of course, in making this argument, the egregious nature of Saddam
Hussein's wrongs would have been critical to justifying assassination.
Moreover, recalling the common argument that assassinating Hitler or
Pol Pot would have been law-enforcing rather than law-violating, the
brief must also have been based on the expectation that leaving Saddam
alive would almost certainly have resulted in additional crimes against
peace (aggression) and crimes against humanity. Needless to say, logi-

Committee, 101st Cong., 2d. Seas., (Oct. 17, 1990).

25.

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,

art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.

993, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 190 (1945).
26. Such a "general principle of law" would have the character of a peremptory or jus
cogens norm under international law. According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, ". . . a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize
forms of insurgency protected by this peremptory norm would be invalid. According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention, "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." The concept is extended to
newly emerging peremptory norms by article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that
norm becomes void and terminates." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
22, 1969, opened for signature,May 23, 1969; U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First
and Second Sessions, Mar. 26 - May 24, 1968, and Apr. 9 - May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

1991

ASSASSINATING SADDAM

623

cally, there is no possible way in which such expectations could have been
defended "beyond a reasonable doubt," but we now know that they would
certainly have been right on the mark.
Even if a compelling jurisprudential argument could have been made
for assassinating Saddam Hussein, it is by no means clear that such an
action would have in any way been useful. It follows that international
law must always be an essential component of any decision on such controversial remedies, but that it must also be balanced with appropriate
tactical and strategic considerations.

STUDENT COMMENTS

Self-Determination and Recent
Developments in the Baltic States
I.

INTRODUCTION

The principle of self-determination is a human right which has taken
its place as a peremptory norm of international law. This principle essentially holds that people have the right to determine their future, to elect
and be governed by a representative government, and to be free from foreign domination.
This paper will focus on the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, and their right to self-determination. Since the history of these
countries is essential to an understanding of their claims to self-determination, Part II provides a brief history of how these nations came under
Soviet domination. Part III discusses the principle of self-determination
and how it relates to the Baltic states. Parts IV and V conclude with an
in-depth look at recent events in the Baltic and the effects of resurgent
nationalism on those countries.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

While the three Baltic nations have different historical backgrounds,
all three countries were incorporated into the Russian empire by the beginning of the 19th century. During this century, the Baltic people were
subjected to increasing political oppression and intense Russification
pressures which helped to foster active opposition and to strengthen their
desire for self-determination. The opportunity to achieve this objective of
self-determination occurred after World War I with the collapse of the
Russian monarchy and the simultaneous defeat of Germany.' Independence was declared by all three republics in 1918, and was recognized by
the Treaty of Versailles.2
During their years of independence, the Baltic states established po-

1. A. ALEXizv, DISSENT AND NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET BALTIc 3 (1983).
2. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43. Their independence was also
recognized by the League of Nations which admitted each of the Baltic nations as member
states. See, e.g., J. DUGARD, REcOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 15-21 (1987).
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litical systems that proved to be stable and effective. The Baltics also
prospered economically, as evidenced by the superior standards of living
in the republics compared to that of the Soviet Union.8
The independence, however, lasted only 22 years. A secret protocol
attached to the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact) as well as subsequent agreements, divided Europe into German and
Soviet spheres of influence. Under the terms of the agreements, the Baltic
states fell into the Soviet sphere of influence,' opening the way for the
Soviets to establish large military bases in the territory.
In June 1940, the Soviet Union used the German advance into Western Europe as a pretext for insisting upon total occupation of the Baltics.
This occurred despite the Soviets' non-aggression/non-interference treaties with each of the republics. In these treaties, the Soviet Union promised to protect the political independence of the republics and not to interfere in their internal affairs. The Soviets waived "voluntarily and for
all time" any claims to the territories.5 In August 1940, the Soviet Union
formally annexed each of the Baltic states.
During World War II, the territories shifted between German and
Russian control. When the Baltics finally ended up in Soviet hands, a
period of brutal repression followed. Over 20,000 Estonians, 100,000 Latvians, and 200,000 Lithuanians were deported to Siberia and elsewhere
from 1945 to 1946. Overall, some 600,000 Balts were deported in the midto-late 1940's, a startling number considering the total population in the
region at that time was only six million.' There was an active armed resistance in the area to the Soviet occupiers which was not completely suppressed until 1952.
After the years of overt oppression, the Soviet Union began a policy
of increased consolidation of the Baltic republics, attempting to gradually
socialize Baltic society with Soviet political and economic norms.7 This
socialization process included persecution of religious groups in the
region."
The process also included rapid industrialization and collectivization
of agriculture in the area. The forced industrialization of the Baltics was
significantly aided by the mass importation of labor from other parts of
3. A. ALzxrEv, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See, e.g., Fein, Baltic Citizens Link Hands to Demand Independence, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 1989, at A10, col. 3; Text of Secret Protocols to 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1989, at A10, col. 3; A. ALEXIEV, supra note 1, at 3-4. For a detailed discussion of the Nazi-Soviet pact and its repercussions for the Baltic states, see I. VIZULIs, THE
MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT OF 1939 (1990).
5. Meissner, The Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and its Significance for
the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 381 (1981).
6. A. ALEXIEV, supra note 1, at 5-6.
7. Id. at 8.
8. For a discussion of religious persecution in the Baltic republics, see I. VIZULIS, supra
note 4, at 79-81.
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the U.S.S.R. This continued influx of workers has diluted the ethnic composition of the region and, as a result, today Estonians and Latvians constitute slim majorities in their republics.' Lithuanians account for over 80
percent of their population which helps explain why Lithuania is at the
forefront of the present separatist movement.' 0 The importation of workers has continued through the years, and has produced a visible backlash
of dissent and nationalism which continues to the present day.
III.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE BALTIC STATES

Although the Soviet Union does not recognize the Baltic states'
claims to self-determination, international law does. The right to self-determination is widely recognized under international law. The Charter of

the United Nations discusses the principle of self-determination; in fact,
this principle was included in the Charter upon the initiation of the Soviet Union." The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, both recognize the right of people to self-determination. Article 1
of both Covenants states: "All people have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."'" Because they were forcibly annexed into the Soviet Union, the Baltic people
have been unable to freely determine their political status. In addition,
the Soviet system of centralized control has prevented them from freely
pursuing their economic, social, and cultural development.1
The Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' was passed by the United Nations General Assembly
on December 14, 1960. The Declaration recognizes that all people have
the right to self-determination, and orders that the subjugation, domination, and repression of people be stopped. 5 The Declaration further condemns attempts to disrupt a country's national unity and territorial
integrity."
The Baltic states have been victims of Soviet colonialism for fifty
years. The Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and
9. Mlechin, Alienation, 44 NEW TIMES, Oct. 1988, at 30, 31.
10. See, e.g., id. at 30-31; Nelan, Lashed by the Flags of Freedom, TIME, Mar. 12, 1990,

at 26, 30.
11. Meissner, supra note 5, at 375.
12. U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966-67), quoted in Meissner, supra note 5, at 376.
13. Because the Baltic republics were annexed against their will, the legal norm of
pacta sunt servanda does not affect the legitimacy of their claims to self-determination.
The Baltic people had no vote with respect to their republics' inclusion in the Soviet Union.
14. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
15. See I. Vizumis, supra note 4, at 45.
16. Id.
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Peoples imposes a duty on the Soviet Union to cease any further attempts at colonization of the republics and to leave the Baltic states so
these republics can regain the sovereign status they possessed prior to
1940.17

The Helsinki Accords of 197518 and the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations19 also recognize the
right to self-determination. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations further discusses the concept
of territorial integrity. It declares that a nation must pass the requirement of possessing a government representing the whole people before it
is entitled to protection from any action which would disrupt its territorial integrity.2 0 Arguably, the government of the Soviet Union does not
adequately represent the people of many of its republics, especially the
Baltic states.
Furthermore, the General Assembly of the United Nations has
adopted a definition of aggression which states that, "nothing in this Definition . . . could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination,
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right .... ,"1The Soviet annexation of the Baltics in
1940 forcibly denied the republics their right to self-determination. In
this regard, the Baltic states have a valid claim to self-determination.
In an article entitled "Self-Determination Under International Law:
Validity of Claims to Secede," Professor Nanda argues that "divergent
political beliefs, claims to resources, or ethnic or cultural identification,"
cannot be the main arguments raised in support of a group's claim to selfdetermination. 22 Such a situation would be too disruptive to the concept
of states and world order. Instead, Nanda argues, the focus should be on
the "nature and extent of the deprivation of human rights of the group
making the claim.1" 3 The test is the extent to which the group suffers
from "subjugation, domination and exploitation," and the extent to which

17. Id. at 47.
18. Final Act of the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in Europe [Helsinki
Accords], concluded Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292.
19. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970).
20. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 260-70 (1981).
21. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
quoted in Nanda, supra note 20, at 270. Despite its numerous resolutions on the right to
self-determination, the United Nations has taken little action with respect to the Baltic
states' claims to independence. The U.N. did open informal talks with representatives from
the Baltic nationalist movements for several months, but these contacts were suspended in
early 1990 because of pressure put on the U.N. by the Soviet Union. See, e.g., Lewis, U.N.,
Bowing to Soviets, Halts its Baltic Contacts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at A14, col. 3;
Lewis, U.S. Criticizes U.N. Over Baltic Move, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at A15, col. 6.
22. Nanda, supra note 20, at 277.
23. Id.
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its members are deprived of the opportunity to participate in the political
process. 2'
Each of the Baltic republics has a local congress, multi-party systems
are emerging in the republics, and several Baltic representatives have
been elected to the National Congress of People's Deputies. Moscow has
recently endorsed a plan which calls for increased participation by all the
Soviet republics in the decision-making process."' These developments,
coupled with the Soviet leadership's unfolding responses to separatist demands, show that the Baltic states do today have some say in the political
process and their futures. However, the present changes in the Soviet
Union cannot alter the fact that the Baltic people have historically been,
and continue to be, subjugated, dominated, and exploited.
Not every commentator believes that the Baltic states have a right to
self-determination. Historian George Strong points out that before 1918,
each of the republics was at times part of the Russian empire. 6 If the
Soviet Union is viewed as a successor to the czarist empire, then, Strong
argues, "there is a certain historical validity to the present Soviet claim to
2'' 7
[the Baltic] territories.
Strong notes that the Baltics enjoyed independence for only 22 years,
and the Russians were not involved in the negotiation of the treaty which
recognized their independence (Versailles). As for the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression treaty, he argues that Stalin had no alternative but to attempt
to buy time from Hitler by signing the agreement.26
Professor Strong is, however, in a substantial minority. In an article
entitled "The Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and its Significance for the Baltic Nations," Boris Meissner states that the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states constitutes "a forcible acquisition forbidden
in modern international law."'29 He argues that even before World War II,
an international prohibition on annexation existed. Thus, the "direct aggression" and forcible acquisition of the Baltics is invalid in light of this
annexation prohibition. 30 Accordingly, Meissner concludes that, "the Baltic states could be considered territory that is occupied by the Soviet
Union. Legally and politically the existing governments in the three Baltic states lack necessary legitimacy."'
Each of the Baltic republics possesses an ethnic homogeneity and internal unity based on a shared history, language, and culture. More importantly, the people of each republic share a common vision of themselves as nations within clearly defined borders. This is true despite fifty

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 278.
See generally infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
Strong, Captive Nations?, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1989, at A22, col, 2.
Id.
Id.
Meissner, supra note 5, at 381.
Id.
Id.
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years of Soviet domination. As Meissner argues: "The right of self-determination cannot be consumed. As long as peoples are in the position to
protect their national unity, they collectively have a continuing right to
self-determination.""2
Izidors Joseph Vizulis, an international lawyer from Latvia, shares in
this conclusion:
[T]he principle of self-determination... seems irrefutably applicable
to the Baltic peoples. They never joined the U.S.S.R. voluntarily; they
were occupied and still are by the Soviet Union .... Their forcible
military occupation and the breach of the treaties in which the Soviet
Union pledged to respect these nations' independence and sovereign
rights cannot confer legitimacy on their seizure nor make the Baltic
states a 'legitimate part' of the Soviet Union. 2
Most Western nations have refused to recognize the Soviet annexation, and all of the Baltic republics maintain diplomatic missions in many
foreign capitals, including Washington, D.C. 4 For countries which have
not recognized the annexation de jure, the Baltic states continue to exist
as legitimate nations from the standpoint of international law. Thus, their
diplomatic missions can be viewed as the legitimate representatives of the
Baltic states."'
The articles on the right to self-determination found in the U.N.
Charter, the Human Rights Covenants, and other international agreements clearly confer on the Baltic states the right to self-determination.
Of course, international law is an imperfect legal system in that it lacks a
central enforcement authority. In this regard, it is left up to individual
nations to remedy unjust situations.3 6 In the case of the Baltic republics,
this responsibility falls squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.
IV.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES

Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika have provided the Baltic people with a new freedom to express themselves. This
has resulted in a situation which would have been unthinkable several

32. Id. at 383.
33. I. VIZULIS, NATIONS UNDER DuRss: THE BALTIC STATES 133 (1985).
34. In addition, Baltic nationals with Baltic passports are regularly granted entry visas
into numerous European, African, and South and Central American countries. I. VIZULIS,
supra note 4, at 145.
35. Meissner, supra note 5, at 383. James Crawford has argued that if the continued
recognition of the Baltic states by some countries signifies their continued existence as
states, then the concept which protects a state against illegal annexation has become a peremptory norm in international law. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (1979). He also notes that the continued "existence" of the Baltic nations in
Western eyes is as much a result of cold war politics as it is of international law. Id. Now
that the cold war is "over," the seriousness of many Western nations' recognition is certainly
open to debate.
36. Meissner, supra note 5, at 382.
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years ago. Independent political groups have emerged throughout the region, including the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Popular Fronts
(also called Movements for Perestroika), as well as a number of smaller,
more vociferous nationalist organizations. The formation of these organizations has led to the emergence of something resembling a multi-party
system in the Baltics.
One of the issues which provided a major impetus for the formation
of the Popular Fronts was the deterioration of the environment in the
Baltics. A decree from Moscow calling for a tenfold expansion of open-cut
mining in Estonia drew widespread protest.8 7 Nearly all the pollution that
fouls local rivers, lakes, and the Baltic Sea is emitted by industries controlled by Moscow. Many of the beaches on the Baltic coast are too polluted for swimming.38
The programs of the Popular Fronts would impose heavy restrictions
and environmental standards on industries operating in the area. An
emerging international human right is the right to a clean environment,39
a right the people of the Baltic states are increasingly being denied.
An "indestructible Baltic sense of national identity"' 0 has led to unprecedented and open protest in the Baltic states. The once-banned flags
of the former countries now fly throughout the region. In August 1989, to
mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet pact, hundreds of
thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians joined hands across
their homelands, demanding their right to "restore their independent
statehood."" At that time, a joint statement drawn up by the Popular
Fronts advocated the right of the republics to self-determination, stating
that the Soviet Union "infringed on the historical right of the Baltic nations to self-determination . . . [in carrying] out their violent
annexations.'42
In July 1989, the Soviet government did acknowledge that "there was
a secret protocol" in the Nazi-Soviet pact.'" In December of that year, the
Congress of People's Deputies declared the protocol to be illegal, stating,
in effect, that the incorporation of the Baltic states was itself illegal."

37. See, e.g., Preston, Rising Demands in the Baltics, Sydney Morning Herald, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REVIEW, June 1989, at 13. For a discussion of the effects of the
environment on nationalism in the Soviet Union, see Panel on Nationalism in the U.S.S.R.:
Environmental and TerritorialAspects, SOVIET GEOGRAPHY, June 1989, at 441.
38. See, e.g., The Cracks Within, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 46, 48.
39. See, e.g., Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1974) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], reprinted in
11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972); THE WORKING GROUP FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (BONN), THE RIGHT
TO A HUMAN

ENVIRONMENT:

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

PROPOSAL FOR AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN

(1973).
Preston, supra note 37, at 13.
Fein, supra note 4, at A10, col. 3.
Id.
See New Future,New Past on Baltic, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1989, at A26, col. 1.
See Soviet Assembly Finds Protocols to 1939 Pact With Nazis Illegal, Boston
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While this development can be seen as another attempt by the Soviet
Union to exorcise its Stalinist past, the Kremlin remains opposed to
granting the republics full independence. As President Gorbachev once
stated to Estonian officials, "in the case of divorce, it is not important
whether the marriage was contracted legally or not. The property must be
divided nonetheless.""'
The Soviet government has tolerated for the most part the recent
developments in the Baltic states, if not aided them. One of the most
remarkable occurrences took place in July 1989, when the Supreme Soviet
endorsed a plan which allows Lithuania and Estonia to develop marketoriented economies independent of the central plan. More specifically, the
two republics will trade with the rest of Soviet Union almost as if they
were foreign countries, trading through contracts rather than being allotted materials under Moscow's state plan." This development "allow[s]
them to effectively secede from the Soviet system of central economic
4'
planning. 7
The plan theoretically allows the republics to control their own budgets, tax policies, financial markets and foreign trade. The Baltic states
hope to develop market economies based on agriculture and light industry, resembling Finland or Sweden more than the traditional, centralized
Soviet model. 8
Critics of the plan say that it will divide the country, and that it
gives too much preferential treatment to the Baltics.4" Much of the opposition pertains to a provision that will allow the republics to control their
own natural resources, a provision which conflicts with the Soviet constitution. 60 However, supporters of the plan in the central government believe that it will create a showplace of economic change, and will bring
foreign investment which will benefit the entire Soviet economy."
The Popular Fronts enjoy tremendous support, and are even establishing some international ties. Leaders of the Fronts have met with political organizations from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the United
States, among others. Representatives from the Baltic republics have
helped mediate the ongoing conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Resourcefulness such as this has led

Globe, Dec. 25, 1989, at 41, col. 1. See also U.S. Criticizes U.N. Over Baltic Move, supra
note 21, at A15, col. 8.
45. Serrill, War of Nerves, TIME, April 2, 1990, at 26, 28.
46. Anderson & Bogert, Crises Around the Clock, NEwswEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 30, 31.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Keller, Soviet ParliamentBacks Autonomy for the Baltics, N.Y. Times, July 28,
1989, at Al, col. 3.
49. See, e.g., id. at Al, col. 6; Keller, More Autonomy for the Baltics Stirs Discomfort
in Moscow, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1989, at A10, col. 1; Anderson & Bogert, supra note 46, at
31.
50. See More Autonomy for the Baltics Stirs Discomfort in Moscow, supra note 49, at
A10, col. 2.
51. Id. at A10, col. 1, 2.
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some to view the Popular Fronts as being a step ahead of the central
government. Moscow often ends up expressing its support and pledging
its cooperation for Baltic initiatives.2
Recognizing the enormity of the Baltic problem, President
Gorbachev made an unprecedented trip to Lithuania in January 1990, in
an attempt to personally persuade the people of the republic to stay
within the Soviet Union. 53 Once there, he declared that the Soviet constitution grants each republic the right to secede. However, he also pressed
the idea of a "federation" and warned of the possibly tragic consequences
of secession. While on the one hand stating that he was "for self-determination all the way to secession from the Soviet Union,""' he also insisted
that, "You [the Lithuanians] are going nowhere. You cannot leave the
Soviet Union."5
Very little was settled during President Gorbachev's three-day trip to
Lithuania. Indeed, two months after Gorbachev's visit, a chain of events
began which brought relations between Moscow and Lithuania to a flash
point. On March 11, 1990, the newly-elected Lithuanian Parliament voted
unanimously to restore their country's prewar independence. Four days
later, the Soviet Parliament passed a resolution declaring Lithuania's secession invalid and illegal, and directing President Gorbachev to use any
means necessary to protect Soviet citizens and interests in the republic.5 6
Soon after passage of the resolution, additional Soviet troops were
sent to Lithuania, and a convoy of military vehicles rolled through the
capital of Vilnius in a show of force. 7 President Gorbachev ordered all
Lithuanians to turn in their firearms, and ordered the Vilnius government
to halt its plan for a self-defense force.58 On March 27, 1990, armed Soviet troops stormed a Vilnius hospital and arrested Lithuanian deserters
from the Soviet army who had taken refuge there. The troops also "secured" the local Communist party headquarters in what became

52. See, e.g., Mlechin, The PopularFront, 43 NEW TIMES, Oct. 1988, at 25, 26.
53. This trip marked the first time a Soviet leader has visited Lithuania since its forced
annexation. For a run-down of Gorbachev's trip to the republic, see Fein, Gorbachev Urges
Lithuania to Stay With Soviet Union, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Keller,
Buying Time in Lithuania, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
54. Gorbachev Assures Lithuania, Rocky Mtn. News, Jan. 12, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
55. Getting Out of the U.S.S.R.?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1990, at 32.
56. See, e.g., Fein, Soviet Congress Rejects Lithuanian Secession Move, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
57. See, e.g., Fein, Lithuania Assails Moscow's Tactics As Convoy Arrives, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Serrill, supra note 45, at 26.
58. See, e.g., Serrill, supra note 45, at 26; Clines, Gorbachev Pressing Lithuanians To
Shun Any Self-Defense Plans, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at AS, col. 1. Not surprisingly,
both of these directives were overwhelmingly ignored. Only a handful of firearms were
turned in, and the Vilnius government has announced plans to draft all young Lithuanian
men into its own defense force, in order to give them legal shelter from the Soviet military
draft. See, e.g., Serrill, supra note 45, at 26; Keller, To Thwart Moscow's Draft, Lithuania
Proposes Its Own, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
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Gorbachev's first use of armed force against the republics.5 9
Moscow's most overt and successful attempt to force Lithuania to
retreat from its declaration of independence came in April 1990, when the
Kremlin shut off the oil pipeline that serves as the principal supply of oil
for the republic."0 The cut-off highlighted Lithuania's dependence on
Moscow for energy sources, and Moscow's ability to exert tremendous economic and political pressure on all of the republics. Soon there began a
long series of negotiations in which President Gorbachev indicated that
Lithuania could obtain independence in two years if it suspended its declaration of independence. 1 In June, a compromise was reached in which
the Lithuanian Parliament voted to suspend its declaration of independence in exchange for Moscow's agreement to negotiate on the indepen62
dence issue, while lifting all economic sanctions against the republic.
The following day, the pipeline was reopened.
Unfortunately, this compromise failed to produce a long-term solution to the strife between the Kremlin and Lithuania. On January 13,
1991, Soviet troops took over Vilnius newspaper offices and radio and television stations in armed attacks which left fourteen Lithuanians dead.
The Soviet troops had ostensibly been sent to the republic in a further
attempt to round up draft resisters; however, once there, the army took
on an increasingly aggressive posture. 3
No one in the Kremlin has taken responsibility for giving the order
to fire on the civilians. Moscow has, however, endorsed the action, assert-

59. See, e.g., Clines, Soviet Troops, Storming Hospital, Seize Lithuanian Army Deserters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1; Clines, Lithuanian Police Guard Parliament As Pressure Rises, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 8. For a discussion of the
significance of the Soviet draft with respect to Baltic nationalism, see Fein, In the Baltics,
the Red Army is a Red-Flag Issue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, at E3, col. 2.
60. See Fein & Russell, Lithuanians Say Moscow Has Cut Off Main Oil Pipeline, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 7.
61: See Fein, Gorbachev Offers Deal to Lithuania, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, at Al, col
5. With this statement, Gorbachev proposed a timetable for independence much shorter
than the possibly five year period envisioned in the Soviet law on secession. See generally
infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
62. See Clines, Soviets Open Line for Lithuania Oil to Help End Crisis, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 1990, at I1, col. 6. While the compromise reflects President Gorbachev's personal
powers of persuasion as well as Moscow's economic and political leverage, it also shows the
Kremlin's inability to fully resolve the issue of its relationship with the republics. Each
crisis is met with an ad hoc response which fails to provide a long-term solution. The Kremlin is clearly hoping that the newly-empowered Federation Council presents such a solution.
See generally infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
63. For a run-down of the events surrounding the killings in Lithuania, see Whitney,
Lithuania Rallies Become Peaceful, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at All, col. 1; Keller, Soviet
Army Raids Lithuania Offices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al, col. 1; Keller, Lithuania
Braces to Resist Any Attempt to Seize Control, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, at Al, col. 3;
Keller, Soviet Loyalists in Charge After Attack in Lithuania; 13 Killed; Crowds Defiant,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at Al, col. 6; Whitney, Gorbachev Blames SeparatistGroup for
Baltic Clash, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991, at A4, col. 1; Keller, Lithuanian Dead Buried as
Martyrs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
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ing that the Vilnius government has allowed ethnic and economic strife to
bring the republic to the brink of civil war. Moscow has also argued that
such steps were necessary to protect ethnic minorities against violence
from the Lithuanians.6 4 Nevertheless, the Kremlin has pledged that it will
not attempt to overthrow the Vilnius government and that it seeks a
peaceful and political solution to the crisis, a pledge that is certainly suspect in light of recent events.
The crackdown in Lithuania has led to fears of military force also
being used in Latvia and Estonia. 5 Indeed, following Lithuania's lead,
Latvia and Estonia have had their own confrontations with Moscow. The
Latvian Parliament issued a declaration of independence on March 30,
1990, and the Estonian Parliament issued one of its own on May 4,
1990.66 Unlike Lithuania, however, which declared full and immediate independence, the declarations of the Latvian and Estonian Parliaments
call for a moderate, piecemeal approach to independence. 7 In effect, the
Latvian and Estonian governments have not attempted to enforce their
declarations, hoping instead to enter into meaningful dialogue with the
Kremlin on the issue. Despite this, President Gorbachev has issued a decree proclaiming the Latvian and Estonian declarations to be null and
void, and has stated that such declarations are a "violation of constitutional norms."68
In arguing that the republics' declarations of independence are illegal, President Gorbachev refers to a law on secession which was passed by
the Soviet Parliament in April 1990. Under the terms of the law, a repub-

64. See, e.g., Gorbachev Blames Separatist Group for Baltic Clash, supra note 63, at
Al, col. 2; Keller, Moscow's Envoy Seeks to Reassure Lithuania, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1991,
at A4, col. 1.
65. See, e.g., Clines, Wider Crackdown is Feared in Baltics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991,
at Al, col. 1. These fears were realized in Latvia on January 20, 1991, when special Soviet
troops raided the Latvian Interior Ministry building in the capital of Riga, killing four people. See Schemann, Soviet Commandos Stage Latvia Raid; 4 Civilians Killed, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1991, at Al, col. 1. Both Latvia and Estonia have National Salvation Committees of
their own, and both Committees seek direct rule in the republics from the Kremlin. As in
Lithuania, these groups may be instigating violent incidents in an attempt to create an atmosphere of civil strife, thereby providing Moscow with a pretext to intervene. See, e.g.,
Clines, Latvia's Leader Tries to Placate the Kremlin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A4, col.
4.
66. Prior to its declaration of independence, the Estonian Parliament declared state
property to be the property of Estonia, not the U.S.S.R. This was followed by a resolution
accusing the Soviet Union of "aggression, military occupation and annexation of the Estonian republic," and declaring the annexation to be illegal. See, e.g., Mlechin, supra note 9,
at 26; Estonians Challenging Soviet Rule, Rocky Mtn. News, Nov. 14, 1989, at 3, col. 4.
67. See, e.g., Keller, Gorbachev Speaks of Retaliation Over Latvia's Independence
Move, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Gorbachev Denounces Estonia's Declaration,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at A2, col. 4. For a history of the constitutional developments
which took place in Estonia between January 1988 and March 1989, see Gryazin, Constitutional Development in Estonia in 1988, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 141 (1990).
68. See Gorbachev Denounces Estonian Declaration,supra note 67, at A2, col. 4; Keller, supra note 67, at Al, col. 6.
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lic may secede only after a referendum is approved by two-thirds of the
voters in the republic, followed by a transition period of up to five years
during which the republic must satisfy all financial and territorial claims,
which are subject to the final approval of the Soviet Parliament.6 Such
terms obviously do not meet with any of the Baltic states' approval. In
any event, the republics argue that the secession law does not apply to
them, as they were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union. 0
While the Soviet law on secession is a powerful tool with which to
keep the republics in line, President Gorbachev seems to be pinning his
hopes on saving the union based on a new union treaty, combined with
the sweeping new powers of his presidency. The draft of the new Treaty
of Union declares the Soviet Union to be a voluntary association of sovereign republics, with local republics' laws taking precedence over union
law, subject to certain crucial exceptions. 7' The Kremlin retains control
over the military, foreign affairs, and a wide range of economic matters.
Significantly, Moscow is also responsible for maintaining order within the
Soviet Union, a provision which could easily be used as a pretext for a
crackdown on disruptive republics.72
The Soviet Parliament endorsed the Union Treaty on December 24,
1990, and it must now be approved by the republics in order to be legally
binding. 73 The three Baltic states refused to participate in negotiations
concerning the drafting of the treaty, and have indicated that they will
not sign it under any circumstances. Such a position should gain widespread acceptance with the citizens of the Baltics, who overwhelmingly
approved independence referendums in each of the republics in February
and March 1991."1

69. For a discussion of the Soviet law on secession, see Keller, supra note 67, at A21,
col. 3; Fein, supra note 61, at A8, col. 3; Clines, supra note 62, at A6, col. 1; Serrill, supra
note 45, at 27.
70. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 67, at A21, col. 3; Fein, supra note 61, at A8, col. 3.
71. See, e.g., Church, Depths of Gloom, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 40, 42; What a Mess,
THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 60, 63; Dobbs, Moscow Orders National Vote on Future
of Soviet Union, Boston Globe, Dec. 25, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
72. See, e.g., Church, supra note 71, at 42; What a Mess, supra note 71, at 63.
73. See Dobbs, supra note 71, at 42, col. 4. Originally, the legislatures of the republics
were to vote on the treaty. The Soviet Parliament has recently indicated, however, that the
vote may include all citizens of the republics.
In an effort to gauge public opinion with respect to the Union Treaty, President
Gorbachev put a vaguely worded referendum to the Soviet people on March 17, 1991. While
approximately 77% of those who voted endorsed the referendum for "preserv[ing] the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics,"
the significance of this result is limited. Most importantly, the voting was boycotted by six if
the fifteen Soviet republics, including each of the Baltic republics. See Cline, Gorbachev
Given a Partial Victory in Voting on Unity, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1991, at A4, col. 6.
74. On March 3, 1991, the citizens of Latvia and Estonia voted overwhelmingly in support of non-binding referendums calling for complete independence of their republics. In
Latvia, about 77% of the voters supported independence, while the corresponding figure in
Estonia was approximately 78%. See Dobbs, Latvians, Estonians Vote to Support Independence, Wash. Post, March 4, 1991, at A8, col. 3. In a similar referendum in Lithuania in
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In conjunction with the new Union Treaty, President Gorbachev
hopes to use his executive powers to stem the separatist tide in the republics. On December 25, 1990, the Soviet Parliament endorsed a plan
which expanded the President's authority. His new powers include the
ability to preside over the Federation Council, comprised of the leaders of
each of the republics."" The Federation Council has historically been a
weak body, but under the new plan it will possess broad powers to coordinate relations between Moscow and the republics, effectively making it
the most important decision-making body in the Soviet Union. 6 Through
the Federation Council, Gorbachev hopes to convince the Baltic leaders
that they have an effective voice in the government, and that they all
possess a shared set of interests. The Baltic states, however, have refused
to participate in the old Council except as observers, and it is likely they
will resist the new Council as well.
The Baltic states are aware that their independence will not come in
one drastic step, if it comes at all. Thus, these republics must first negotiate a radically different relationship with Moscow, a "special status" for
the republics. This could take the form of a confederal relationship much
like that envisioned by President Gorbachev, whereby the republics
would be provided more autonomy to create democratic institutions, a
multi-party system, and a market economy, while remaining subject to a
wide range of Soviet laws."
It is possible that the nationalist movements are too nationalistic,
that is, that they are prejudiced against non-Balts. Discrimination is undoubtedly taking place against the "imported," Russian-speaking minority in the Baltics.7 The suggestion has even been made that the "migrants" be paid to leave the region, an idea which has been strongly
79
disavowed by the Popular Fronts.

February 1991, about 90% of the voters supported independence. Id. The higher number in
Lithuania reflects the republic's comparatively higher ethnic homogeneity.
75. See Remnick, Soviets O.K. Expansion of Gorbachev's Authority, Boston Globe,
Dec. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 5. It is hoped that the new government framework will put an end to
the so-called "war of legislation" between the republics and Moscow, whereby the Kremlin
issues a law which is then declared null and void by the republican legislatures. For a discussion of the war of legislation, see When the Juggling Has to Stop, THE ECONOMIST, Nov.
24, 1990, at 47; What a Mess, supra note 71, at 60; Church, Time of Troubles, TIME, Nov.
12, 1990, at 44; Masters, Baltic Independence: A Dream Kept Fresh, Wash. Post, July 9,
1989, at A20, col. 1.
Despite prevailing on his plan for the Federation Council, Gorbachev did lose in an
attempt to create a presidential organ specifically designed to ensure that the republics
comply with Soviet laws. See Remnick, supra note 75, at 1, col. 5.
76. See, e.g., When the Juggling Has to Stop, supra note 75, at 41.
77. See, e.g., Lewis, The Estonian Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, at A19, col. 1. This is
not unprecedented. Some states in the U.S.S.R. already operate on a federalist basis, with
their local governments enjoying a great deal of autonomy. The Ukraine and Byelorussia, as
sovereign republics, are members of the United Nations. Mlechin, supra note 52, at 28.
78. For an argument that the Popular Fronts are not respecting the rights of non-Baits,
see Mlechin, supra note 9, at 30; Nelan, supra note 10, at 32-33.
79. Mlechin, supra note 9, at 31.
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The perceived prejudice of the Popular Fronts has led to the formation of "Russian" opposition groups called National Salvation Fronts, as
well as the International Movement (Intermovement) and the Council of
Work Collectives. These groups feel threatened by Baltic initiatives (e.g.,
national language and citizenship requirements), and have called on President Gorbachev to impose direct presidential rule on the republics.8 0
Some of the Popular Fronts' schemes do seem to promote discrimination
on the basis of nationality. Thus, there is a danger of not only the Soviet
Union being split on the basis of nationality, but the Baltic states as well.
Many observers believe that the nationalist movements cropping up
throughout the Soviet Union could bring about the demise of the Soviet
empire.8 ' One commentator has noted that, "if an empire is rated by its
control over far-flung peoples and territories, then the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet Union obviously signifies weakening central control."8'2 While predictions of the collapse of the Soviet Union appear to be
alarmist, it is clear that the central government must respond adequately
to its "nationalities" problem. President Gorbachev has acknowledged
that the nationalities problem is one of the "most fundamental and vital
issues" facing his country; however, the resurgent nationalism presents
him with a dilemma. The more he encourages glasnost and perestroika,
the greater the danger that ethnic aspirations will become uncontrollable.
Thus far, the situation in the Baltics has not erupted into ethnic violence and social anarchy; it has instead taken the form of peaceful protests and parliamentary debate.88 However, the Baltic people have become more assertive and radical in their positions. They now call for not
only more freedom from Moscow, but complete independence." There is
a real danger that an uncompromising line from the republics will inspire
a crackdown from Moscow, which has described recent events in the republics as a threat to "the very viability of the Baltic nations." 85
While acknowledging that his reforms have "brought to light a lot of
problems ... in interethnic relations," President Gorbachev "condemn[s]
attempts at artificial aggravation of these questions, and advancing ultimatum demands."8 6 There has been a noticeable shift to hard-line rheto-

80. See, e.g., id. at 33; Keller, supra note 64, at A4, col. 1; Keller, Lithuania Told to
Yield or Face Worse Hardship, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15 1991, at Al, col. 1.
81. With 15 republics (in addition to other "sub-republics") having conferred upon
themselves varying degrees of autonomy, it is apparent that the future Soviet Union will be
much different from that to which we have grown accustomed since World War II. For an
argument that the Soviet Union will not be able to hold onto all of it republics, see Nelan,
supra note 10, at 26; Lewis, Hold People Power, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1990, at A23, col. 1.
82. Schurman, Evil Empire May End in Ethnic Squabbling, Rocky Mtn. News, Oct.
19, 1989, at 47, col. 1.
83. See, e.g., Kohan, Cry Independence, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 28.
84. Fein, supra note 4, at A10, col. 1.
85. Dobbs, Estonia Voids Anti-Russian Voting Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1989, at A20,
col. 1.
86. The Cracks Within, supra note 38, at 46, 47.
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ric coming from the Kremlin, with Gorbachev, the head of the KGB, and
the commander of the Soviet
Baltic Fleet all warning of possibly further
87
bloodshed in the republics.
Warnings such as these have not gone completely unheeded in the
republics8s The independence movements have been relatively orderly
and democratic thus far. The Kremlin is attempting to alleviate the crisis
in the Baltics by appeasing the republics with more autonomy, while
warning them not to push too hard. However, these measures are only
short-term solutions; a new federal structure must be created if Moscow
is to maintain control over all of the republics.
V.

CONCLUSION

While certain developments reflect Soviet recognition of more autonomy for theBaltic republics, this does not mean that Moscow is willing to
accept their calls for self-determination. As Professor Nanda points out,
territory and resources constitute a state's power base, and it is unlikely
that a state will willingly part with any of them.8 9 The Baltics are an area
rich in agriculture and industry, and President Gorbachev will not let
them just leave the Soviet economy. Furthermore, allowing secession will
only promote the other nationalist movements in the Soviet Union, and
will probably mark the end of Gorbachev's rule.
Thus, while international law recognizes the right of the Baltic states
to self-determination, it is highly-unlikely that they will be able to fully
realize this right. Of course, nothing can be taken for granted in light of

87. See, e.g., Keller, Gorbachev Urged to Consider Crackdown in Republics, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1990, at A3, col. 3; Remnick, KGB Chief Says Soviets Must Prepare for
"Bloodshed," Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 1990, at 2, col. 1; Soviet Officer Warns of Force in
Baltics, Boston Globe, Dec. 27, 1990, at 18, col. 3. President Gorbachev recently stated that,
"where the situation becomes especially tense and there is a serious threat to the state and
people's welfare, I will have to introduce a state of emergency presidential rule." Keller,
supra note 87, at A3, col. 4. Comments such as these have increased fears of a return to
authoritarian rule in the Soviet Union, and prompted the resignation of Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze in protest.
A further indication that the Kremlin may be reverting to its old, hard-line policies is
President Gorbachev's recent suggestion that a Soviet law on freedom of the press be suspended. See, e.g., Fein, Gorbachev Urges Curb on Press Freedom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1991, at A4, col. 4. The policies of glasnost and perestroika have certainly suffered setbacks
recently, with the takeovers of Lithuanian and Latvian media centers, and the grossly inaccurate media coverage of the crackdown in those republics. See, e.g., id.; Clines, Curbs on
Soviet Press Hint at Retrenchment, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at A4, col. 1; Fein, Credibility, Too, Is a Victim of the Repression in Vilnius, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at A5, col. 1;
Whitney, Glasnost Not Public Accountability, Censorship on Baltic Troops Shows, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
88. In a possible response to the Kremlin's new hard line, the Lithuanian Parliament
recently dropped its demand for the signing of a protocol on the goals and conditions of its
negotiations with Moscow on Lithuanian independence, as a condition precedent to such
negotiations. See, e.g., Lithuania Eases Stand, Seeks New Talks With Soviets, Boston
Globe, Dec. 29, 1990, at 2, col. 5.
89. Nanda, supra note 20, at 263.
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the remarkable changes presently taking place in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. However, the Kremlin does have significant political and
economic pressures it can exert should it so desire. Furthermore, if the
Baltic states push too hard, too fast (i.e., by increasing violence in the
liberation movements), it is likely that Soviet -troops will continue to
crackdown in the republics.
Arguably, the economies of the Baltic republics are so intertwined
with the Soviet Union that it is not even possible for them to go it alone
at present. As the leader of the Estonian Green Movement has stated:
"We can decide to be separate and free, but what will we do the next
morning? Everything has been damaged by fifty years of Soviet administration. We have to reach a standard of living first that would make it
possible to raise the question of secession." 90 These sentiments are echoed
by an Estonian Front leader, who states: "[W]e must find a clever way to
coexist and create conditions which would make the Soviet Union interested in our independence."9 1 It remains unclear whether Gorbachev's recent initiatives will provide the framework necessary to appease all sides.
While they are Gorbachev's boldest initiatives to date with respect to the
republics, the Baltic states appear unwilling to accept them.
While many Western governments do not recognize the incorporation
of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, the republics should not expect too
much help from them. Most governments which have not recognized the
annexation of the Baltics (such as the United States) also have not recognized their declarations of independence.99 The West favors Gorbachev
and his reforms, and thus will avoid doing anything that will weaken him
domestically and give the hard-liners in the Kremlin reason to again seize
control.
Thus, it appears that at present, the Baltic states and the Soviet
Union will have to find a way to peacefully coexist. The best that the
Baltic people can hope for is a continued increase in political and economic autonomy, while remaining republics within the Soviet Union.
William C. Allison, V*

90. Kohan, supra note 79, at 31-32.
91. Id. at 32.
92. For a discussion of the dilemma faced by the United States and other governments,
see Lewis, Tough Choice for U.S.: Baltic States or Gorbachev, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1990, at
16, col. 1; Rosenthal, U.S. Softens Tone on Lithuania Issue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1990, at
Al, col. 7; Friedman, U.S. Is Artfully Silent on Oil Threats to Lithuania,N.Y. Times, Apr.
19, 1990, at A10, col. 1. The Baltic states have been disappointed by the muted response
from the West. During the oil pipeline crisis in Lithuania, Lithuanian President Vytautas
Landsbergis charged that the United States "sold us out" for higher interests. Lithuanian
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The Economic Evolution of Polish Joint
Venture Laws
I.

INTRODUCTION

Poland, perhaps more than any other Eastern bloc country, is undergoing a profound political and social revolution. In November and December of 1990, hotly contested presidential elections took place in which
Lech Walesa emerged the winner. One of the harshest political issues concerned Poland's economy. The initial reform plans to transform Poland's
state-run economy into a free market system implemented by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki proved to be inadequate and have thrown Poland into a state of disarray with high unemployment and a deep recession.' Due to the failure of this "shock therapy"2 approach to economic
reform, Prime Minister Mazowiecki lost his bid to become Poland's president in the November 1990 primary election. After this defeat, he resigned as Prime Minister.3 Political turmoil, however, continued after this
resignation. Because no candidate captured fifty percent of the popular
vote in the November election; the two leading candidates, Lech Walesa
and Stanislaw Tyminski were forced into a run-off election slated for December 9, 1990. In the run-off election, Walesa defeated Mr. Tyminski
4
and became Poland's first freely elected President in sixty-five years.
As stated previously, the economy was the major issue of this presidential election. During debates preceding the November 1990 election,
Lech Walesa attacked the "shock therapy" economic program and its policies as too slow. According to Walesa, acceleration of economic programs
was needed.5 Later, as the December run-off election grew closer, Walesa

1. Engelberg, Evolution in Europe: Premier in Poland Resigns as Voters Prefer Newcomer, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
2. "Shock therapy" is the name given to the radical economic reform program that
Tadeusz Mazowiecki put in place after he was appointed Prime Minister. The goal of the
plan was to transform the primarily centralized economy of Poland into an economy based
on free-market principles. This program included steps that would end subsidies, revise the
monetary and banking systems of Poland, and further privatize Polish enterprises. This
plan slowed down Poland's hyperinflation, stabilized the zloty exchange rates, and put consumer goods back in stores; a novelty that had not been seen in Poland in some time. However, the plan did have its drawbacks, such as unemployment. Engelberg, Evolution in Europe: Will Poles Scuttle Economic Plan?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1990, at A6, col. 4. Because
of the unemployment and various other side-effects associated with this ambitious economic
program, the populace of Poland, who expected greater change with the ideological change
in governments, voted against Prime Minister Mazowiecki as their next President. Engelberg, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Engelberg, PolandElects Walesa President in Landslide, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1990,
at A3, col. 1.
5. Engelberg, A Rough Campaign Closes in Poland, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1990, at A3,
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was more inclined to support Mazowiecki's embattled "shock therapy"
program, with certain corrections in economic areas such as agriculture,
unemployment policies, and shutdowns of inefficient enterprises. 6 Furthermore, after Walesa was declared the winner of the elections, it was
reported that he asked Prime Minister Mazowiecki to remain in power
until parliamentary elections in the spring of 1991. 7 It is thus apparent
that Lech Walesa will continue the initial groundwork set up by Prime
Minister Mazowiecki. If Walesa had chosen to completely revamp the
revolutionary economic reforms set up by Mozowiecki, it is not clear what
effect that would have had on direct foreign investment in Poland. By
maintaining this economic direction, however, future western investors
are better able to determine the costs and benefits of establishing a business in Poland. Thus, foreign investors can look to existing laws and predict how their investment will fare.
Poland has just completed its first free elections in sixty-eight years
and its citizens have viewed an openly harsh and antagonistic political
battle, but Poland is still faced with an economy in disarray. Although
inflation has been stymied by the "shock therapy" economic plan, there is
a huge amount of unemployment and Poland's foreign debt continues to
grow. 8 It is thus extremely important that Poland's fledgling government
continue its attempt to "kick-start" the economy and modernize its industries, while at the same time dealing with its people who have expected so much with the- advent of political revolution. Poland's people
have suffered greatly in the transition from a state-based to a market
economy.
Poland is still actively attempting to attract more investment by foreign businesses in order to facilitate its economic recovery and promote
economic growth. Over the years, there has been a steady expansion of
Polish investment opportunities for foreign investors, due to continued
relaxation of investment laws. Specifically, Poland is encouraging the formation of joint ventures. The most recent attempt to attract this type of
foreign investment is the December 23, 1988, law on Economic Activity
with the Participation of Foreign Parties.9 This law was amended in December of 1989. The amendments were designed to speed the development of a free-market economy and to make the zloty fully convertible.10

col. 1.
6. Engelberg, The World: Walesa's Victory Now Complicates Poland's Unease, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
7. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1990, at A3, col. 2.
8.. Currently, Poland's foreign debt is hovering around $38 billion. Dornberg, Poland's
Chancy Big Bang, INST'L INv., Feb. 1990, at 111.
9. The Law on Economic Activity with the Participationof Foreign Parties / The
Polish Foreign Investment Law / Warsaw December 1988 [hereinafter 1990 Law]. Because
this law was amended in December 1989, it has been re-titled the Polish Investment Law of
1990. Unless stated otherwise in this comment, I will refer to the original 1988 Law; as
amended in 1989, as the 1990 Law.
10. Gordon, The Polish Foreign Investment Law of 1990, 24 INT'L LAW. 335, 339 (1990).
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In addition, other changes to provisions that deal mainly with foreign
currency and taxation have been added." The 1988 Law and its 1989
amendments went into effect on January 1, 1990, and together they are
known as the 1990 Foreign Investment Law."2 This law, by replacing the
Polish Foreign Investment Law of April 23, 1986,"2 provides foreign investors with a greater opportunity to invest in joint ventures and have
greater management control over the joint venture operation. The remainder of this comment will address the 1990 Foreign Investment Law
as it marks the beginning of a new economic era that may provide the
solution to Poland's economic woes and provide support for continued
political and social reform.
A.

The Advantages of Joint Ventures

A joint venture is a partnership in which two or more firms create a
separate entity in order to carry out an economic activity where all partners take an active role in decision-making. 4 Joint ventures are one way
that Poland can accomplish its goals of a solid economy and freedom
from its foreign debt. The advantages of joint ventures to both foreign
investors and domestic partners from Eastern bloc countries are numerous. For foreign investors, the formation of a joint venture provides access
to new markets, reduced labor expenses, and the possibility of diminished
production costs. Thus, because production is local (i.e., Polish), the tariffs on what would have been imported goods are eliminated. Host governments may also provide tax exemptions for newly formed joint
ventures.'5
Joint ventures provide the domestic Polish partner with new technology, as well as "the introduction of modern management methods and
production techniques, including the training of domestic personnel for
managerial and technical positions.' 6 Also, through joint ventures, existing industries within the country San be modernized by western technology.' 7 Joint ventures can provide jobs and training for local workers as
well as an increase in worker productivity through the economization of
their collective manpower. The promotion of exports and expansion of
markets is, however, of primary importance to the domestic partner. This
is true because of the continuing deterioration of available convertible

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. THE LAW OF 23 APRIL 1986 ON COMPANIES WITH FOREIGN CAPITAL PARTICIPATION, 17
J. LAWS, Item 88 [hereinafter 1986 Law], reprinted in ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE,
EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES. ECONOMIC, BUSINESS, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS, U.N. Doc.

ECE/Trade/162,

U.N.

Sales

No.

E.88.II.E.18

(1988)

[hereinafter

EAST-WEST

JOINT

VENTURES].

14. EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES, supra note 13, at 1.
15. Id. at 3.

16. Scriven, Co-operation in East-West Trade: The Equity Joint Venture, 10
BUS. LAW. 105, 106-7 (1982).
17. Id.
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currency throughout CMEA countries. 18 Promotion of exports provides
the domestic partner with the necessary foreign capital and currency to
satisfy its foreign debts. 19
B.

History of Joint Venture Regulation in Poland

Joint venture regulation in Eastern Europe was enacted because of
the "desire to modernize and accelerate economic development.' 0 In an
effort to modernize and develop, these countries were forced to trade to
acquire capital goods, technology, and marketing and managerial skills.
Thus, joint ventures became the avenue by which Eastern European governments could generate exports, replenish
hard-currency reserves, mod2
ernize, and extinguish trade deficits. '
Beginning in 1976, Poland began to enact legislation directed toward
foreign-owned businesses in Poland. Although the 1976 regulations did
not specifically talk about joint ventures, Orders of the Minister of Finance "Concerning Permits of Foreign Exchange Operations by Mixed
Companies" were issued as the first cautious step toward greater foreign
investment in Poland.2 2 These regulations dealt with the financial aspects
of mixed capital joint ventures, including regulations on their establishment, operation, and dissolution.2 3 For the most part, these regulations
were generally geared toward attracting foreign individual investors of
Polish extraction. 4 Because these enactments were extremely narrow and
restrictive in permitted fields of activity, not to mention the fact that
businessmen disregarded their force and effect, the government replaced
these orders with more lenient provisions.2 '

18. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or COMECON, formed January 20, 1949.
Member countries include the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, the former German Democratic Republic, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia. Boukaouris,
Joint Ventures in the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Poland, 21 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 1,
7 n.32 (1989).
19. Scriven, supra note 16, at 107.
20. Buzescu, Joint-Ventures in Eastern Europe, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 407, 413 (1984).
21. Id.
22. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 7. See also Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, Poland's
New ForeignInvestment Regulations: An Added Dimension to East-West Industrial Cooperation, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17, 33 (1981); Scriven, Joint Ventures in Poland, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 424, 426-27 (1980); Rajski, Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Poland, YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 159, 160 (W. Butler ed. 1986) [hereinafter
YEARBOOK].

23. Scriven, supra note 22, at 426.
24. Id. The main goal of these regulations was to attract Polonian private investment.
A Polonian investor is described as a person of Polish origin who has "maintained .more or
less their links to the Polish nation and culture ...[and who have maintained] traditions
rooted in their Polish origin reveal[ing] interest in Polish culture and show[ing] an understanding for the Polish national interests." Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 8 n.40 citing M.
ARNOLDI, WESTERN INVESTMENT IN POLAND (1976-1986) 28 (1987) (unpublished thesis, available in Carleton University Library, Ottawa, Canada).
25. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 7; Jadach, Ownership and Investment in Poland, 18
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 63, 76 (1985)., Permitted fields of activity for joint ventures will be
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The Polish Foreign Investment Law of 197926 was enacted for the
purpose of defining a specific legal framework for joint ventures.2 This
resolution was quite detailed as to explicit regulation of spheres of activity, legal and organizational status, convertible currency requirements,
profits, taxes, employment, and relation of the joint venture to the national economic scheme. 28 With the multitude of rules and regulations
contained in secondary legislation, this resolution appeared to be too
complicated and restrictive. 29 Also, there were problem provisions that
limited both the life of the joint venture (to fifteen years) and profit
repatriation. 0
In response to the problems of the 1979 regulations, the July 6, 1982,
law on Principles of Carrying on Ecopomic Activity in Small Industry by
Foreign Corporate Bodies and Private Persons on the Territory of the
Polish People's Republic was enacted."1 The 1982 Law was directed toward both Polonian companies and small business venturds.3 2 This regulation, although specifically applicable to Polonian companies and small
business ventures, expanded the scope of foreign participation in the Polish economy. The most important factor of this limited law was that participation in the specified scope of activities could be in the form of joint
ventures or wholly owned foreign companies.3
Since the 1982 Law covered only small business ventures, there was a
need for regulation of large-scale investment. Hence, on April 23, 1986,
the law on Companies with Foreign Capital Participation was enacted.
This law was touted as the long-awaited act that would clearly define
"the rules which Polish and foreign entrepreneurs could follow to carry
out a joint economic activity on a large scale." 3" Although this law ameliorated a variety of problems, foreign investors still struggled with investment in Poland. In light of these concerns, on December 23, 1988, Poland's legislature enacted the law on Economic Activity with the
Participation of Foreign Partners. This law repealed the 1986 Law and
adhered to the demands of many foreign businesses. This law and later
amendments have made the establishment and maintenance of a joint
venture much easier. Moreover, the western partner has more control
over economic decisions and operations by having the possibility of majority ownership in the venture.

discussed later in the text. See generally infra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
26. Resolution No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 February 1979 [hereinafter 1979
Resolution].
27. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 9.
28. Scriven, supra note 22, at 428.
29. YEARBOOK, supra note 22, at 160.

30. See generally Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 9.
31. YEARBOOK, supra note 22, at 160-61, citing Dziennik Ustaw no. 19, item 146 (1982).
32. See generally supra note 24 on description of Polonian investors and companies.
33. Jadach, supra note 25, at 76.
34. Burzynski, The Polish Law of 1986 on Joint Ventures, 3 FLA. INT'L L. J. 51, 52

(1987).
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Poland's Future: What Role will Joint Ventures Play?

In the 1970's, CMEA countries realized that joint enterprises created
within CMEA countries with foreign capital contribution and with participation in management, would "promote the interests of both parties to
East-West co-operation."' 5 For Poland, joint ventures will be the key to
future economic success and political stability. This article will discuss
the important sections of the new 1990 joint venture law of Poland and
how it has evolved since its humble beginnings in 1976 and 1979. The
main goal of this section is to provide a historical background to the 1990
Law concerning joint ventures and to demonstrate that this evolution has
been a systematic and deliberate attempt by past and present Polish
leaders to cure the economic ills of the country while maintaining control
over the country. Notwithstanding present and radical political developments, the need for foreign investment in Poland has always been necessary and fundamental to economic recovery and growth.
The 1990 Foreign Investment Law continues the positive trend toward relaxation of regulations, so an attractive economic environment is
created for foreign investors. 36 Because the 1990 Law has made it easier
and more profitable for foreign investors to enter into joint ventures,
many foreign businesses have initiated talks about establishing joint ventures in Poland. These positive overtones by foreign businesses signal a
new era in Polish economic history that can be continued only if the Polish government realizes that as times continue to change, more reforms
will be necessary in order to insure economic growth and development.
Without foreign investment, however, Poland's new political and economic outlook will probably not survive its initial months of existence.3
II.
A.

CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF POLISH JOINT VENTURE LAWS

Allowable Scopes of Activity

Although the 1976 regulations were not directed entirely toward joint
ventures, the scope of allowable activities was quite narrow. The activities
were limited to crafts, retail trade, and catering, hotel, and other services. 3 Since the 1976 regulations offered no guidance as to what forms of
business organizations were permissible, foreign investors had to wait until 1979 to discover what joint venture activities were allowable.
In 1979, a formal legal framework was established that limited the
scope of activities to the "production of goods for domestic and export
markets along the same lines as regional industrial enterprises and coop-

35. Szasz, Legal Framework of the Economic and Foreign Trade System of Hungary
and Other CMEA Countries, 10 INrr'L Bus. L. 99, 103 (1982).
36. See generally Buzescu, supra note 20, at 415.
37. Moody, Mazowiecki Appeals to West to Turn Aid Promises into Action, Reuter
library Report, Oct. 19, 1989.
38. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 22, at 20.
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eratives." 39 Basically, this meant that joint ventures would be allowed in
"small down-stream ' 40 industries where advanced technology and labor
systems could be introduced and where the industries themselves were
dependent on Polish raw materials.' Such activities included food
processing, textiles, consumer durables, light engineering, agricultural
chemicals, plastics, and selected other technical enterprises.' 2 In order to
prevent the influx of capitalist ideals into the national economy, joint
ventures were not allowed in key national industries. Due to the limitations on permissible activities, the 1979 regulations failed to attract much
foreign investment.'3
New regulations, as promulgated by the 1982 Law, demonstrated
that Poland was adjusting to the influx of foreign investment. Hence, the
narrow restrictions of 1979 were relaxed to a certain extent. The limitations of this law were the production of commodities or granting of services, trade, and export of products or services;" however, this law only
covered small industries.
Amendments to large scale joint venture regulations did not appear
until the Polish Foreign Investment Law of 1986. These regulations
opened the door for companies with foreign capital participation to perform "any economic activity aimed at the production of goods and rendering of services beyond the sphere of small industry and banking . .
-45 Permits could not be granted to companies wishing to
establish joint ventures in certain economic areas. Thus, economic activities in defense fields, rail and air transport, communications, insurance,
publishing, and other activities involving foreign trade agencies were not
6
allowed unless there was a justifiable economic reason.4
The 1990 Foreign Investment Law is an attempt by the government
of Poland to consolidate all economic activity with foreign capital participation under one law in order to minimize administrative red tape. Economic activity is defined as "production, construction, trade and services
conducted for profit.' 7 Thus, almost any economic activity is allowable
subject to permit restrictions in article 6. The business activity may be
unjustified if state economic interests, state security and defense, state
secrets, or the environment are threatened.'6 Furthermore, although the
1982 law is still valid, pursuant to article 40 of the 1990 Law, companies
organized under the 1982 Law are permitted to reorganize themselves

39. Scriven, supra note 22, at 429.
40. Note, Joint Ventures in Poland:Polish ProposalsBefore the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. 377, 383 (1981).
41. Scriven, supra note 22, at 429.
42. Note, supra note 40, at 382; Scriven, supra note 22, at 429.
43. Note, supra note 40, at 382-83.
44. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 18.
45. Burzynski, supra note 34, at 53.
46. 1986 Law, supra note 13, art. 7,
1-2.
47. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 1, 1 2.
48. Id. art. 6, 1 1.
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4
pursuant to the provisions of the 1990 Law. 9

One of the major goals of the original 1988 Law was to increase the
privatization of Poland's state-controlled industries. To accomplish this
goal, Hubert Janizsewski, Vice-President of Poland's Foreign Investment
Agency, asked western accounting firms for their help on how to effectively make private certain key parts of Poland's economy. According to
Mr. Janizsewski, prime targets for privatization are Poland's shipyards
and other light industries." A total of 2,000 joint ventures have been approved so far and an anticipated 1,300 joint ventures between foreign investors and domestic firms will have been approved by the end of 1990.
This will result in a total investment of one billion U.S. dollars and will
further the goal of privatization. 1 Because of the 1990 Law, joint ventures have become a key instrument in Poland's privatization program.
Limitations on the scope of economic activities of companies with foreign
capital participation had to be reduced in order to promote this privatization program and further encourage foreign investment in Poland's beleaguered economy."2
B. Procedural Requirements to Establish a Company with Foreign
Capital Participation
The regulations of 1976 required that foreigners who were going to
undertake investment activities within Poland obtain permits. The permits were issued for a period of ten years but could be renewed after the
date of expiration.53 Pursuant to this regulation, permits for economic activity had to be obtained from the competent governmental unit within
the territory where the proposed activity was to take place. This governmental unit was known as the voivodship.5' The 1976 regulations were at
best scant in describing the procedural requirements for joint ventures.
Thus, the 1979 Resolution was needed in order to set out the procedural
criteria.
Since the 1979 Resolution specifically stated that only state enterprises and cooperatives were authorized to enter into joint venture contracts, the Polish participants in the joint venture process were required
to obtain the proper permit.5 5 Permits were granted on the basis of an
application submitted by the heads of the participating organization.
This application was accompanied by a statement from a relevant foreign

49. Id. art. 40, 1.
50. Poland Sees Western Firms Investing A Billion Dollars, Reuters Money Report,
Sept. 19, 1989.
51. Polish PrivatizationContinues as Cabinet Prepares to Consider Securities Market
Bill, 7 Int'l Trade Rep.(BNA), No. 40, at 1551 (Oct. 10, 1990).
52. Reuters, supra at 50.
53. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 22, at 21.
54. Id. Poland is divided into 49 voivodships, each of which acts within its territory
much like the administrative organs of any government.
55. Id. at 33.
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trade organization, stating whether the joint venture would export its
product to convertible currency markets.5 6 The permit was then issued by
57
the appropriate minister or other governmental organization.
Under the 1982 Law, a permit application had to be submitted
jointly by the partners.5 8 The application contained: the purpose of formation, scope of economic activity, possible employment scheme, amount
of capital invested by each partner, and location of the enterprise. 59
When an application was completed, a founding deposit was required
from the partners. This was designed to prevent unlawful speculation and
misrepresentation in order to gain a quick profit. Finally, the permit was
issued by the local Polish administrative authority at the voivodship.Y°
The application requirements were basically the same for a permit
issued under the 1986 Law, with the exception that if a company wished
to engage in foreign trade, the application had to include a request for a
foreign trade license.6 Unfortunately, this is where the similarities ended.
Pursuant to the 1986 Law, the only parties entitled to participate in joint
ventures were state enterprises, cooperatives, scientific institutions, and
commercial companies.62 Thus, as with the 1979 regulations, these entities, in their status as a partner, were required to finalize a permit.6" The
permit application included drafts of the articles of incorporation, a costbenefit analysis to establish the probable success of the proposed company, and documentation regarding the legal and financial status of the
prospective partner.6 4 Once filed, the permit was granted at the central
level by the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation "acting in agreement with the Minister of Finance and other authorities."6 5 After a permit was granted, the enterprise was obligated to register it "according to
rules applicable to the commercial register."6 6
The complex application process is simplified in the 1990 Law. Most
notably, the new law greatly expands the provisions regarding partnership participation. The parties now entitled to participate in joint ventures include the Treasury, other legal persons established under Polish
law, and most importantly, natural persons domiciled in Poland.6 7 All
these parties must stil meet the application requirements.
An application requires basically the same information as that re-

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.
Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 22-23.
Burzynski, supra note 34, at 55.

62. 1986 Law, supra note 13, art. 3,

1.

63. Burzynski, supra note 34, at 55.

64. Id.
65. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 22.
66. 1986 Law, supra note 13, art. 12, 1 1.
67. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 3, 1.
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quired under the 1986 Law. 8 The application must contain information
about the necessary funds required by a company to commence business.69 The application should also contain a draft of the company's
founding act, documentary evidence of the legal status and financial condition of prospective shareholders, and a feasibility study of the proposed
company."' This differs from the 1986 Law since a company is no longer
required to show the legal status of a prospective shareholder, or establish
the probable success of the venture. It is preferable, however, that this
documentation be included to assure approval of the venture. The documents themselves can be submitted in a foreign language, as long as there
are certified copies in Polish. 71 The decision regarding the permit will be
made within two months from the date of filing, as compared to three
months under the 1986 Law. 7' Registration requirements after permit approval are the same as in the 1986 Law.
Permits are to be issued whenever the business activity ensures introduction of modern technologies and management methods into the national economy; provision of goods and services for export; improvement
in the supply of modern and high quality products and services to the
73
domestic market; and protection of the environment.
It is apparent that applications under the 1990 Law are geared toward easing the red tape of the approval process. By giving natural persons the right to participate in joint ventures, the foreign investor has
greater freedom to structure the transactions. 4 Also, a participating Polish person has the opportunity to invest in a "free market system." By
allowing natural persons the right to participate in joint ventures, Poland
may be able to influence Poles who have saved as much as five to ten
billion U.S. dollars, and other hard currencies, to invest in Polish businesses.7" Furthermore, with the eased application and permit process,
many small industry investors may be induced to invest. Assuming, of
course, they are offered the same protections guaranteed to large-scale
investors, and they are spared the hassle and expense of feasibility studies and paperwork.
There is a possible downside to these relaxed requirements. Without
a feasibility study or a legal and financial status requirement, persons
who approve such joint ventures are handicapped in their decision mak-

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

4, art. 5,
10, 1.
10, 2.
10, 1 3.

72. Id. art. 10, V 4;

4.

EAST-WEST JOINT VENTURES,

supra note 13, at 41.

73. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 5, 2.
74. Compare Jadach, supra note 25, at 80. According to Jadach, this was a problem
with prior joint venture legislation in Poland. The usurpation of ownership rights that occurred under provisions of old joint venture legislation are substantially eliminated by the
1990 Law.
75. Shares, Helping the East Without Busting the Budget, Bus. WK., Oct. 2, 1989, at
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ing because they lack pertinent information. No large company will enter
Poland without first determining whether-there are potential profits to be
made; smaller companies that can not afford feasibility studies are entering Poland blind. Thus, these studies, like the cost-benefit analysis requirement of the 1986 Law, force a future investor to investigate rather
than speculate whether a particular venture will succeed. Finally, permit
approval persons or committees had more pertinent information under
the old regulations, and therefore, they were in a better position to judge
the substance and validity of future joint ventures.
C. The Legal Status and Position of Joint Ventures Within the Polish
Economy
1.

Business Organization Form of the Joint Venture

Although the 1976 regulations were not specific as to what forms of
business organizations were permissible, the 1979 Resolution stated that
joint ventures were to be organized as limited liability companies under
the still existing provisions of the pre-revolutionary Commercial Code of
1934.78 Thus, provisions in the Commercial Code concerning limited liability companies were mandatory with respect to the formation of the
company, its activities, and its termination. 7 The 1982 Law, on the other
hand, introduced the concept of joint stock companies. This new regulation allowed individual Polish citizens and other legal entities, not within
the socialist sector of the economy, to participate in joint ventures with
foreign partners.7 s
The 1986 Law also followed the 1934 provisions of the Commercial
Code. The 1986 Law, however, stated that companies with foreign capital
participation acted as either limited liability companies or joint stock
companies.7 9 Both forms enjoyed corporate status and partners were liable for company obligations only to the extent of their assets within the
company.8 0 These provisions of the 1986 Law are essentially the same
under the 1990 Law, except that article 2 of the law provides that the
contribution of foreign partners may not be less than twenty percent of
the company's total equity.8 1
2.

Position of the Joint Venture within Poland's Economy

Historically, joint ventures have not played an essential role in Poland's basic economic planning. The foreign investment regulations of
1976, and the further clarifications for joint ventures in the 1979 resolu-

76. Scriven, supra note 22, at 429.
77. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 22, at 38.
78. Buzescu, supra note 20, at 416.
79. Burzynski, supra note 34, at 54.
80. Id.
81. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 2, 1 1. See generally infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
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tion, attempted to place the activities of joint ventures within the national plan by specific regulation.2 Joint ventures were placed in the national economic plan in such a way that they were considered outside and
independent from the goals and plans of the various ministers and industrial associations. These ministers and industrial associations decided
what was important for the state economy at any given time. 8 Thus, pursuant to the 1979 Resolution, after an application was filed by the Polish
partner, the joint venture could be exempted from certain production restrictions and requirements. Because the scope of allowable activities was
so narrow under the 1979 Resolution, joint ventures had very little impact
on national economic plans. Furthermore, Polish economic planners were
not keen on including capitalist forms of business in their plans for Poland's socialist economy."
Enterprises created under the 1982 Law concerning small industry
were not subject to the requirements of economic planning. 5 Owners or
shareholders of companies made decisions concerning business activities
based on what was set forth in their operative permit. 81 The undertaking
of a new activity beyond that provided for in the operative permit required an additional "special" permit. Also, an augmentation of business
activity required that the company acquire an enlargement of the original
permit.8
The 1986 and 1990 Laws themselves do not differ greatly. Due to the
increased scope of joint venture activity, however, joint ventures can no
longer be considered an independent area of Poland's national economy.
Both laws place joint ventures on a level equal with the large economic
organizations in Poland (i.e., state enterprises and cooperatives).8 8 Under
the 1986 Law, joint ventures enjoyed rights that were denied to state organizations. Specifically, various rules and procedures related to obtaining
raw materials and other indispensable production materials were waived
for joint ventures.8 Under the 1990 Law, joint ventures must procure
these items just as any other socialized economic entity.' Favorable
treatment in this specific area no longer exists. Under the 1986 and 1990
laws, joint ventures continue to have the right to lease land for the duration of the company's life.8 1
With the advent of certain aspects of a free market economy within
Poland and an attempt by the government to privatize certain state-con-
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83.
84.
85.
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87.
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Scriven, supra note 22, at 433.
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trolled industries, it is hard to envision that joint ventures can be treated
favorably or referred to by Polish planners as solely an independent economic area, separate from national economic goals and planning. Since
joint ventures are allowed in almost any area of the Polish economy and
since they will be invaluable to future growth and modernization, economic policy must begin to reflect the joint venture as an integral part of
the Polish economy.
D. Capitalization, Ownership, Other Financial Requirements, and
Profits
1. Initial Capitalization of the Joint Venture Operation
Prior to 1979, minimum capitalization was not required in order to
form a wholly-owned foreign company in Poland. After passage of the
1979 Resolution, the minimum investment to form a joint venture was
fixed at five million zlotys.2 This minimum amount could not be decreased during the life of the company; 9 the foreign investor was required to obtain at least four shares of the company; and the shares had
to have a par value not less than 250,000 zlotys." ' Thus, the foreign participant had to invest at least 30,000 U.S. dollars, which represented
twenty percent of the minimum capitalization necessary to commence a
joint venture.95 The foreign investor, however, could only invest and own
up to forty-nine percent of the total equity of the venture. The Polish
participants had to own at least fifty-one percent of the venture's
equity."
The 1982 Law regarding small industry was a radical departure from
previous regulations. This law allowed for 100 percent foreign ownership
in cases "substantiated by economic or social reasons. '97 The effect of
this enactment was a large increase in the number of joint ventures
formed in the area of small industry.9 8
The 1986 Law, unlike its predecessors, did not have a minimum capitalization requirement. But, just as with the 1979 Resolution, the foreign
investor could neither contribute more than forty-nine percent of the capital nor own a majority of the equity in the joint venture.9 9 The Minister
of Foreign Economic Cooperation could, however, grant exemptions to
92. Scriven, supra note 22, at 429.
93. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 22, at 39.
94. At the time, 250,000 zlotys was approximately $7,500. Recently, of course, the zloty
has lost a considerable amount of its value. See generally infra note 102 and accompanying
text. Scriven, Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 633, 643-44 (1980); Scriven, supra note 22, at 429; Burzynski & Juergensmeyer,
supra note 22, at 39.
95. Scriven, supra note 22, at 429.
96. Id.

97. Buzescu, supra note 20, at 421.
98. Id.
99. Burzynski, supra note 34, at 52.
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this rule if certain criteria were met. An exemption could be granted if
the case was economically justified, if it did not threaten state secrets, or
if the Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation acted in accordance
with the particular Minister concerned. 100
Under the 1990 Law, minority ownership by a foreign investor is no
longer a requirement. The foreign partner can own the entire operation;
however, the 1990 Law requires that foreign partners contribute at least
twenty percent of the equity upon formation of the joint venture. 1 ' The
total value of foreign investor contributions cannot be less than twentyfive million zlotys (about 2,600 U.S. dollars at the effective date of the
1990 Law)1"' in order to insure a serious commitment. 0 3 This amount is
adjusted pursuant to changes in currency exchange rates.104 These less
restrictive ownership and capital contribution regulations were passed by
the Polish legislature after it was found that the 1986 Law did not completely succeed in attracting investment which might bring needed technology and managerial know-how to Poland.' 5 Furthermore, by placing a
limitation on the amount of allowed ownership, reinvestment in the venture was impossible after the limitation level was reached. Thus, this
money would be treated as profits and taxed at a higher rate than retained earnings.'", These less restrictive regulations lend themselves to
foreign investment since investors not only have greater control over their
investment, but are also allowed to reinvest profits back into the enterprise thereby continuing the enterprise's expansion and growth. Furthermore, the possibility of majority ownership gives the investor the opportunity to watch over and control major aspects of the operation. With this
security, investors will be more willing to invest more money, technology,
and other necessary tools. This in turn, will help Poland escape the dark
shadows of debt and inflation.
2.

Capital Contribution and its Valuation

Allowable contributions of capital in Poland include cash, tangible
assets such as machinery and property, and intangible assets such as patents and trademarks.' In this section, the discussion will center upon
valuation of non-cash assets such as tangible and intangible goods.
Under the 1979 Resolution, at least fifty percent of all contributions
100. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 30.
101. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 2,
1.
102. Gordon, supra note 10, at 349.
103. Id.
104. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 16, 1 4. In fact, in 1989, the solidarity-led government
of Poland introduced radical economic reforms that were specifically geared to, among other
things, turning the Polish zloty into a convertible currency. Poland Seeks Radical Reforms,
The Den. Post, Dec. 18, 1989, at 1. These reforms, although not very successful in some
areas, have helped to stabilize zloty exchange rates. See generally Engelberg, supra at 2.
105. Fulton, Reassessing the Polish Market, Bus. AM., Sept. 26, 1988, at 16.
106. Scriven, supra note 16, at 108.
107. Buzescu, supra note 20, at 422.
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by the foreign investor had to be in the form of monetary contributions.
Under certain exceptional circumstances, this rule could be modified. 108
Valuation in Polish zlotys of non-monetary capital assets was performed
by outside experts.10 9 Value was based on prices of the contributed assets
in the country of origin and, therefore, the valuation depended on the
existing zloty exchange rate. The whole process was further complicated
by the fact that there was no evaluation methodology provided for in the
regulations. Hence, a whole transaction was subject to disruption if there
was an unanticipated valuation. 1 0 Consequently, foreign investors had
difficulty valuing their contributed assets at a premium price.1 '
The 1982 Law required that the minimum foreign investment contribution could not be less than the minimum founding deposit. However,
just as the regulations of 1979, it contained
no set procedures regarding
1
the valuation of non-monetary assets. 2
The 1986 Law stated that there were only two kinds of allowable contributions; contributions in cash or in-kind. In-kind contributions consisted of equipment, raw materials, patents, and other rights. 13 In-kind
contributions by foreign partners were required to be transferred from
abroad or acquired in Polish zlotys obtained from a documented exchange of foreign currency."" Polish partners could only contribute inkind." 5 Finally, valuation of in-kind assets was to be determined by the
partners in the contract, subject to possible verification by independent
experts if the permit granting body requested an investigation.1 6
The 1990 Law is premised upon the same in-kind cash distinction as
that in the 1986 Law; however, there are some differences. Article 16, paragraph 3, provides for contribution by foreign partners who have their
headquarters in a CMEA member country. In accordance with binding
agreements, these partners can contribute in transferable roubles or in
the national currency of their countries."' Polish parties may contribute
in zlotys, foreign currency, or in-kind. Also, state-owned real estate may
be contributed to the extent allowed by the administrator of state land."'
Once again, valuation is left to the partners, subject to possible verification by the authority issuing the permit."'
The relaxation on possible contributions by foreign investors and Polish partners continues the overall positive goal of promoting investment
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in Poland. Since natural Polish citizens are entitled to participate, they
are also entitled to contribute their foreign currency. Thus, by promoting
local investments, there is an opportunity for Poland to recover some of
the money it has lost to foreign banks.
3.

Other Financial Aspects

The 1976 regulations concerning wholly owned foreign businesses
contained few limitations on the financial aspects of joint ventures. A potential investor was forced to wait until 1979 to determine what was financially necessary to do business as a joint venture.
First, the 1979 Resolution required that all financial operations of
joint ventures on the domestic Polish market be conducted in zlotys. 2 '
Thus, the books of the joint venture were to be maintained in zlotys. Second, the joint venture was to establish an amortization, risk, and reserve
fund. 2' The function of the amortization fund was to "refund the use of
machinery or equipment during the joint venture production process. "122
Thus, as machinery depreciated each year, money was contributed to the
fund for the purpose of refund and future investment. 12 The risk fund
was created for the purpose of covering losses and as a guarantee for the
joint venture's debts. It was established from contribution made by the
joint venture in its first year of activity. Later, the amount contributed
was twenty-five percent of before-tax profit, up to ten percent of the
value of the fixed assets and reserves of the company. 24 The reserve fund
was used both to cover losses if the risk fund was expended and to
purchase necessary assets for the joint venture. The reserve fund could
also provide compensation to workers for work related accidents and diseases. ' If the reserve fund and the risk fund did not completely cover
losses of the joint venture, the parties to the venture were required to
cover the 26difference proportionately to their contributed share in the joint
venture.
Pursuant to the 1979 Resolution, the joint venture could open zloty
and foreign exchange accounts in the Polish National Bank. The foreign
exchange account could be used to buy goods and services connected with
business operations and as a depository for fifty percent of foreign exchange proceeds from exports. 2 7 The other fifty percent had to be transferred to the zloty account or used to buy goods and services in connection with the joint venture.' 28
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The 1982 Law provided for the creation of a social and housing fund
but lacked a provision for a reserve fund. The founding deposit requirement was deemed to be the source of all funds needed to protect the
business."2 9
The 1986 Law required a reserve fund to cover possible losses. The
required contribution was ten percent of net profits each year. Those contributions ended once the fund had reached four percent of annual operating costs.'3 0 The joint venture was further required to sell fifteen to
twenty-five percent of its foreign currency proceeds to the State; however,
in economically justified cases, this requirement could be waived. 1 1 The
amount of foreign currency proceeds that had to be sold was established
by the operating permit. After that requirement was met, the company
could use the remaining money as it saw fit."' The company had to deposit its foreign and Polish currency into a Polish foreign exchange account. The company could also deposit this currency in a foreign bank if
it obtained permission from a Polish bank.' 3 ' Finally, each year, a company was subject to an audit by the Minister of Finance. The share of
profit transferable abroad was that shown as the audited profit in the
company's annual report."'
The 1990 Law is substantially different from the 1986 Law. First, the
company is required to have a reserve fund. The necessary contribution
to this fund is eight percent of after-tax profit. This requirement ceases
after the fund reaches four percent of the company's costs in a fiscal
year." 35 The Minister of Finance must still audit the accounting books
and records of the company. Financial statements must be prepared
within two months of the end of the fiscal year with signatures from all
members of the board. These statements must be filed with the "registration court" and the government within two weeks.'" If the Minister of
Finance fails to audit the balance sheet or notify the company of any
objections to the balance sheet within three months, the balance sheet is
considered audited. If there are objections, they must be complied with
before the balance sheet is considered audited." 7
Under the 1990 Law, the joint venture is required to sell fifteen percent of its foreign currency export proceeds to a Polish foreign exchange
bank. In economically justified cases, this requirement may be set at a
lower rate by the President of the Foreign Investment Agency. Proceeds
from the sale of replaced fixed assets are exempt from this require-
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ment.3 s After all financial requirements are satisfied, the company may
use the balance of its proceeds to purchase necessary goods and services.' The 1989 amendments impose new restrictions on the availability
of foreign currency for purchasers abroad. Consequently, if a joint venture finds itself in need of an essential item that is only available outside
of Poland, it is possible that Polish hard currency reserves will be
unavailable. 4 0
Under the 1988 Law, a joint venture could open a bank account in
the Polish foreign exchange bank of its choice. Just as in the 1986 Law,
after obtaining a foreign exchange permit, the joint venture company
could also maintain accounts in foreign banks."' Under the 1989 amendments, joint ventures can maintain foreign currency accounts in foreign
banks but there are no provisions regarding foreign currency accounts in
Poland. According to one author, this problem may be eliminated by the
Foreign Currency Law, enacted in December 1989.142 Under the 1990
Law, joint ventures may secure foreign loans without a foreign exchange
43
permit.1
After an application is submitted to the Minister of Finance, the
minister can issue a guarantee to shareholders that compensation payment will be made in the event of a loss resulting from a decision of State
authorities such as nationalization or expropriation. 14 This guarantee
only applies to expropriations that are nondiscriminatory (i.e., equal application to all foreign property) and expropriations that are made in the
interest of the public. 4"
4.

Profits

Repatriation of profits is of fundamental importance to the foreign
investor. Pursuant to the 1979 Resolution, profits could be repatriated
only if the joint venture had convertible currency available for this purpose. 41 Polish authorities, however, guaranteed foreign partners that requisite permits for remission of convertible currency would be issued.
Thus, when there was not enough convertible currency available to pay a
foreign partners' share of the profits, the Ministry or the Board of Directors of the Central Federation of Cooperatives would be under an obliga-

138. Id. art. 19, V 1.
139. Id. 7 2.
140. The amendments of December 1989 put limits on the amount of foreign currency
that may be used abroad for the purchase of necessary items. Gordon, supra note 10, at 353.
Thus, it is incumbent on the investor to take these stumbling blocks into account and to
have alternative plans available for the acquisition of necessary goods in case just such a
situation arises.
141. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 22, 111-3.
142. Gordon, supra note 10, at 350.
143. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 22, $ 4.
144. Id. 115-6.
145. Gordon, supra note 10, at 351.
146. Scriven, supra note 94, at 648.
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tion to provide adequate amounts of currency. 14 7
This requirement prompted the change in the 1979 Resolution, which
stressed export production activities. Such activities generated sufficient
convertible currency funds to pay foreign investors their share of the
profits." 8 The Resolution provided no limitation as to the amount of
profit that could be made."" On the other hand, the 1982 Law limited the
amount of profit that could be transferred abroad to no more than fifty
percent of the net income realized in the previous year. Again, the Ministry of Finance could waive this requirement under certain justifiable
circumstances. 50
For purposes of determining profit, the operating costs of the company include "depreciation of fixed assets and non-material values, computed in accordance with depreciation rates and principles provided for
state enterprises."' 51 This is in keeping with the 1986 Law. The company's profit was that which remained after income tax was deducted.
This money was distributed to the partners in proportion to their interest
in the company. 52 The foreign currency profit was that which resulted
from "the excess or export earnings over import outlays in the previous
accounting year, remaining after the resale provided for in article
21 . . . . "I The foreign currency profit could be distributed to the partners in proportion to their participation, and foreign partners could
transfer their shares abroad without a separate foreign exchange permit." ' The earned money could also be reinvested in the company to increase the company's initial capital, as long as an appropriate permit was
issued and the equity participation of the Polish partner remained at or
above fifty-one percent. 155
The initial 1988 Law concerning the company's profit was similar to
the 1986 Law. For example, the same distribution scheme applied. 15 6 Pursuant to article 20 of the 1988 Law, a company could distribute profit in
foreign currency if its export surplus exceeds its import outlays. A separate foreign exchange permit was not required. A separate permit was
also not required for a foreign partner to transfer profit abroad. A Polish
partner had the right to put his foreign currency profit in a foreign currency account with a Polish bank. A foreign partner could use his zloty
profit in Polish domestic markets without restriction, but the purchase of
real estate required a separate foreign exchange permit." Since there was
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no restriction on equity participation, a foreign investor could reinvest
into the company. The company's equity could be increased without a
permit if there was no change in the ratio of the partners' equity holdings
as set forth in the permit of establishment. If the ratio was changed due
to reinvestment, a new permit was required. 58
Free transfer of profits abroad is still allowed under the 1989 amendments. Pursuant to these amendments however, joint ventures must now
resell 100 percent of their foreign currency profits to a Polish foreign exchange bank. The joint venture may then repurchase the permissible
amount of hard currency. 59 Foreign partners are allowed to purchase a
restricted amount of foreign currency. 16 0 They can purchase, however, as
much as is initially allowed to be freely transferred abroad without obtaining further government consent. This amount is reduced by the aggregate amount of foreign currency that the company's foreign employees
choose to convert from their wages.' 6
Under the initial 1988 Law, foreign investors could transfer their
earned profit abroad with ease. Now, there are procedural requirements
that must be fulfilled. These requirements should not greatly affect foreign investment. The requirements are new guidelines that the Polish
government is imposing in order to stabilize and "solidify" Polish currency. It is still possible to invest in almost every aspect of the economy
without fear of bureaucratic red tape. Although it may be more difficult
to liberate profits now, this problem should be overcome in the near
future.
E.

Employment and Management

Principles concerning the employment and management of joint ventures were set down first in the 1979 Resolution. Pursuant to these regulations, employees of the joint venture were to receive those benefits that
were accorded Polish citizens in the same branch of industry. Foreign
personnel were exempted from the taxes collected, as well as from making
contributions to retirement funds.' The managerial board member who
controlled the activity of the venture had to be a Polish citizen. This requirement was purposefully worded in a vague manner in order to insure
that foreign personnel could hold certain key positions, while the Polish

158. Id. art. 21, 1.
159. Gordon, supra note 10, at 351.
160. The foreign partner is allowed to transfer abroad its entire share of the profit. This
amount however, has been explicitly restricted to a certain amount of foreign currency. The
joint venture, according to the 1989 amendments, must sell all export proceeds to a Polish
foreign currency bank. The foreign partner is entitled to purchase in hard currency its proportional share (as determined by ownership interest in the joint venture) of export surplus
that represents profits. Furthermore, the foreign partner is entitled to purchase fifteen percent of the remaining profits in hard currency. Id. at 351-352.
161. Id.
162. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 22, at 47.
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general manager could deal with domestic problems and governmental
matters. The arrangements made in the joint venture agreement regarding managerial roles were usually binding so that the foreign investor
6s
could maintain some semblance of order.
Under the 1982 Law, majority foreign ownership was allowed, and
the inherent problems of management could be alleviated. However, if
the company was mixed there had to be agreement among the parties
concerning management.1 6 4 Companies were also required to use Polish
labor resources according to the principles set forth by the Council of
Ministers. Additionally, if Polish labor was utilized, Polish labor requirements had to be met.16 5
The 1986 Law also required the company's manager to be a Polish
citizen who permanently resided in Poland. The law included provisions
for a supervisory board and labor representation on the company's
board.166 The framework of management was determined by the initial
contract agreed upon by the parties. 67 Employment of Polish citizens was
governed by applicable Polish law. Furthermore, the 1986 Law required
that foreign workers be used only when their special qualifications required their use and that the local state administrative authority must
approve such employment.'6 8 Polish employees were to be paid in zlotys
while foreign employees could receive fifty percent of their wages in foreign currency.6 "
Since the 1990 Law contains no provision regarding foreign minority
ownership, there are no requirements regarding the management of the
joint venture. Thus, partners to joint ventures are free to organize the
operation as they please and foreign investors can maintain control over
the governing board to insure that their policies are implemented and
followed. Employment of both Polish workers and foreign workers must
meet the same standards as those enumerated in the 1986 Law.17 0 Procedures for paying employees are set forth in the Company's founding act.
Salaries for company employees shall be set and paid in zlotys. Under the
initial 1988 Law, foreign persons could be partially paid in foreign currency from the foreign currency reserves of the company. As a result of
the most recent amendments, all wages must now be paid only in zlotys. " ' This remuneration of foreign employees is subject to a thirty per-

163. Scriven, supra note 22, at 432.
164. Boukaouris, supra note 18, at 39.
165. Id. at 43.
166. Id. at 39-40; 1986 Law, supra note 13, arts. 17-18.
167. 1986 Law, supra note 13, art. 16.
168. Id. art. 32, 1 1-3.
169. Id. art. 33, 1 1-3.
170. 1990 Law, supra note 9, art. 31, T1 1-3.
171. Id. art. 32, T 1-3. Under the 1989 amendments, technically, foreign employees will
be paid in zlotys. These employees can then choose to convert wages paid in zlotys to foreign currency. The amount purchased by these employees results in a reduction of the
amount of foreign currency the foreign partner is able to transfer abroad. Gordon, supra
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cent tax in the foreign currency, unless international agreements with Poland exist to the contrary. Polish citizens are subject to taxes that are
applicable to employees of non-socialized entities. " 2
F.

Taxation

Joint ventures established pursuant to the 1979 Resolution were subject to Polish tax laws. For the first three years of operation the joint
venture was exempt from taxation. 178 After that period, taxes levied upon
enterprises having majority state ownership consisted of a four percent
turnover tax and a five percent tax for the rendering of non-contracting
services. 17 With majority ownership vested in a Polish socialized enterprise, the company was also subject to an income tax of sixty-five percent.
This could be modified by the Minister of Finance under justifiable economic circumstances. "' Profits paid to foreign investors were subject to a
thirty percent lump sum tax. As with every other regulation, this could be
reduced in economically justified cases upon application to the Minister
of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy.17 6 Double taxation treaties did
and continue to exist between Poland and other countries concerning taxation problems in the area of profit repatriation. A foreign investor must
be aware of these treaties and their ramifications for existing or future
investments.' 7
Under the 1982 Law, joint ventures had to pay taxes at a rate which
varied depending on the profitability of the operation in a given year. The
venture also had to pay a turnover tax, an urban property tax and a social
insurance tax. A three year tax exemption was provided for in the Law. " 8
This exemption was conditioned upon the fact that one-third of the income earned during a specified period had to be reinvested into the operations of the venture. 79 In this event, fifty percent of the investment
180
value was deductible.
The burdensome quality of the 1982 Law was its treatment of personal income tax. Pursuant to 1983 Polish tax law regulations, foreign
investors' personal income was subject to an eighty-five percent tax rate.
Thus, potential investors were significantly deterred from investing in various small Polish industries."''
Under the 1986 Law, joint venture companies paid the same basic
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taxes as any other state enterprise. Companies with foreign capital participation, however, paid a fifty percent tax on their gross income. For every
one percent of export value of production or services sold, there was a 0.4
percent reduction in tax."8 2 Contrary to previous legislation, the joint venture enjoyed a two year tax holiday. Money earmarked for investment by
the joint venture and import duties on in-kind contribution by the foreign partner were granted tax exemptions under this law. 83
Under the 1990 Law, the joint venture is required to pay the same
basic taxes as under the 1986 Law. The corporate income tax rate, however, is only forty percent and there are allowable deductions. These deductions consist of investment outlays and donations for socially beneficial purposes, as long as the donations do not exceed ten percent of
income. The 0.4 percent deduction rate continues to exist, but the income
tax can only be decreased by ten percent.'84 The joint venture is exempt
from taxation for three years and an additional period of up to three
years may be granted if the venture engages in work in the preferred sectors of the economy as determined by the Council of Ministers.'8 5 Foreign
shareholders are subject to an income tax of thirty percent, unless an international agreement provides otherwise. The tax must be paid in zlotys
from a documented exchange of foreign currency. 86 Finally, Polish custom duties usually levied upon the in-kind contributions of shareholders
will be waived, as will other duties levied upon other types of contributions required for business activities. 8 '
Through these revamped tax provisions, Poland is attempting to attract more overall foreign investment, but these provisions are also geared
toward investment in special areas of the Polish economy. Consequently,
Poland has provided for three year tax exemptions as well as the possibility of continued exemption pending approval of the Council of Ministers
for select investment areas. These tax benefits, coupled with other reforms, can be used to attract investments geared toward revitalizing and
modernizing uncompetetive Polish industries such as data processing,
telecommunications, pollution control, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and foodprocessing machinery.8 8 These areas are of great concern in
Poland. Without these basic industries and services in a semi-modern
state, further foreign investments will be hindered.
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Dissolution

The 1979 Resolution provided that joint ventures could last for a period of fifteen years. This time period could always be extended. Other
provisions regarding the termination of the joint venture were left to the
partners to decide in their agreement. If the venture terminated because
of the passage of time the fixed assets of the venture became the property
of the Polish partner unless there was an agreement to the contrary. The
existing assets were to be divided proportionately according to the partners' respective shares. Foreign partners were given the right to repatriate
their share.'8 9
The 1982 Law provided for a life expectancy period of twenty years
(or forty years depending on depreciation values). This period could be
extended. Among other things, the Polish partner had a right of preemption to buy what was left of the operation upon liquidation of the
venture.190
The 1986 Law required that the permit state the expected duration
of the company's activities. The Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation could accept or deny the time period at his discretion. When a company dissolved, the assets were to be sold in compliance with the 1934
Commercial Code of Poland. What remained after satisfaction of creditors was divided among the partners in proportion to their initial contributed capital. Polish partners had priority to buy the rights and other assets that belonged to the company. Finally, the foreign partners could
transfer abroad that which they received after dissolution. 1 '
Like the 1986 Law, the 1990 Law provides for the preemptive rights
of the Polish shareholder and other dissolution procedures. The 1990 Law
differs from the 1986 Law on only one point. Under the 1990 Law, if the
company dissolves within the three year tax exemption period, the company will be liable for the unpaid taxes of that period. 9" This law places
foreign investors in a precarious situation. They must make an effort to
keep the joint venture operation alive for at least three years. This enables the Polish economy to readjust and adapt to new and different investments. Attempts by the foreign investor to make quick profits will be
deterred, thereby emphasizing quality foreign investment. Poland may
reap the benefits'of a foreign company insight and knowledge thereby
furthering the goal of a stable and modernized economic system that is
adaptable to the fast-paced world of today.

III. CONCLUSION
Recently, a 525 room hotel was completed in Warsaw. This is no or-
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dinary hotel. It is the product of a Polish-American-Austrian joint venture, including Marriot Hotels and LOT, Poland's national airline. 9 3 Although this joint venture was formed under the 1986 Law, it is a
testimony of Poland's commitment to future economic revitalization and
industrial modernization. The opening of this hotel symbolized to foreign
investors that Poland was a worthwhile gamble. This joint venture represented to the outside world that Poland can and will complete large-scale
productions. In fact, many foreign companies have entered into, or are
planning to enter into, joint ventures with Polish companies because of
the 1988 Law. As Poland attempts to reach further goals by enacting new
amendments to these rules and regulations, foreign investment will
increase.
Many companies are looking to Poland as a new market of 38 million
possible customers. These companies include Today Home Entertainment, which has formed a joint venture in Poland effectively breaking the
long-standing monopoly that the Polish state had over all matters relating to the film industry. The entertainment field will be freed from state
control and allowed to produce quality domestic entertainment.' Chase
Enterprises has also formed a joint venture with a Polish company which
will bring cable television to many residents of Poland. 95
Further liberalization of Polish foreign investment laws is intended.
This will include provisions for extended tax exemptions, majority ownership, and expanded scope of activities. There is hardly any reason why
further investment will not occur. The only possible hindrances to expanded investment in Poland are the current political situation throughout Eastern Europe, and other basic logistical problems within Poland.
Radical political changes tend to undermine foreign investor confidence
in the stability of Poland. The acquisition of goods necessary for produc96
tion within Poland may be hindered by a lack of availability.'
Poland's movement toward a freer form of government and an open
economic system tends to lessen investors' fears. These changes also show
Poland's commitment to furthering a free market system and providing a
financial environment geared toward stable and profitable investment. 9 '

193. U.S., Warsaw Agree to Begin Talks on Pact for U.S. Investment in Poland, [Regulation, Economics and Law] Daily Report for Executives, (BNA) No. 182, at A-15 (Sept.
21, 1989).
194. Today Home Entertainment Establishes First Private Film and Commercial Enterprise Company in Eastern Europe, Bus. WIRE, July 7, 1989.
195. Hershey, Polish TV Joint Venture for Chase Enterprises, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1989, at D2, col. 5.
196. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 347. Even though Poland is attempting to shed its
centrally planned economy, it is possible that certain aspects of this system will still be in
effect until a better system of organization can be formed and arranged. Thus, logistically,
certain key items might not always be available. This is something that potential investors
must provide for in their basic business plans when they decide to enter into joint ventures
within Poland. Id.
197. Poland's Future: Poland Ventures Forth into a Free Market Economy, Rocky
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Recent foreign investment led by West German joint ventures, merit the
conclusion that Poland is on the right track. At the very least, Poland has
learned from past experiences and past mistakes. Because Poland has a
valid investment law in place that has endured the recent internal political changes in Poland, foreign investors' fears associated with revolutionary political changes are diminishing.
Finally, Poland has a well trained work force and possesses many of
the needed raw materials that can help facilitate production. Poland has
geared its future toward foreign investment. This is the only way Poland
can escape many of its economic woes. Joint ventures are and will continue to be the key to Poland's continued economic recovery. These operations will provide Poland with the requisite technology and expertise
that will enable domestic businesses to modernize, revitalize communication networks, and create substantial revenues to pull itself out of possible economic ruin.
Polish leaders of today seem to realize that this is only the first wave
of reforms needed on the long road to recovery. The Poles will have to
work with new problems that arise everyday and continue to use outside
help and technology to provide solutions to these dilemmas.
Matthew W. Sanidas*

Mtn. News, Dec. 17, 1989, at 79, col. 1.
* I would like to thank Mr. Bazyli Samojlik, Chief of the Economic Counselor Office,
Economic Counselor-Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of the Polish People's Republic and Ms. Anna Janowska, Public Affairs Officer for the Polish Mission to the United
Nations for all their help in gathering valuable and up-to-date materials.
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REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES, edited by Ved P. Nanda, Greenwood Press (1989); ISBN 0313-26870-3, 209 pp.
Refugee Law and Policy: Internationaland U.S. Responses is a collection of concise essays exploring a wide range of issues relating to a
major global problem (i.e., the creation and treatment of refugees). The
book accepts as its point of departure the post World War II definition of
refugee embodied in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,1
but also discusses other classes of displaced persons and documents the
need to expand upon that definition to include these classes. Topics span
international, national, state, and local issues. They focus on root causes,
including interventionist policies, deterrence of refugee generating conduct, responsibilities of receiving country governments, sanctuary, and
the roles of non-governmental organizations. Some essays address issues
that are very broad in scope, such as the relationship between ethics and
government policy; others address narrower issues, such as the treatment
of deposed dictators. The unifying approach to this collection is the focus
on human rights, human needs, and humanitarian concerns in all of the
contributions.
A unique contribution that this book makes to the literature on refugees is its interdisciplinary approach to the subject matter. The book not
only contains essays written by eminent international legal scholars such as Ved Nanda and Richard Falk - and practicing attorneys, but
* Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law.
1. Entered into force April 22, 1954, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No.6577, 189 U.N.T.S.
137. The convention defines a refugee as a person who has a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, [and] is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Id. art.1.
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also essays by authors who are scholars or practitioners in other ethical
and social science disciplines. The varied non-legal professions represented include political scientists, directors of state refugee/migrant programs, human rights activists, international studies scholars, and theologians. Because of this combination, the book as a whole does achieve its
stated objective of analyzing refugee problems from legal, political, economic, and social perspectives.
Refugee Law and Policy is divided into five major parts. Parts I and
V are both written by the book's editor, Ved Nanda, which adds to the
collection's unity. In Part I, Nanda gives a summary of the origin, nature,
and extent of the post World War II refugee problem and briefly describes the major international legal doctrines and treaties which relate to
the treatment of refugees. He also draws attention to the root causes of
refugee flows which is an important theme that runs throughout the book.
Part II focuses on a variety of issues relating to international responses to the plight of refugees. One author explores the topic of deterrence of refugee generating conduct through the development of standards for compensation, criminal liability, and orderly departure. Another
outlines a framework for advocating protection of aliens through the use
of both human rights and humanitarian law, with special attention being
given to the principle of non-refoulement. A third author raises issues
relating to the moral foundations of the political order using as his vehicle a discussion of deposed dictators as a limited class of refugees. Conflicting trends among France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
European Economic Community in West European treatment of refugees
are also explored; the effect of non-legal factors on legal enforcement and
interpretation is a highlight of this exploration.
Part III consists of five chapters which generally address issues relating to the U.S. responses to refugee problems. One chapter looks at the
general political issues involved in immigration law and policy, including
the distinction between asylum and refugee applicants; the impact of the
lessening of super power tensions; the need to eliminate causes for fear;
and the links between refugee issues, foreign policy, economic assistance,
and global economic relations. Another focuses more narrowly on the issue of whether U.S. courts have undermined Congressional intent in their
interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980. Two chapters focus on U.S.
responses to Central American Refugees - particularly from Guatemala
and El Salvador - and to African refugees; the latter chapter also contains useful information about the overall African refugee situation and
international efforts in general. The final chapter in this Part addresses
issues related to state, specifically Colorado, governmental formulation
and implementation of refugee policy.
Part IV explores the roles of citizens and church related groups in
responding to the refugee crisis. One particularly intriguing discussion in
this Part is the exploration of the realistic relationship between ethics,
morality, and foreign policy. It contains some pragmatic suggestions regarding ways in which citizens' groups can use the media to publicize
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their views on peace and justice issues. Part IV concludes with an essay
on the sanctuary movement, particularly as it relates to Guatemalan and
El Salvadoran refugees.
The final Part of the book summarizes the complex challenges involved in averting refugee flows, providing effective protection to refugees
and providing durable solutions to the refugee crisis. It acknowledges the
need for responses at all levels of society and specifically suggests a
framework for responses at the international and national levels. It highlights the necessity for widespread dissemination of information as well as
useful roles for non-governmental organizations.
The individual essays in this collection are compact discussions and
succinct impressions of different aspects of the global refugee problem.
They whet the reader's appetite for more details. Therefore, an important
contribution of the book is the reference to additional materials contained in the endnotes to each chapter and in the Selected Bibliography
compiled at the end of the book.
Collectively, the essays in Refugee Law and Policy provide a good
overview and introduction to the issues, laws, and policies involved in the
treatment of the global refugee crisis. It provides a body of background
information and sets forth probing questions which must be answered if
viable short and long term solutions to this complex problem are to be
fashioned. Additionally, it advocates solutions, or at least a framework for
solutions, which are grounded in a concern for fundamental human rights
and human needs.
Refugee Law and Policy is a very readable interdisciplinary exploration of the refugee crisis. It should not only prove useful to lawyers, policy makers, and professionals working on refugee issues, but also to any
citizen who wishes to become more informed about a major global problem which will continue to affect everyone.

BOOK NOTES

EWING, GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN
BRITAIN; Oxford University Press, Cary, N.C. (1990); $52.00; ISBN 0-19-

825413-X; 305pp; Index and bibliography.
This book presents a critical view of the Thatcher government. The
authors discuss their opinion regarding the decline of political freedom in
Britain in the 1980's. They question the power the police and courts have
been using to "curb political dissent, subversion, and extremism."
S.H., LEGAL SYSTEM OF IRAQ; Royston Publishers, Glasgow, Scotland (1990); ISBN 0-946706-32-8; 62 6pp; Index and bibliography.
This book is part of a series devoted to the legal systems of various
Muslim countries. The book is written for the reader who is just beginning to learn about Arabic or Iraqi law. This volume concentrates on a
comprehensive study of the Iraqi legal system as a whole.
AMIN,

Edited by Werner F. Ebke
and Joseph J. Norton; Vertag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, Heidelberg
(1990); ISBN 3-8005-1046-4; 470pp; Collection of essays.
This book is a collection of 23 essays in honor of Sir Joseph Gold's
77th birthday. The essays cover the range of Sir Joseph's academic and
professional interests. The book includes such subjects as: Sovereign Immunity, Common Roots of European Accounting Law, Mexican Private
International Law, and several essays discussing the International Monetary Fund.
FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD;

Two

EEC
Edited by K: Lenaerts; Kluwer Law
and Taxation Publishers, The Netherlands (1988); ISBN 90-6439-541-1;
89pp.
This book is a record of the proceedings of the "Commemorative
Day" organized on March 27, 1987, on the 200th anniversary of the signing of the U.S. Constitution and the 30th anniversary of the signing of the
European Economic Community. The Commemorative Day focused on
the constitutional and political model of federalism in the U.S. and the
EEC.
HUNDRED YEARS OF U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THIRTY YEARS OF

TREATY: OUTLOOK FOR A COMPARISON;
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ISNEBERGH, JOSEPH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN

TAXPAYERS

AND FOREIGN

INCOME; Vol. I & II; Little, Brown and Company,

Boston, Mass. (1990); $225.00; ISBN 0-316-43285-7; Vol. I, 635pp; Vol. II,
780pp; Tables, index in vol. II.
This is a two volume set of books examining how the U.S. income tax
system is applied to transactions that have an international element. The
set is divided into four sections: Elements of International Taxation; U.S.
Taxation of Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corporations; U.S. Taxation
of Foreign Income; and Income Tax Treaties.
Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, Mass. (1990); $125.00; ISBN 0-316-54515-5;
75 2 pp; Bibliography, tables, and index.
This book explores the policy objectives of economic sanctions and
the underlying statutory authorities available. The book details current
economic sanctions programs of the U.S. against Central America, South
Africa, and Libya as well as embargo controls against Cuba and East
Asia. The book also investigates the limitations on the use of sanctions
and their effectiveness.
MALLOY, MICHAEL P, ECONOMIC SANCTION AND U.S. TRADE;

INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION; Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, Mass. (1991); $125.00; ISBN 0-316-71441-0;
799pp; Bibliography, tables and index.
This book focuses on deregulation of the London Securities Market
in the 1980's and the investor protection regulation that followed. The
book examines the responses of the major European countries to deregulation. The author concludes that deregulation has been a catalyst for creating a world wide system of competitive markets.
POSER, NORMAN,

Edited by
Yash H. Ghai; Institute of Pacific States, University of the South Pacific
(1988); $14.00; ISBN 982-02-0049-0; 393pp; Tables and index.
This paperback book focuses on the constitutional and governmental
systems of the independent Pacific island states. The author examines
the constitutional growth in the economic and political systems of the
states.
LAW, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLAND STATES;

GHAI, AND COTTRELL, HEADS OF STATE IN THE PACIFIC:
STITUTIONAL ANALYSIS;

A

LEGAL AND CON-

Institute of Pacific States, University of the South

Pacific (1990); $14.00; ISBN 982-02-0017-2;

2 6

1 pp; Appendixes, tables,

and index.
This paperback book analyzes the constitutional provisions relating
to the leaders of certain Pacific island states including Fiji, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
and Western Samoa. The authors strive to establish the political context
in which these leaders operate. The authors believe it would be valuable
to read this book in conjunction with Law, Politics and Government in

the Pacific Island States cited above.
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GHAI, ET. AL., PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT IN SMALL STATES;

Institute of Pacific States, University of the South Pacific (1990); $12.00;
ISBN 982-02-0018-0; 257pp; Index.
This paperback book examines the problems faced by small states in
the South Pacific and the role of the Public Administrator in dealing with
these problems. The topics discussed include health administration, communication policy, dealing with foreign investors, and land management.
ALFRED K, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: CAN
CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM COEXIST?; Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT

Ho,

(1990); $42.95; ISBN 0-275-93433-0; 184pp; Appendixes, bibliography,
and index.
This book examines six aspects of joint ventures in China. The author begins with an historical analysis of how joint ventures emerged as
economic reform, and then goes on to explain how this reform became
part of local legislation. Next the author describes the procedure for establishing a joint venture in China and discusses successful joint ventures. The Tiananmen Square incident and its impact on government policy are also evaluated. Finally the author provides an outlook on the
investment environment and how joint ventures effect the chinese
economy.

